University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

12-2004

The Quality of Black Legislative Life: Perceptions of Black and
White City Councilors at the Beginning of the New Millennium
Gregory Glen Neddenriep
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss

Recommended Citation
Neddenriep, Gregory Glen, "The Quality of Black Legislative Life: Perceptions of Black and White City
Councilors at the Beginning of the New Millennium. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2004.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/6608

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Gregory Glen Neddenriep entitled "The Quality
of Black Legislative Life: Perceptions of Black and White City Councilors at the Beginning of the
New Millennium." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and
content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.
Anthony Nownes, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Michael G. Johnson, Daniel Lipinski, William Lyons
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Gregory Glen Neddenriep
entitled "The Quality of Black Legislative Life: Perceptions of Black and White
City Councilors at the Beginning of the New Millennium." · I have examined the
final paper copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it
be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Anthony Nownes, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
d its
ance:
and
�l

C

��V--

JtLL/;!F
Vice Provost an
Studies

THE QUALITY OF BLACK LEGISLATIVE LIFE:
PERCEPTIONS OF BLACK AND WHITE CITY COUNCILORS
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Gregory Glen Neddenriep
December 2004

Copyright© 2004 by Gregory Glen Neddenriep
All rights reserved.

ii

- DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my friend and mentor, Dr. Lawrence Golden,
who showed me that one person can make a difference.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have incurred many professional debts during the course of this research that I
cannot begin to repay. I wish to thank first, and foremost, my committee chair,
Anthony Nownes. Through his direction, I not only completed this project, but
also established a research program that will allow me to advance in my
professional career.

I would also like to thank Michael G. Johnson, Daniel

Lipinski, and William Lyons for their invaluable comments and for serving as
committee members.
Like any piece of "original" research, my study owes a great intellectual
debt to persons other than myself. In this respect, I wish to acknowledge the
contribution of James Button, David Hedge, and Mary Spear who developed the
concept "quality of black legislative life" and who provided me with a copy of their
survey instrument. Their groundbreaking effort made it possible for me to extend
their work from state legislatures to city councils.
My gratitude also goes to the scholars with whom I consulted about
various aspects of this project. I am grateful to Richard C. Feiock, Timothy B.
Krebs, Susan MacManus, John P. Pelissero, and Susan Welch for their advice
about data collection issues. I am especially grateful to Susan MacManus and
the International City/County Management Association for providing me with data
from the IMCA's 2001 Municipal Form of Government Survey, which I used to
supplement my dataset.

I also owe a tremendous debt to my friend and

colleague, Christopher Cooper, who read parts of my manuscript, served as a
sounding-board for my ideas, referred me to relevant literature, and consulted
iv

with me about statistics. His efforts clearly went above and beyond the call of
duty and were vital to the completion of this project. I also wish to extend my
appreciation to my roommate-for-a-month, Greg Ryan, who helped me stamp
and stuff envelopes (I apologize for the paper cuts and the dry tongue).
I would also like to thank the patrons who made this research possible
through their financial contributions.

First, I am indebted to the University of

Tennessee's Political Science Department for making funds available to me
through the Jay Young Dissertation Fellowship Award. I am also grateful to my
parents, Gary and Marcia Neddenriep, who not only provided me with
encouragement, but also subsidized much of my data collection expenses.
I am sincerely grateful to my wife, Christine, for her constant support and
strength, without which my accomplishments would be inconceivable.
Finally, I wish to extend my deepest appreciation to the city councilors
and municipal clerks who participated in my research and provided me with a
wealth of information. Without their valuable insights and generous assistance, I
could not have completed this project.

V

ABSTRACT

Although scholars have become increasingly interested in the black legislative
experience, they have largely overlooked black city councilors and the
environment in which they serve. I utilize two nation-wide surveys to address this
gap in the literature. I sent one survey to black city councilors in 2002 and the
other to their white counterparts in 2003. The two instruments were similar in
content and question wording so that I could compare the two groups in terms of
their perceptions and personal profiles.
My data show that the two sets of councilors generally have similar
backgrounds. and profiles. However, their perceptions of the black legislative
experience are fundamentally different. White councilors overwhelmingly say
that their black colleagues' experiences are positive and, only on rare occasions,
do they identify discrimination or report that race relations are impaired. Many
black councilors concur with this assessment, but statistically significant
differences still remain between the two groups. Blacks tend to be more cynical
than whites about their legislative experience, and they are more likely identify
racial barriers that encumber their progress.

Race seems to be the primary

explanation for the perceptual gap since the differences remain when I control for
alternate factors using bivariate crosstabulations.
Finally, I relied on dichotomous logistic regression with robust standard
errors to explain the variance in how the black councilors assess the quality of
their legislative experience. My analysis shows that contextual factors are more
meaningful than individual-level factors.
vi

Gender, ideology, and perhaps

education, are the only two individual-level variables that seem to matter.
However, a host of contextual variables are significantly related to at least some
aspect of the black legislative experience.

The most important of these

contextual variables are the municipality's electoral format (at-large vs. wards)
and the quality of race relations within the city council.

vii
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 began a new era of political empowerment for
blacks by eradicating the system of intertwining barriers that effectively deprived
them of the franchise.

The Act, unlike its emasculate predecessors, was

effective because it gave the federal government, not the states, the authority to
enforce its provisions and it did away with the requirement that forced aggrieved
parties to sue on a case-by-case basis to obtain relief (Davidson 1992). As a
result, it sparked a dramatic increase in black voting in the Deep South (Albritton
et al. 1996) and facilitated the creation of majority-minority districts that allowed
blacks to elect representatives of their choice to legislative bodies (Lublin 1997).
Not surprisingly, these trends produced an increase in the number of black
lawmakers at all levels of government, which in turn, allowed them to play a more
important role in legislative politics (Cf., Walters and Smith 1999: 29).
These developments in the law and the political changes that ensued
provided students of racial politics with an abundance of new research topics.
Initially, most studies either overtly or subtly extolled the value of descriptive
representation and focused on ways to encourage the election of black leaders.
Thus, the first generation of studies identified aspects of a municipality's
governmental structure that either helped or hindered the election of blacks.
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Some scholars, for example, examined whether black representation on city
councils was influenced by staggered terms (Bullock and MacManus 1987) the
number of available seats (Alozie and Manganaro 1993; Brouthers and McClure
1985; Taebel 1978), and the percentage of blacks in the electorate (Burns 2003).
More frequently, however, they debated whether at-large districting formats in
local elections were a subtle, discriminatory barrier that thwarted black
representation that would have been achieved under a ward system (MacManus
1978; Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel 1978; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982; Welch
1990; Zax 1990).
The second generation of research was no longer preoccupied with these
questions because Voting Rights Act litigation (or the threat of it) prompted many
municipalities to abandon their at-large formats in favor of ward-based or mixed
systems. Thus, researchers turned their attention to different questions as they
came to realize that studying the link between districting systems and descriptive
representation was a moot point. As an alternative, they began inquiring about
the goals that the new officials hoped to accomplish (Hamm, Harmel, and
Thompson 1983), and whether black lawmakers in Congress and state
legislatures could deliver policy benefits to their constituents (Cameron, Epstein,
O' Halloran 1996; Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1984; Epstein and O'Halloran
1999; Sharpe and Garand 2001; Whitby 1987). I n short, the recent literature
assumes that the descriptive representation of black lawmakers is assured, but it
questions whether the mere presence of black lawmakers within legislative
2

bodies yields substantive representation. In other words, scholars have realized
that it is a empty accomplishment for black lawmakers to win a seat at the table if
they cannot translate their electoral victories into policy benefits for their black
constituents.
Despite the groundbreaking nature of these works, we still know relatively
little about the about extent to which black lawmakers have been accepted by
their white counterparts and whether they are satisfied with their new careers
(Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). Similarly, scholars have yet to adequately
assess the role blacks play in legislatures, the barriers they face, and their ability
to accomplish important policy objectives (Button and Hedge 1996).

In sum,

researchers have just begun to document the progress that these individuals
have made within legislative bodies, and this gap is especially pronounced when
the legislature at issue is a city council. Unlike the first generation of research,
the newer scholarship narrowly focuses on either Congress or state legislatures
while largely ignoring these issues in the local context.

Overview of My Research

Although my study falls squarely within the second generation of research, it
makes a unique contribution by examining the experiences of local black
lawmakers.

My work is clearly exploratory and it has a strong descriptive

element to it because virtually nothing is known about this topic. This noticeable
gap in the literature enhances my study's value; however, it also prevented me
3

from formulating a testable theory that explains the legislative experiences of

local black lawmakers. I did not borrow a theory from a more developed body of
literature because none was a good analytical fit. The only relevant framework is

what Lani Guinier (1994: 43) labels the "Black Electoral Success Theory," which,

despite its name, does not qualify as a theory in the scientific sense.1 This

framework, discussed in Chapter Two, is the conventional wisdom that civil rights
activists use to explain how and why the election of black officials is

advantageous for black citizens and their interests. Therefore, I use my findings

to critique this conventional wisdom, but doing so should not be mistaken for the
rigorous falsification process described by philosophers of science (e.g., Popper
1968).

Most practitioners agree that explanation and prediction are the

paramount goals of the social sciences.

Rather than focusing on thick

description, social scientists try to develop theories that systematically account

for events and relationships in the social world-i.e., they try to make causal

inferences that apply in many settings. Accordingly, the absence of theory in my

work is a recognizable limitation, but this does not imply that my research is
inconsequential or unscientific.

Description remains important because it

1

According to Harry Eckstein (1975: 86), "hard" theory described by philosophers
of science has four defining characteristics. First, the theory's concepts must be
precisely defined. Second, researchers must use these concepts to formulate a
deductive set of propositions. Third, the propositions must be logically consistent
and correspond to empirical observations. Finally, the propositions must be
falsefiable.
4

facilitates the development of testable theories (Hult, Walcott, and Weko 1999),
especially when information on a topic is scarce. As one well-known source put
it, "Description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before we
know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of
what characteristics" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 34).
My primary objective is to describe the quality of legislative life
experienced by black lawmakers who serve on mixed-race city councils. The
concept "quality of black legislative life," broadly defined, refers to how satisfied
and successful black lawmakers are within their respective councils. My thesis is
that individual and contextual differences explain the variance in the black
councilors' perceptions.
I utilized two nation-wide surveys (discussed in Chapter Four) to generate
data for my study. I sent one survey to black city councilors and the other to their
white counterparts. The two instruments were similar in content and question
wording so that I could compare the two groups in terms of their perceptions and
personal profiles. The national coverage of the surveys was especially desirable
because it allowed me to make broad generalizations that were not limited to
particular municipalities.

Likewise, ,I found a comparative approach to be

advantageous because it allowed me to look at the black legislative experience
from two very different perspectives-a black one and white one. In the end, this
approach yielded two large datasets that greatly enh�nce our understanding of
black legislative life at the local level of government.
5

The I mportance of My Research

Why Study the Black Legislative Experience?

My research is relevant to current policy discussions involving civil rights

and minority empowerment.

To date, policymakers have ensured minority

representation by creating legislative districts with sufficiently large minority

populations so as to virtually guarantee the election of a minority candidate.

However, both courts and scholars have criticized this approach on a number of

different grounds. The Supreme Court has been suspicious of majority-minority
districts with unusual shapes (Shaw v. Reno 1993), and it is now applying strict

scrutiny to any districting arrangement where race was predominant factor in its

creation (Miller v. Johnson 1995). In contrast, some scholars denounce majority

minority districts because they are poorly suited for delivering substantive
benefits to minority groups. Some critics point out that concentrating minority
populations in minority-majority districts only dilutes the minority group's
influence in the adjacent d istricts (Cameron, Epstein, and O' Halloran 1996;

Overby and Cosgrove 1996).

Similarly, Swain (1993) questions whether

majority-minority districts encourage lawmakers to be more responsive to
minority concerns. Relying on Richard Fenno's famous "soaking and poking"

strategy, she observed that black members of Congress from majority-minority

districts were no more inclined to represent black interests than their
counterparts from majority-white districts with sizeable black populations.
6

Aside from issues surrounding majority-minority districts, the study of the
black legislative experience is important because it is linked to the substantive
representation of minority interests. Guinier (1994) makes a powerful argu ment
that civil rights activists place too much emphasis on black electoral success and
have forgotten the more pressing objective of securing policy benefits for black
citizens. · In her opinion, it is a superficial achievement for blacks to win
descriptive representation, but fail to achieve substantive representation because
the individuals they elect were unable to place issues on the agenda or influence
policy outcomes. For this to happen, blacks must be fully integrated into the
legislative process and be viewed as equals by their white counterparts
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984 ). Therefore, a direct relationship may exist
between the quality of black legislative life and the delivery of helpful policies
intended to improve the lives of black citizens.
An indirect relationship may also exist between the quality of black
legislative life and the substantive representation of black interests. A hostile
legislative environment (signified by a poor legislative experience) may prompt
black lawmakers to leave office sooner because it makes public service less
desirable. Granted, there is very little empirical evidence directly on point, but
there is still good reason to believe that this argument holds true. For one thing,
it is based on powerful intuitive logic. Likewise, we do know that political conflict
is related to psychological burnout and the voluntary turnover among city
managers (Kaatz, French, and Prentiss-Cooper 1999).
7

Hence, it seems

plausible that the unpleasantness associated with racial tensions might also
prompt city councilors to leave office sooner. In fact, councilors have even less

incentive to remain in such an environment since they receive only modest

compensation for their services and they generally hold their jobs on a part-time
basis (MacManus 1999; Lascher 1993).

If a hostile environment encourages black councilors to leave office

sooner, these individuals may never realize their full potential as lawmakers.

Turnover may prevent black lawmakers from becoming experts in a narrow policy
area (Nelson 1991) and undermine their ability to secure important committee

assignments that are based on seniority. It may also prevent them from forging
friendships that may enhance their effectiveness.

For instance, the length of

tenure in office has been linked to the formation of interpersonal friendships
among legislators (Patterson 1959).

These interpersonal ties translate into

support for policies since pairs of lawmakers who consider themselves to be

friends tend to have a higher level of agreement in their roll-call voting (Arnold ,
Deen, and Patterson 2000).

Hidden Aspects of Legislative Life

Most scholars study substantive representation by analyzing how

lawmakers cast their roll-call votes at the state and national levels of government.

This strategy is practical because the data is readily available and researchers

can use quantitative statistics in their analyses. Even so, Richard L. Hall makes
8

a compelling argument that studying roll-call votes overlooks important aspects
of the legislative process. He reasons that "floor voting is only one and probably
not the most important form of participation in the legislative process" (1996: 2).
Instead, he points out that members influence policy by building coalitions,
drafting amendments, planning strategy, and persuading colleagues to adopt
legislation ( See also, Bratton and Haynie 1999: 660-61 ).
My study follows Hall's lead �nd has the potential to reveal events that
take place behind the scenes in city councils.

The barriers that black city

councilors face are likely to be subtle and their career satisfaction is probably
related to their informal interactions with white lawmakers. Thus, open-ended
items in my questionnaire expose what is occurring in the less visible aspects of
the local legislative process by inviting respondents to describe discrimination
that they had experienced or observed. Therefore, I make a unique contribution
by illuminating how councilors interact in intimate legislative settings.

Why Study City Councils and Local Lawmakers?

In 1957, Lawrence J.R. Herson authored a provocative piece in the
American Political Science Review titled ''The Lost World of Municipal

Government." In his article, he lamented the state of the local politics literature
and challenged political scientists to conduct systematic studies of municipal
government rather than emphasizing its administrative aspects. Many scholars
rose to the task and the local literature, as a whole, is now empirically rich.
9

Regrettably, the same cannot be said for the city council literature, where ·

scholars have concentrated on a few key issues (e.g., whether at-large districting

arrangements thwart minority representation) while largely ignoring others.
other

Scholars may disregard city councils because they are less powerful than
legislative bodies

such

as

Congress.

However,

doing so is

counterproductive because local governments and their institutional subparts are
important in their own right!

Local governments are primarily responsible for

financing and delivering vital services-police, fire, garbage, streets, and parks

that have a substantial impact on the daily lives of citizens (Hofferbert and
Sharkansky 1971; MacManus 1999).

Moreover, in recent years, municipal

governments "have been elevated to a new status in the American federal

system due to devolution of federal and state responsibilities to the local level

and the widespread recognition that they are the governments most capable of
innovative behavior'' (Ihrke, Proctor, and Gabris 2003: 79). Local governments

are considered "laboratories" where reforms are tested and improved before they

are put into practice at the state and national levels of government (Gabris et al.

2000). Therefore, by implication, city councils and the lawmakers who serve on

them play an integral role in American politics because they make critical

decisions about local policies.

Scholars also neglect city councils because studying them is d ifficult.

Data availability is a perennial problem.

Archival sources specifying each

municipality's governmental structure are outdated and incomplete; and, in many
10

places, it is difficult to obtain meticulous records of roll-call votes or minutes from
council meetings. This problem is compounded by the fact that city councils, on
average, have only six members serving on them (Krebs and Pelissero 2003;
MacManus and Bullock 2003). Thus, even when data is available, researchers
have difficulty using quantitative statistics to analyze roll-call votes because the N
is too small.
Pragmatic researchers (although few would candidly admit it) have
responded by focusing their inquiries on Congress or state legislatures. Here,
data availability is seldom an issue and the N is sufficiently large so they do not
need to sacrifice their technique or adopt a different research design to
compensate for the aforementioned problems. Kaplan (1998: 28) labels this "the
law of instrument" and explains:
Give a small boy a hammer, and he finds that everything he
encounters needs pounding. It comes as no particular surprise to
discover that a scientist formulates problems in a way which
requires for their solution just those techniques in which he himself
is especially skilled.
This strategy is understandable because it increases the likelihood of publication
and the professional accolades that come with it.

Unfortunately, it limits the

accumulation of knowledge in areas that are more difficult to study and it
undermines attempts to formulate broad generalizations that extend to all
legislative institutions.

11

This is not to say that the state and congressional research is misguided

or unimportant, but only that its findings are not automatically generalizeable to

the local context.

Differences are likely to exist since city councils and the

lawmakers who serve on them generally do not share the same attributes as

their counterparts at the state and national levels of government. City councils

are less powerful, they typically have fewer members, many lack standing
committees (Krebs and Pelissero 2003), and they are all unicameral bodies

(MacManus 1999). Likewise, city councilors tend to be political amateurs who

receive only modest compensation for their services (Lascher 1993) and many
hold their positions on a part-time basis (MacManus 1999).2 About two-thirds of

them are elected in non-partisan contests (Cassel 1985) while partisanship is a

defining characteristic of state and national elections.

Given the paucity of literature on city councils, it comes as no surprise that

very few scholars have written about black councilors or the environment in

which they serve. This gap in is especial ly troubling since the number of black
councilors has been growing in recent years such that they are becoming an

even more important subgroup within local legislative bodies.

For example,

3,468 blacks were serving on municipal governing bodies in 1998, and this

number climbed to 3,538 in 2001 (Bositis 2001; Joint Center for Political and

Economic Studies 1998). This absence of literature is also troubling because we

2

Haas (1995) disputes the dominant view and argues that councils are often full
time and well-paid bodies.
12

do not know what elements of a city's governmental structure affect the quality of
the black councilors' experiences once they assume office. In fact, a host of
structural variables could potentially be relevant such as the form of city
government (mayor-council vs. council-manager), the electoral format (at-large
vs. wards), and the level of professionalism on the council (salary, number of
staff, frequency of meetings). Hence, I break new ground by not only describing
the experiences of local black lawmakers, but also by establishing which
structural variables are affect their experience.

What Follows

In Chapter Two, I review two distinct strands of literature that are relevant to my
research. The first strand focuses on black legislative life, while the second
strand concerns structural variables that are unique to the study of local politics.
I review each strand in turn, then concentrate on a small number of studies that
come close to bridging the gap between these two bodies of literature. Toward
the end of the chapter, I state a series of hypotheses (or assumptions) that I will
test with my data.
I present my methodology in Chapter Three. I devote the most of the
chapter to my data collection procedures and the survey instruments that I used
to tap the perceptions of the black and white city councilors. Moreover, I explain
how I measured and operationalized the "quality of black legislative life," the
central concept in my study.
13

In Chapter Four, I present and discuss some of my key findings. My main

objective is to compare and contrast the black and white city councilors in terms

of their personal profiles, constituencies, · and perceptions about the black

legislative experience. My results demonstrate that the two groups have much in

common, but these similarities are overshadowed by differences in the

councilors' constituencies and in how they perceive the black legislative
experience. Next, I examine a series of independent variables that potentially
explain this perceptual gap between the two groups.

Lastly, I discuss the

implications of these findings and connect them with the literature.

In Chapter Five, my goal is to determine which individual and contextual

factors account for the variance in the quality of black legislative life.

To

accomplish this objective; I rely on a series of logistic regression models using

data supplied by the black councilors. I made no attempt to apply this technique

to my white dataset because there was hardly any differentiation in the white
councilors' perceptions.

Chapter Six is my summary and conclusion.

Here, I restate my major

findings and reiterate the broad implications of my research.

Specifically, I

describe how this study has contributed to our knowledge about local black

lawmakers and the environment in which they serve. I close with a discussion of

the pitfalls that I encountered, and I make suggestions for how the study of black
city councilors should proceed.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Two strands of Literature are relevant to my research. The first concerns black
legislative l ife and the second deals with local politics. In this chapter, I review
each strand in turn. In the first part of the chapter (devoted to black legislative
life), I discuss the Black Electoral Success Theory and Lani Guinier's reasoning
for why it fails.

Next, I move beyond this theoretical debate and examine

empirical studies that pertain to the black legislative experience. In the second
part of the chapter (devoted to the local politics literature), I discuss the relevance
of the municipality's electoral format, governmental structure, and the way
communities organize their city councils.

Finally, I examine works that come

close to bridging the gap between the two strands of literature, and I offer some
hypotheses or assumptions that I will test in subsequent chapters.

The Black Legislative Experience
The Black Electoral Success Theory

The civil rights community is striving to make legislative bodies responsive
to minorities, but it has not identified the most prudent way to accomplish this
objective. Most civil rights activists embrace an approach that Lani Guinier labels
the Black Electoral Success Theory (BEST). As she explains (p. 42), "it has not
been expl icitly endorsed as a strategy or articulated as a coherent conceptual
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model." Hence, I base my description of this strategy largely on her framework

because other sources do not describe it in its entirety (pp. 54-69).

Activists who embrace the BEST believe that their primary objective is to

elect "authentic" black lawmakers who are neither co-opted by the white
establishment nor indebted to white voters (Guinier 1994: 55). This goal can be

accomplished by mobilizing the black electorate and, if necessary, through

litigation under the Voting Rights Act (See Figure 1. ). Once in office, these black
legislators are thought to deliver substantive policy benefits to the black

community in the form of protective civil rights legislation, helpful economic
policies, and beneficial social policies (See generally, Black 1978; Hanks 1987;
Herring 1990; Karnig 1979; Lublin 1997; Whitby 1997). Black lawmakers can
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in the black
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Figure 1

The Black Electoral Success Theory
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ostensibly accomplish these objectives by adding items to the agenda, improving
the quality of the debate, and utilizing their influence to encourage the passage of
helpful legislation (Mansbridge 1999).
The BEST also maintains that descriptive representation is important in its
own right because black legislators become symbols of equality and
achievement.

The presence of black officials demonstrates that blacks are

dignified, they can excel at demanding tasks, and they play an integral role in
American politics (Guinier 1994). More importantly, the BEST assumes that the
presence of black lawmakers will enhance the value of communications with the
black citizens they represent. This evidently occurs because these individuals
are more skilled at understanding their constituent's "signals" and "shorthand
communications" due to their shared set of experiences (Mansbridge 1999:
641 ). These common experiences qualify black legislators to be spokespersons
for the black community because they are cloaked in legitimacy and apparently
share "the original civil rights vision" (Guinier 1994: 66).

As a result, they

become role models for aspiring black youth and black citizens derive
psychological benefits by electing representatives who share their background
and race (Lawson 199 1.

See also, Mindiola and Gutierrez 1988: 351 ).

Ultimately, these psychological benefits mobilize the black electorate so that
additional political gains can be achieved (Lawson 1991 ).
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Although research concerning the symbolic value of black lawmakers is
relatively scarce, advocates of the BEST can point to some empirical findings
that bolster their contentions. Survey data shows that black citizens believe that
it is important for black representatives to hold office (Cole 1976), and they feel a
stronger sense of political efficacy once they obtain representation (Bledsoe
1 986). Furthermore, black constituents represented by black congressmen are
more likely to contact their representative than blacks represented by white
congressmen (Gay 2002). Finally, some black congressmen claim to represent
blacks who live outside of the geographic confines of their district (Swain 1993:
218). If so, these constituents probably derive symbolic benefits from the black
congressmen because it is unlikely that they would have access to the policy
benefits that these representatives steer to their home districts.
The BEST is especially relevant to my research because it predicts that
black lawmakers will have no difficulty assimilating into legislative bodies once
they are elected.

I t maintains that prejudice is the result of ignorance and

differences, but that these impediments can be surmounted in the intimate,
collegial settings found in legislative bodies (Guinier 1994).

I n this context,

continuous voting opportu nities foster accommodation and lawmakers have
ample time to build bridges because they have an ongoing relationships.
Legislative bodies also provide a level playing field for minority lawmakers
because the institutional rules give them the same ability to participate in
debates, the amendment process, and hearings (Karlan 1989).
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Hence, white

legislators hear black representatives articulate the black community's interests
(Abrams 1 988), which in turn, may sensitize them to the these concerns (Dennis
1 990: 25).
In the end, the BEST anticipates that black lawmakers will be successful
in shaping legislation and delivering substantive benefits to their constituents.
Although it is probably too early to draw definitive conclusions about this
. supposition, it does enjoy empirical support. For example, anecdotal evidence
has revealed M ississippi's black legislators, . voting as a group, could cast the
decisive votes when white lawmakers were divided on important issues and
when a supermajority was needed to pass a particular piece of legislation. In this
context, one white lawmaker commented, "when it gets down to suspension bills
that take a two-thirds vote or revenue bills, their bloc vote definitely is a
determining factor then" (Parker 1 990: 1 34 ).

Lani Guinier's Critique

The most important criticism of the BEST concerns the quality of the
black lawmakers' experiences once they win election and assume office. This
critique was primarily developed by Guinier (1 994) although other scholars like
Bullock (1 989) clearly espouse similar views. Guinier argues that the BEST is
defective because it does not guarantee that blacks will have meaningful
influence once they are elected to legislative bodies. She argues that black
electoral victories do not resolve discrimination and racially polarized voting,
19

but merely shift these problems from society at-large to the legislature. As a
numerical minority, black lawmakers must garner support from their white
colleagues to be successful. However, they will be ineffective if they fail to
forge crucial alliances and "infiltrate the decisionmaking process" (p. 61).
Such failures are likely when whites harbor racial prejudice or remain
indifferent to the needs of blacks.
Guinier's critique is based largely on anecdotal evidence excerpted from
a redistricting lawsuit in the 1980s that exposed many of these problems in the
Arkansas Legislature. During this litigation, white legislators admitted that they
used racial slurs when discussing prominent black leaders. They also testified
that they had no black staff members and they told their black constituents to
bring their concerns to black legislators who represented different districts
(Guinier 1994: 62). I n short, Arkansas's black legislators testified that they
were an ineffective minority in the predominantly white assembly.
Guinier develops her argument in greater detail and eventually concludes
that the health of race relations within a legislative body determines the quality
and extent of minority empowerment. She predicts that minority issues will only
receive a fair hearing if whites are willing to engage in an ongoing dialogue as
equals, consider relevant information, and compromise. This requires them to
act in good-faith when sharing information, exchanging views, and debating the
issues.

Black legislators, according to Guinier, encounter formidable barriers

because they do not operate in an environ ment where good-faith and
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cooperation are the norm. First, they may have difficulty finding colleagues to co
sponsor bills. Second, they may feel a need to modify their stance on issues in
response to stress inflicted by white lawmakers. Third, whites may exclude them
from debates that occur in private, informal settings. Fourth, chamber rules place
them at a disadvantage because many decisions must be made with the support
of numerical majorities, and motions typically cannot pass unless another
legislator seconds them {See, e.g. , Walton 1985).

Finally, the presence of

minority lawmakers may exaggerate the solidarity among white lawmakers
{Guinier 1994: 62-64).
Guinier also argues that black legislators have difficulty forming and
entering coalitions that expand their political influence.

In a prejudicial

environment, a white majority can exclude them from existing coalitions so blacks
remain strategically weak in the legislature.

Indeed, the presence of black

lawmakers may increase the value of white membership in the winning coalition
because legislative spoils can be divided among a smaller number of white
lawmakers {See generally, Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Ferejohn, Fiorina, and
McKelvey 1987; Riker 1962; Wilson 1973).

Thus, the dominant coalition is

careful not to raise divisive issues for fear that whites who loose these battles will
join forces with the marginalized black leaders (Riker 1962: 179-80). Therefore,
coalition-building-absent institutional incentives for cooperation-will serve the
temporary interests of the white majority who will only cooperate when doing so
enhances its dominant position. This, of course, means that black legislators will
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have difficulty delivering substantive benefits to their constituents unless whites
are receptive to good-faith bargaining and deliberation.

In short, Guinier argues that the effects of prejudice and minority status

preclude blacks from effectively participating in important deliberations; so, in her

view, they become token representatives who have symbolic value, but lack the

ability to influence policy outcomes. Charles Bullock echoes these sentiments in
an earlier work. As he put it, "there may be a black . . . elected to the council, but
if that person is unable to join the coalition-typically dominated by Anglos-that

controls council decisions, the minority member may be a voice crying in the

wilderness" (1989:

97).

This critique may have far-reaching implications for

minority empowerment and the quality of democracy enjoyed by black citizens.
It may mean that black citizens will feel less efficacious if they believe their

representatives are failing to accomplish important policy objectives (Cf. ,

Rodgers 1974: 273-277; Weissberg 1975: 477-478, 481). If so, voter turnout

may suffer in the black community thereby preventing blacks from realizing

addition gains that could have been achieved if they had been mobilized. For
example, some evidence suggests that black turnout decreases once a black

wins a seat on a previously all-white council (Neddenriep 1996), but it is unknown
whether this decrease is linked to the quality of black legislative life.
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Moving From the Theoretical Debate to Empirical Research
A small yet growing body of empirical literature examines the experiences
of black lawmakers and evaluates whether they .are successful , content with their
legislative career, and fully included in the legislative process. Almost all of these
studies focus on blacks serving in state legislatures while overlooking the
experiences of those who serve on city councils. Many studies rely on indicators
that are found in the visible aspects of the legislative process (Clemons and
Jones 2000; Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Menifield 2000; Perry 1976),
but they generally disregard conduct that occurs behind the scenes in informal
settings where discrimination is more likely to occur. Thus, in most cases, this
body of literature is poorly suited for exposing the subtle instances of
discrimination that may be occurring within legislative bodies.
Some researchers have examined the quality of black legislative life by
looking at the bill passage rate of black state legislators (Clemons and Jones
2000; Menifield 2000; Orey 2000 ; Perry 1976). This measure assumes that the
greater the passage rate, the more support blacks have garnered from their white
colleagues. Conversely, low bill passage rates imply that blacks are operating in
a hostile environment where whites remain unsupportive of their agenda and
policies. Most of these works are descriptive case studies and they generally
show that black lawmakers have lower bill passage rates than their white
colleagues (See Table 1.). Differences were most pronounced in the Missouri
Senate in 1987 and in the Georgia House in its 1987 -1988 session where white
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Table 1
Bill Passage Rates in Selected State Legislatures
Study

Legislature
or Chamber

Session
or Year

White Bill
Passage
Rate by %

Black Bill
Passage Rate
by %

Difference
by %

Menifield 2000

MO Senate

1 987

77

8

69

Holmes 2000

GA House

1 987-88

68.7

32.5

36.2

Clemons &
Jones 2000

VA Legislature

1 987

54.3

25.6

28.7

Perry 1 976

MO House

1 969

37

9

28

Orey 2000

MS Legislature

1 987
1 988

28.5
21 . 1

1 2.0
5.0

1 6.5
1 6. 1

Legette 2000

SC Legislature

1 987-88

22.7

7.7

15

Holmes 2000

GA Senate

1 987-88

44.0

35.1

8 .9

Clemons &
Jones 2000

VA Legislature

1 988

57. 1

50.6

6.5

Menifield 2000

MO House

1 987
1 988

9
6

8
5

1
1

Menifield 2000

MO Senate

1 988

2

9

-7

Sullivan 2000

NC Legislature

1 987-88

51

62

-1 1
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sponsored legislation was much more likely to pass than black-sponsored
legislation (Holmes 2000; Menifield 2000). Nevertheless, the black bill passage
rate actually exceeded the white bill passage rate in the North Carolina
Legislature (Sullivan 2000) and the Missouri Senate in its 1988 Session
(Menifield 2000).
Although it is difficult to identify why the passage rates differ, Hedge and
Conkl in (2002) offer three plausible explanations ( See also, Mindiola and
Gutierrez 1988: 359-360.). First, the black sponsored legislation may be more
difficult to pass because it tends to be too liberal . Second , the lower passage
rate may reflect the fact that blacks, as a group, are generally underrepresented
in positions of power within legislative bodies. Finally, racism and discrimination
may subvert the passage of black-sponsored legislation. As one black legislator
from Mississippi commented in a recent telephone interview, "it was often
enough to simply identify a bill as a 'nigger bill' to ensure defeat in his state's
legislature" ( Hedge and Conklin 2002: 6).
Only three studies have moved beyond a descriptive approach and
controlled for intervening variables . One of these studies could not identify a
statistically significant relationship between ethnicity and the bill passage rate
once a lawmaker's seniority and leadership position were considered (Hamm,
Harmel, and Thompson 1 983). In contrast, another study's logit analysis showed
that blacks were less likely than whites to pass legislation in three of six states
examined ( Bratton and Haynie 1 999). This study controlled for a wide range of
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factors that related to the characteristics of the sponsors and the bills. These
results are bolstered by a third study . that relied on multiple regression to
examine the pathways to legislative success in the Missouri House of
Representatives (Ellickson 1992). This study conceptualized legislative success
as a sequential process culminating in the passage of legislation , and it ultimately
found that more successful lawmakers tended to be white, moderately young,
and well-educated. Successful legislators also tended to belong to the majority
party and they generally possessed more seniority.
Although informative, the bill passage rate literature provides an
incomplete picture of how blacks and their interests fare within legislatures.
These studies-many of which are dated-only apply to a small number of state
legislatures, and they say nothing about the progress blacks have made within
city councils. In fact, only one published work addresses the issue at the local
level (Cole 1976). It found that passage rates fluctuate with the subject matter of
the legislation and that black-sponsored legislation seldom passes .
Perhaps a more serious problem with the bill passage literature is that it
does not distinguish between legislation that is especially important to black
legislators and legislation that is trivial. The bill passage indicator may be more
meaningful if it narrowly focuses on legislation that black lawmakers prioritize in
their agendas which, in most cases, probably reflects its importance to the black
community. Some studies are moving in this direction by examining whether the
bill passage rates differ across various types of legislation (Bratton and Haynie
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1 999 ; Cole 1 976 ; Holmes 2000; Legette 2000). This is an importa nt step forward
because the subject matter of the leg islation might influence the passage rate
rather tha n the sponsor's race. Despite this progress, the evidence has been
mixed .

A study of the Georgia Leg islatu re found very little difference in the

content of the bills sponsored by black and white lawmakers (Holmes 2000).
However, in South Carolina, black lawmakers tended to introduce more
consumer protection bills, while whites were more wil ling to regulate business
competition . Nevertheless, in both states, the overall passage rate was lower for
blacks than whites.
Other researchers have used descriptive case studies to assess the
progress that black lawmakers have made within the com mittee systems of
various state leg islatures.

Here, the literature shows that blacks have made

progress, but only to a certain extent. Some studies show that blacks were given
assignments on minor or moderately important committees (Perry 1 976; Walton
1 985). They have also had difficulty becoming members of finance committees
and obtaining chairmanships. For example, Mississippi's black legislators were
excluded from "money committees" because they were perceived as "spend and
tax liberals" (Orey 2000: 803). Likewise, Virginia's black legislators successfully
obtained seats on 9 of the 1 1 standing committees, but they failed to hold any
positions of power in the 1 987 to 1 988 legislative session (Clemons and Jones
2000).
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On the other hand, case studies focusing on different states suggest that
blacks receive equitable treatment because they now occupy a substantial
number of chairmanships, some on prestigious committees (Haynie 2001;
Menifield 2000; Sullivan 2000). I n fact, a study of the Texas House found that
minorities were over-represented on some powerful committees (Thielemann
1992). Even so, this same study reported that minorities were less satisfied with
their assignments than their white colleagues who where also members of the
dominant party in the chamber. These minority legislators favored institutional
rules that guaranteed fair treatment despite their speaker's genuine effort to
enhance the quality of their assignments.
This literature is valuable because it acknowledges the important role that
committees play within legislatures. But it also contains flaws that detract from
its utility. First, some of the studies insinuate that blacks do not receive their "fair
share" of committee chairmanships and assignme�ts on important committees.
These conclusions are problematic when the studies fail to operationalize what is
"equitable" or "unrepresentative," and they base their assessments on some
undefined standard. Second, and more importantly, most of these studies do not
control for intervening variables. These might include membership in the majority
party, the member's assignment preferences, or· the amount of seniority that
minorities have accumulated. Thus, a more sophisticated analysis is necessary
to remedy these shortcomings and enhance our understanding of these issues.
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David Hedge, James Button, and their various co-authors have made
tremendous strides explaining the black legislative experience. Their approach,
based on survey research, is unique because it relies on the perceptions of
lawmakers to assess the quality of black legislative life. This methodology is a
vast improvement over descriptive case studies because it increases the N and it
allows for intervening variables to be controlled. This strategy is also useful
because it can potentially reveal subtle instances of discrimination that may
occur in intimate legislative settings.

This type of knowledge is simply not

accessible by looking only at bill passage rates or who is serving on prestigious
committees. In other words, survey research can directly expose instances of
discrimination whereas studies that rely on bill passage rates or committee
assignments are forced to infer discrimination from discrepancies in the
achievement levels of black and white lawmakers.
The primary objective of this impressive body of work is to identify barriers
that black lawmakers face and the accomplishments they have made within state
legislatures (See Figure 2.). In one groundbreaking article, Button and Hedge
(1996) sent separate surveys to black and white state legislators inquiring about
the black legislative experience. The items in the two questionnaires asked ( 1 )
whether "black issues" received a fair hearing, (2) whether black legislators
experienced or observed discrimination, and (3) whether black legislators made
progress in the last ten years. They also asked about possible discrimination in
the committee system and by the political parties operating within the legislature.
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Impaired race relations

Black
Legislators

Discrimination

Need to .work harder to
gain respect

Difficulty persuading
white legislators to
support policies
favorable to blacks

Goal of
Equal
Inclusion

Failure to obtain
influential or preferred
committee
assignments

Figure 2
Potential Barriers Encountered by Black Legislators
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Policy
Benefits

Their results painted a negative picture of black legislative life across a
wide-range of indicators, and it revealed differences between the perceptions of
black and white lawmakers. The vast majority of white lawmakers believed that
their black colleagues had a positive experience, but black lawmakers tended to
have a pessimistic outlook. The questions concerning legislative fairness and
discrimination were typical of this pattern.

Only 30% of black lawmakers

indicated that "black issues" received a fair hearing and 60% reported instances
of discrimination. In stark contrast, 73% of the white respondents reported that
black legislation received a fair hearing and only 24% admitted that they had
witnessed discrimination .

Race was the primary reason for these differences

even when other important variables were held constant (gender, region , the
racial composition of the respondent's district, and majority vs. minority party in
the chamber).
The dataset from their survey of black legislators yielded a second article
about the quality of black legislative life (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). This
time , the authors sought to identify which variables explain the variance in quality
the black legislative life rather than narrowly focusing on how the two groups of
lawmakers differed in their perceptions. As predicted, individual and contextual
factors both proved to be important. The results showed that black lawmakers
who were male, had more seniority, and held leadership positions tended to
report a more positive experience. Context also mattered as respondents were
more likely to report a positive experience if they represented a majority-white
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district. As expected, blacks who served in legislatures with more positive race

relations tended to be more satisfied with their committee assignments and were
more influential within their party. Finally, black lawmakers from the Deep South

were less likely to see themselves as influential even when other variables were
controlled.

Another study authored by Edith J. Barrett (1997) yielded similar findings

from its nation-wide survey of black and white state legislators. She found that

blacks believe they must work harder than whites to succeed in their legislative

careers, and they must pursue an agenda that considers both general interests

and the narrow concerns of their black constituents. Her data also showed that

certain independent variables affect the black lawmaker's perceptions including

the size of the legislature and proportion of Democrats serving. On the other

hand, factors such as the proportion of black lawmakers (less than vs. greater

than 15% ), the party identification of the governor, and the geographic region
(South vs. Non-South) were not statistically significant.

Even these cutting-edge studies do not provide a complete picture of the

progress that black legislators have made. None address whether blacks have

assimilated into legislative coalitions, and none make a serious effort to explore
the extent of interracial cooperation, communication, and compromise. However,

these limitations are trivial and say more about the topics these scholars have
chosen to address rather than the way they conducted their research. A more
serious limitation is that these studies are based solely on perceptions. This is
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problematic because the authors cannot definitively say that their data reflect the
objective conditions that exist within the legislative bodies they studied. Even so,
the problem is not fatal because perceptions themselves are important.

As

Hedge, Button, and Spear (1996: 89) explain,
We realize there may be a gap between our respondents'
perceptions and the actual conditions within state legislatures. We
believe those perceptions, nonetheless, provide a reasonably
accurate and valid picture of the [quality of black legislative life]. In
the first instance, those perceptions are, in and of themselves,
important. It is perceptions that members typically act upon and
those perceptions are normatively, a legitimate basis for gauging
how blacks fare in the states' legislatures.
In sum, a small yet growing body of empirical literature has increased our
understanding of the black legislative experience. We know black lawmakers
generally have lower bill passage rates than whites (See Table 1.). Likewise, we
know from descriptive case studies that the ability of blacks to secure prestigious
committee assignments turns on the state in which they serve ·(Menifield 2000 ;
Orey 2000 ; Perry 1976; Sullivan 2000; Walton 1985). In recent years, scholars
have also made an important contribution by using survey research to assess the
black legislative experience (Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996; Hedge,
Button and Spear 1996). From these studies, we have learned that black and
white lawmakers have divergent perceptions about the black legislative
experience, and that blacks are more likely than whites to identify racial barriers
that impede their progress (Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996).

These

studies also demonstrate that independent variables such as gender, seniority,
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region, leadership positions, racial composition of the legislature, and majority
minority district can affect the respondent's perceptions. Hence, I will examine
these variables as well in my su bsequent analysis.
Despite these advances, there is still much to learn because almost all the
literature narrowly focuses on state legislatures rather than city councils. The
black legislative experience may be different in the local context because city
councils are u nique. These u nicameral bodies are less powerful than state
legislatures, they tend to have fewer members, many lack standing committees,
and many are non-partisan institutions (Krebs and Pelisser6 2003). Similarly,
scholars have identified a series of variables, u nique to the study of local politics,
that are thought to be important. However, almost no effort has been made to
connect these city-level variables to the black legislative experience. Some of
these variables relate to the local electoral system (at-large vs. wards), the
municipality's governmental structure (mayor-council vs. cou ncil-manager), and
the demographic composition of the municipality. Hence, my research is vital
because (1) it is unclear whether conclusions drawn from research on state
legislatures is generalizeable to city councils, and (2) we know very little about
which city-level variables affect the black legislative experience.
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The Local Politics Literature
Political scientists have been fascinated with structural variables and , at some
level, most practitioners would agree with the popular adage: "structure matters !"
That is, institutional arrangements shape political outcomes because they are
essentially the rules governing how politics are conducted .

This school of

thought (sometimes called neoinstitutionalism) has transcended the empirically
based subfields within the discipline _ and has greatly contributed to our
understanding of the political world. The local politics literature is no exception
and structural variables have taken center stage in many studies. Therefore, it is
important to examine whether structure influences the quality of black legislative
life because the answer has important implications for how communities organize
their governments. The following subsections consider the relevance of electoral
structure, the overall structure of city government, and structures specifically
pertaining to city councils.

Electoral Structure

Scholars have emphasized the importance the electoral format in their
work because, in many instances, it is clearly distinct from that employed in state
and national contests. This uniqueness is attributable to the good government
movement that sought to dismantle the political machines and depoliticize the
delivery of governmental services in the early part of the Twentieth Century
(Harrigan and Vogel 2000 ; Krebs and Pelissero 2003).
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As a part of these

reforms, municipalities began adopting nonpartisan elections and selecting

councilors from the municipality at-large rather than from wards. As it stands

now, 77% of America's municipalities do not list a candidate's party affiliation on

the ballot next to their name (MacManus and Bullock 2003). Likewise, 64% of all

municipalities use an at-large system, 1 4% elect their councilors exclusively from

wards, and 21 % employ a hybrid format where some councilors are elected at
large and others are elected from wards (MacManus and Bullock 2003).

Researchers have noted. that these attributes of the electoral system have

significant implications for minorities seeking election to city councils.

In

ethnically diverse cities, nonpartisan contests rearrange existing electoral

cleavages so that voters gravitate toward candidates of their own ethnic heritage

when they can no longer rely on the candidate's party affiliation as a voting cue

(Lieske and H illard 1 984; Pamper 1 966). Another problem is that nonpartisan

elections contain a latent class bias that favors Republican candidates (Lascher
1991) and those who possess a high socioeconomic status (Cassel 1985;

Rodgers and Arman 197 1 ). This disadvantages black candidates who tend to be
Democrats and who probably have a lower socioeconomic status than whites.

In the 1 980s, scholars frequently debated whether at-large districting

arrangements dilute the black community's voting strength.

I n municipalities

where blacks are a numerical minority, at-large systems disadvantage black
candidates when voters tend to cast their ballots al.ong racial lines.

This, of

course, means that the predominantly white electorate simply outvotes the black
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candidates.

Moreover, at-large elections may put black candidates at a

disadvantage because they increase campaign · costs; they require more
endorsements from civic groups, and they require additional media exposure to
ensure name recognition (Kamig and Welch 1980 :

29). . Conversely, ward

elections facilitate black electoral success when . the black community is
concentrated within the geographic confines of a ward. A great deal of attention
is usually given to minority interests during the redistricting process (Lyons and
Jewell 1988) so that at least one majority-black ward is created. Under these
conditions, the election of a black candidate is virtually assured . In the end , the
weight of empirical evidence supports the proposition that at-large systems
disadvantage black candidates (Jones 1976; Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel
1978; Welch 1990 ; Zax 1990).
The literature on city · council elections has greatly increased our
understanding of the electoral environment in which black candidates operate.
However, researchers have not take the next logical step by inquiring about how
the electoral format influences the experiences of black councilors once they win
election and begin serving their term of office. Despite the paucity of literature on
the topic, there is good reason to believe a nexus exists between the electoral
format and the black legislative experience.
I predict that at-large and nonpartisan elections ultimately work in the
black councilors' favor and increase the likelihood that they will have a positive
experience on the council. Nonpartisanship and the depoliticized council it is
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thought to produce may help black councilors forge alliances with their white
colleagues in the absence of overt partisan wrangling. More importantly, black
councilors who succeed in the presence of an at-large system, no doubt, enjoy
considerable support from white voters in an electorate that I presume is
predominantly white. I n this context, these individuals probably view the political
process as being more even-handed and less fraught with racial divisions.
Additionally, black candidates who win an at-large contest are likely to have a .
leadership style that facilitates amicable relations with the white lawmakers on
the council . These individuals, because they represent a predominantly white
constituency, will probably advocate policies that enjoy the support of many of
their white colleagues and they will be less likely to employ a confrontational style
to achieve their objectives.

Governmental Format

Mu nicipalities have adopted different governmental formats in their
charters. MacManus and Bullock (2003) explain recent trends using survey data
collected in 2001.

According to them, 53% of the responding municipalities

utilize a "council-manager" government where an elected council and chief
elected official (usually called the mayor) have the authority to make policy, but a
professional administrator runs the government's daily operations. Thirty-eight
percent utilize a "mayor-council" government where the council serves in a
legislative capacity and the chief elected official retains administrative powers.
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Six percent of the sample possessed a "town meeting" government where voters
make basic policy decisions and choose a board of selectmen who implement
these policies.

Finally, the "commission" government and the "representative

town meeting" government each comprised approximately 1 % of the sample. In
a commission government, individuals elected in at-large contests serve as both
lawmakers and administrative department heads.

In a representative town

meeting government, voters choose representatives at town meetings and these
individuals vote on policy matters.
The form of municipal government is a variable that researchers should
consider in their analyses.

This variable is important, as John P. Pelissero

(2003: 14) suggests, because the "political and policy making roles performed by
city councils, mayors, city managers, and bureaucrats will vary with the form of
government used."

However, in recent years, scholars have noticed that

differences between the various formats are becoming less pronounced
(Desantis and Renner 2002; Frederickson and Johnson 200 1; MacManus and
Bullock 2003 ). Hence, they are beginning to question whether the traditional
typology has become outmoded as more municipalities adopt hybrid forms of
government (Frederickson, Wood, and Logan 200 1; Svara 200 1 ).
The existing literature makes no direct connection between governmental
format and the quality of black legislative life. The most relevant studies consider
whether

reformed

governmental

structures

such

as

council-manager

governments are more fiscally conservative than unreformed structures such as
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mayor-council governments (Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Lyons 1978; Morgan
and Pelissero 1980). The answer to this question, as Lyons (1978: 120) astutely
observes, has important ramifications for minorities who benefit from increased
governmental spending because they "rely on individually divisible goods Uobs)
or group divisible goods (social services) to a greater degree."

Thus, the

argument can be made that black councilors will have a more positive experience
in mayor-council cities where government spending is ostensibly higher. I n these
places, they will probably have a greater ability to bring tangible benefits to their
constituents because there are more goods being distributed.

However, in

places with strict constraints on spending (council-manager cities), it is
reasonable to assume that black lawmakers will report a more negative
experience because there is heightened competition for scare resources. I n this
environment, white council members (if they hold a numerical majority) may
exclude blacks from the dominant coalition because the legislative spoils can be
divided between a smaller number of lawmakers (Riker 1 962).
Unfortunately, the empirical studies have arrived at different conclusions
and there is no definitive answer as to whether a particular governmental format
is related to governmental spending.

Lineberry and Fowler's (1967) seminal

work found that reformed structures have lower levels of taxing and spending
than unreformeq structures. They also noted that reformed structures tend to be
less responsive to the demographic characteristics of their constituencies than
unreformed structures.

Similarly, Lyons (1978) found that unreformed
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municipalities

increase

their

expenditures

more

rapidly

than

reformed

ju risdictions as financial resou rces and citizen demands increase.

However,

Morgan and Pelissero (1 980) reached a different conclusion.

They tried to

approximate an experiment by examining 1 1 municipalities that adopted reform
structures and 1 1 municipalities that maintained their unreformed structures
during this same time period . They found no appreciable differences between
the experimental and control groups.
Perhaps a better explanation for why governmental format matters has to
do with the decision-making coalitions within city council�.

One authoritative

work argues that minorities and their interests fare better when a minority
cou ncilor is incl uded in the dominant voting bloc (Browning, Marshall , and Tabb
1 984 ). Based on an analysis of ten California cities, these authors observed that
the likelihood of a minority lawmaker being included in the dominant coalition
increases when reform institutions decline and are replaced by unreformed ones
(p. 201 ). If so, liberal coalitions frequently become dominant and mayors and
councilors assu me more ind ividual power. The presence of a liberal coalition
favors black councilors because they are overwhelmingly Democrats and are a
better ideological fit within a liberal coalition than a conservative one.
Accord ingly, the mayor-council form of government (an unreformed structure) is
probably more conducive to the political incorporation of minorities, which in tu rn,
probably enhances the quality of their experience.
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The Structure of City Councils

Students of local politics generally believe that the way city councils are
organized is important. Scholars writing on a variety of topics have used council
size as a variable in their analyses (Alozie and Manganaro 1993; Karnig and
Welch 1 979; Pelissero and Krebs 1 997). Others have pointed out that staggered
terms of office (versus concurrent ones) should be considered when looking at
minority representation on city councils (Bullock and MacManus 1 987). Still
others insist that an increased level of council professionalization is important
because it provides councilors with greater opportunities for advancement within
th� legislative body (Clingermayer and Feiock 1 994). Professionalism is not a
structural variable per se, but it is closely associated with structure because it is
likely to be measured in structural terms.

I ndicators of professionalism might

include the frequency of council meetings, the number of council staff, the
councilors' salaries, and the use of standing committees.
The literatu re provides no guidance as to how the aforementioned
variables might influence the quality of black legislative life.

Hence, I have

mentioned them because of their general interest to scholars, not because the
literature identifies a compelling reason for their inclusion in my research. Even
so, two elements of council structure might influence the black councilors'
legislative experiences.

First, smaller councils are probably associated with a

more positive experience because more intimate settings probably encourage
interracial cooperation. This may occur because small councils probably give
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lawmakers more opportunities to become acquainted and to showcase their
legislative skills before all their colleagues. Second, more professional councils
are probably more conducive · to a positive legislative experience than less
professional councils. Not only will there be more opportunities for advancement,
but the desirable nature of the position is likely to attract politically savvy
candidates (both black and white) who possess a higher level of education. If so,
one might expect that whites serving on professional councils would be less likely
to engage in discriminatory conduct assuming, of course, that prejudice is the
product of ignorance and unfamiliarity.
In summary, the local politics literature has greatly contributed to our
knowledge by highlighting the importance of structural variables. We know that
at-large and non-partisan elections ·place minority candidates at a disadvantage
(Jones 1976; Lieske and Hillard 1984; Robinson and Dye 1978; Zax 1990). We
know that the way a municipal government is arranged affects the roles
performed by its mayor, city councilors, and bureaucrats (Pelissero 2003). And,
the literature informs us that the term of office, council size, and
professionalization are important variables to consider when studying city
councils (Alozie and Manganaro · 1993; Bullock and MacManus 1987;
Clingermayer and Feiock 1994). Despite this progress, we still have much to
learn because scholars have made little or no effort to connect these structural
variables to the quality of black legislative life. For instance, they have devoted
considerable attention to how electoral formats affect the . election of minority
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candidates, but they have not examined whether the electoral format matters
once the victor assumes office.

Likewise, scholars have hinted that a

municipality's governmental format might be related to the black legislative
experience (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984), but there is almost no
empirical evidence that directly establishes this connection. Given this gap in the
literature, I make a unique and valuable contribution by testing whether these
structural variables are associated with the black legislative experience.

Black Officials in Local Government

I n the previous sections, I reviewed two strands of literature that relate to my
research. The first dealt with the black legislative experience and the second
dealt with the structure of local governments. N ow, I will discuss literature that
comes closest to bridging the gap between these two strands. First, I review the
literature that addresses whether local black officials have been able to deliver
substantive policy ben efits to their black constituents. Second, I discuss specific
barriers that local black leaders encounter during the course of their service. The
local focus of this literature makes it especially relevant, but there is still much to
learn because scholars have focused on black officials in general rather than
concentrating on black city councilors.
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Substantive Representation in the Local Context
Scholars have noted that the presence of local black officials has
important implications for black citizens and their interests. Several studies have
examined whether the presence of black mayors is related to the spending
patterns of municipal governments (Karnig and Welch 1980; Keller 1978). These
works assume that particular types of aggregate budgetary expenditures are of
greater importance to black citizens.

For example, Karnig and Welch (1980)

authored an important book that addresses this subject using data collected from
cities with populations over 50 ,000 .

Their statistical analysis revealed that

communities with a black mayor and greater black representation on their
councils spent significantly more money on welfare services and significantly less
on amenities (parks and libraries), physical facilities (streets, sanitation , and
hospitals), and protective services (fire and police).
These findings are informative, but they are also flawed in two important
respects.

One criticism is that expenditure data is "too dependent on law,

history, or economics, and thus not subject to short-term influences of
government officials" (Saltzstein 1989: 526).

Another problem, as Eisinger

(1982) points out, is that there is no way to determine how much benefit is
actually conferred upon citizens of each race. Thus, studies relying on aggregate
budget figures sometimes make tenuous assumptions about what policies are
truly important to black citizens. For instance, Karnig and Welch (1980 : 119)
hypothesized that cities with a black mayor and greater black representation on
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their councils would spend less on protective services. Nonetheless, it is equally
plausible that this reduction in spending disadvantages black citizens because
the incidence of fire is greater in poor areas and blacks are more likely to be
victimized by crime (Eisinger 1982).
Other scholars have linked the presence of local black leaders (especially
black mayors) to the number of blacks holding public-sector jobs. Public jobs are
thought to be an attractive benefit- because they are more secure and have
higher pay than comparable positions in the public-sector (Eisinger 1982). Civil
service reforms largely dictate who municipal governments hire, but affirmative
action policies give minorities an advantage despite the merit-based requirement.
Thus, black employment, as a measure of black progress, is · an improvement
over aggregate budget figures because it is "easily measurable, divisible [by
race] , and a relatively unambiguous prize" (Eisinger 1982: 381).
Researchers have used different methods to show that the presence of
black officials expands public-sector opportunities for blacks. Some have used a
comparative approach to demonstrate that black mayors have secured municipal
jobs for black citizens (Nelson and Meranto 1977; Stein and Condrey 1987).
Black mayors are able to do this by throwing their support behind affirmative
action policies and placing black administrators in charge of their city's personnel
office (Eisinger 1983). These results have been bolstered by quantitative studies
with more sophisticated designs. One cross-sectional study of 43 cities found
that the number of black public employees was largely attributable to the size of
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the black population and the presence of a black mayor (Eisinger 1982). A�other
study's pooled time-series data revealed that the number of minority employees
is a function of minority councilors and, more importantly, minority administrators
occupying key positions in the bureaucracy (Kerr and Mladenka 1994 ). Minority
administrators were thought to _have a long-term effect on hiring patterns
because they can consistently influence the opportunities that are available to
minorities. Interestingly, this same study found that black mayors had very little
effect on the ability to minorities to secure public-sector employment over time.
Other studies have shown that black officials have been able to confer
benefits to their constituents that are not related to public employment. One
ground breaking work, focusing on 82 urban school districts, identified a
statistically significant relationship between the number of black school board
members and equitable education policies for black students (Meier and England
1984 ). This relationship remained even when controlling for black political and
economic resources. Another study indicates that black mayors are associated
with citizen controls being placed over police departments (Saltzstein 1989 ).
These two studies demonstrate that the link between black officials and
substantive representation extends beyond the realm of public employment and
the achievements of these officials are not simply the product of a modern form
of machine politics.
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This body of literature demonstrates that black officials are not just
symbolic assets to the black community because they can deliver policy benefits
to their constituents. Although not explicitly stated, these studies suggest that
black officials have been successfully integrated into the political system and
their experiences must be positive in light of their accomplishments.

This

reasoning, no doubt, calls into question whether it is even necessary to examine
the quality of black legislative life because the main impetus behind studying the
topic is its ostensible link with public policy. Simply put, these studies raise a
provocative question:

why study the black legislative experience when black

officials are apparently achieving their policy goals?
Compelling reasons exist for studying the black legislative experience
although the aforementioned literature suggests that local black officials are
successful.

First, most studies concentrate on the ability of black mayors to

deliver substantive benefits to black constituents.

I t would be improper to

assume that the success of black mayors is generalizeable to black councilors.
I n many municipalities, the mayoral experience is different because mayors are
i ndependent executives who are elected separately from the council. Councilors,
on the other hand, must operate within the confines of the legislative body and
they have no independent authority to act. To be successful, they must forge
alliances and persuade their fellow councilors to support their agenda. Second,
and more importantly, the substantive representation literature usually looks for a
correlation between the presence of black officials and favorable policies, but it is
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poorly suited for revealing specific barriers that black officials encounter during
the course of their service. It is possible that barriers do exist, and that they
prevent black officials from being even more successful than they already are. If
so, it is important that we identify these barriers, learn how they operate, and
determine what conditions produce them.

Barriers Encountered by Local Black Officials

Only one study has made a serious to effort to identify barriers that local
black officials encounter during the course of their service (Button, Richards, and
Bethune 1998).

This study, focusing on local black officials from Florida,

compared personal interview data collected in 1975 to survey data collected in
1993.

Although much of the article was devoted to the changes that had

transpired, it also illuminated many of the perennial obstacles that black
officeholders face. Respondents from both time periods cited a lack of revenue
as the greatest barrier. Furthermore, a majority of the respondents indicated that
a lack of cooperation from black citizens impairs their ability to serve. This lack
of cooperation is characterized by apathy, an absence of electoral support,
factionalism, and unreasonably high expectations. Conversely, the respondents
reported that their white colleagues impeded their ability to effectively represent
their constituents. In the 1 990 survey, a majority of the responde�ts admitted
that they were outvoted by their white counterparts and they acknowledged that
whites were generally unwilling to cooperate. White opposition occurred with
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greater frequency when redistributive policies were at issue or when black
officials attempt to alter their municipality's priorities (p. 185).
This study also identified variables that influenced the effectiveness of the ·
local black officials. As for contextual factors, the community's per capita income
was a significant predictor of effectiveness, but no statistically significant
relationship existed for the community's size, percent black, or its electoral
system (at-large vs. wards). Only one political factor-the perceived helpfulness
of affirmative . action programs-was significant across the three dependent
variables which included the black official's effectiveness, economic growth, and
black employment. Finally, education was the only personal attribute that had a
meaningful connection to economic growth and development. Other individual
factors such as years in office and ideology were not significantly related to any
of the dependent variables including the black officials' perceived effectiveness.
This study is especially valuable because it is the only one that identifies
specific barriers that local black officials face during their tenure in office. I t also
makes an significant contribution by linking local variables to the black political
experience. Despite this meaningful contribution, additional work is necessary to
fully understand the black legislative experience within city councils. First, the
study only covered black officials serving in Florida so its results are not widely
generalizeable-especially since that particular state is not typical of other
southern states.

Second, this study mixed together responses from black

councilors and responses from other black officials who serve in different

50

capacities. This, of course, means that it is possible that the study's results
might change once responses from the black councilors are separated from
those provided by the other black officials.
To review, we have learned much about the policy successes of local
black officials.

Their presence is associated with policies and expenditures

thought to confer a greater benefit upon blacks than whites (Karnig and Welch
1980; Keller 1978; Saltzstein 1989; Meier and England 1984 ). We also know
that their presence is associated with increased employment opportunities for
black citizens (Eisinger 1982; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Nelson and Meranto
1977; Stein and Condrey 1987). Nevertheless, there is still reason to believe that
local black officials encounter racial barriers that impede their progress. Opinion
data from a Florida study showed that many black officials perceived that their
white colleagues were generally unwilling to cooperate and, they reported that
they were frequently outvoted by whites (Button, Richards, and Bethune 1998).
There · is still much to learn although a growing body of literature
chronicles the experiences of local black officials. Much of what we know comes
from studies about black mayors rather than black councilors. In fact, only two of
the aforementioned substantive representation studies (Karnig and Welch 1980;
Kerr and Mladenka 1994) even considered black councilors in their analyses.
Extending conclusions about mayors to city councilors is improper because the
councilors operate in a different environment and have different limitations.
Unlike mayors, they do not have unilateral authority to set policy, hire/fire
51

personnel , or set directives for city bureaucrats. Instead , they must rely largely

on diplomacy and their personal powers of persuasion to garner the support of

their fellow councilors if they hope to accomplish their objectives.

We also have much to learn because most of the existing stud ies only

show a correlation between the presence of black officials and substantive

benefits received by the black community (Eisinger 1 982; Karnig and Welch

1980; Meier and England 1984; Saltzstein 1989). Hence, these stud ies have

difficulty establishing causation and they are poorly suited for identifying
particular barriers that black officials encounter.

Only one study (Button,

Richards, and Bethune 1998) has attempted to identify such barriers, but its

focus was limited to Florida and it combined opinion data from black councilors

and other city officials.

Hence, we only have a vague idea whether these

· findings hold true nationally when just city councilors are examined .
Expected Findings

General Expectations

Many commentators believe that racial divisions persist and that whites

continue to deny ethnic minorities full inclusion in the political process. Indeed ,

Lani Guinier argues that the election of black lawmakers has not remedied this
problem, but merely shifted it from society at-large to legislative bodies.

evaluate this argument by describing how black councilors assess the quality of
their experiences on mixed-race city councils.
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Based on recent empirical

findings (Barrett 1 997; Button and Hedge · 1 996; Button , Richards, Bethune
1 998), I anticipate that black councilors will perceive themselves to be less
influential members of their council and perceive that race relations are
impaired . I also expect a large portion of the black councilors to identify barriers
that impede their progress.

These perceived obstacles will probably include

racial discrimination , blacks must work harder than whites to gain respect, race is
used as a factor when determining who receives a · leadership position, and
blacks will be less likely to interact with the mayor than whites.
Resea rch also shows that blacks and whites view the world and the
political landscape differently.

Public opinion data demonstrates that wh ite

citizens generally believe that African-Americans receive fair and equitable
treatment in ou r society, but blacks typically feel that prejud ice and discrimination
persist (Siegelman and Welch 1 991 ).

This divergence in perceptions also

extends to blacks and whites who

serve

in state legislatu res.

One

groundbreaking work demonstrates that black legislators are much more likely
than whites to observe discrimination and report that issues important to blacks
do not receive a fair hearing (Button and Hedge 1 996). Based on this evidence,
I expect this same pattern wil l be present when I compare the responses of the
black and white city councilors. A finding of this nature could have significant
implications for how local governments handle racial issues.

As Button and

Hedge (1 996: 21 5) correctly observe, "those very real differences make it less
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likely that issues important to African Americans, including discrimination, will be
addressed or resol ved easily."

Individual Explanations

Another objective of my research is to account for the variance in the
quality of black legislative life.

As Hedge, Button, and Spear (1996) note,

· individual factors play a critical role in determining the quality of a black
lawmaker's experience including their seniority, status (leadership positions and
chairmanships), and gender.

I f these individual characteristics (treated as

independent variables) are significantly related to the quality of black legislative
life, it suggests that merely having a seat at the table is no guarantee that these
lawmakers will have an equal capacity to influence policy outcomes.
Higher status councilors are those who hold committee chairmanships or
positions of power (e.g., the Mayor Pro Tempore). These lawmakers are likely to
be more active and effective because they have lower information and
transaction costs (Hall 1996).

They may also feel that they have received

equitable treatment because of their elevated status and power. Thus, I expect
that black councilors who enjoy an elevated status will be more l ikely to positively
assess their legislative career and less likely to identify racial barriers that impair
their ability to serve.
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Seniority is also likely to affect the quality of black leg islative life (Hamm,
Harmel, and Thompson 1 983 ; Hedge, Button, and Spear 1 996).

Lawmakers

with greater seniority are more likely to hold leadership positions and
chairmanships on important committees.

Moreover, cou ncilors with greater

seniority probably have had more opportu nities to hone their legislative skills,
develop an expertise in a particular policy area, and forge friendships with other
important political figures in their municipality-both on and off the council.
These qualities will allow councilors with greater seniority to be more successful
than newly elected ones. Based on th is ·reasoning , I expect that the longer a
member servers, the more positive his or her legislative experience will become.
Gender is another individual factor that should be considered when
explaining the variance in the quality of black legislative life. I assu me that black
women will have a less positive experience than black men because they are
d isadvantaged by virtue of their race and by virtue of their gender. Scholars
have begun to add ress this possibility, but they have gotten mixed resu lts . Some
researchers have found that black women confront both a race and a gender
bias when running for office (Clayton and Stallings 2000; Githens and Prestage
1 977).

Likewise, black women are more politically alienated that black men ,

white men, and wh ite women. They are the most hesitant group to trust the
federal government; they have the lowest feelings of political efficacy; and , they
perceive a greater amou nt of employment discrimination (Baxter and Lansing
1 983). On the other hand , others have found either no su pport for the double
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disadvantage argument (Darcy and Hadley 1 988) or only partial support for it
( Hedge , Button, and Spear 1 996; Moncrief , Thompson, Schuhmann 1 991 ). The
most relevant evidence comes from Hedge, Button , and Spear's (1 996) survey of
black state legislators. They found no appreciable difference in the rate at which
black men and women serve in party leadership roles, the amount of influence
they wield over party affairs, and satisfaction with their committee assignments.
However, they also found that black men were slightly more likely to chair
committees than black women. And, black women were less likely to serve on
committees dealing with financial matters, but more likely to serve on those
relating to education, welfare, families, and health.

Contextual Explanations

The context in which black councilors serve may also explain the variance
in the quality of their legislative experience. In this subsection, I consider a host
of contextual variables that are likely to be consequential. Some of thes·e are
very broad in scope such as geographic region.

Other contextual variables

narrowly focus on way the city council is organized. Finally, some contextual
factors are even more restricted their scope and deal only with the type of district
that the councilor represents. In the remainder of this subsection, I identify these
variables and explain how each might affect the black legislative experience. I
do this by moving from factors that are broad in scope to those with a more
restricted focus.
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I hypothesize that the environment in which black councilors serve affects
the quality of their experience.

Specifically, I assume that respondents from

municipalities in the Deep South will be more inclined to report a negative
experience given that region's history of racial strife. Regrettably (from a
normative standpoint), others have found evidence to this effect at the state level
(Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). They learned that black state legislators from
the Deep South were less likely to chair committees or report that they were
influential. These findings (in conjunction with others) prompted these authors to
conclude that societal tensions ultimately play themselves out within legislative
bodies so as to limit potential advances of minority groups.
The type of government a municipality adopts . is important because it
dictates the roles played by its municipal officials. Some scholars associate the
presence of a city manager with deceased government spending (Lineberry and
Fowler 1967). If so, this might mean that council-manager governments pit black
and white lawmakers against each other when the council is deciding how to
allocate the municipality's limited resources. In this situation, whites may exclude
their black counterparts from the dominant coalition so the legislative spoils can
be divided between a smaller number of coalition members (Riker 1962). Other
scholars have used a different argument to arrive at this same conclusion.
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984: 20 1) observed that the presence of a
minority lawmaker in the dominant coalition is more likely in unreformed
governments that employ the mayor-council format.
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Here, liberal coalitions

frequently become dominant and mayors and councilors enjoy more individual
power. · Based on this evidence, I anticipate that black councilors from mayor
council cities · will have a more positive experience than those who serve in
council-manager cities.
Although empirical evidence is scarce, I predict that both nonpartisan and
at-large contests favor black lawmakers once they win election. Nonpartisanship
may help the black lawmakers forge alliances with their white colleagues by
suppressing overt partisan bickering. Conversely, black candidates who succeed
despite an at-large system will probably report a more positive experience
because they enjoy considerable support from the white electorate.

Hence,

these lawmakers probably view the political process as being even-handed and
less divided along racial lines. They are also likely to have leadership style and
agenda that facilitates amicable relations with white councilors. That is, they
probably favor a race-neutral, policy oriented approach rather than militant or
confrontational style when pursuing their objectives because they depended on
white votes to win reelection.
The structure of city councils may also influence the quality of black
legisl ative life.

Blacks who se.rve on smaller councils probably · have a better

experience than those who serve on larger ones. · This may be so because
smaller councils have a more intimate legislative setting that requires blacks and
whites to work together on a more personal level. The more intimate setting may
also enhance the ability of black councilors to prove they are skilled lawmakers.
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Next, blacks who serve on professional councils ·are more likely to report a
positive experience than those who serve on less professional councils.
Professionalism is characterized by higher salaries, more staff, the presence of
standing committees, and frequent meetings. Thus, councils with professional
attributes may provide their black members with more opportunities for
advancement. Likewise, these councils may attract candidates (both black and
white) with higher levels of education because the job is more desirable. If so,
the increased levels of education are likely to decrease discrimination based on
the assumption that discrimination is the product of ignorance.
Structural variables are certainly important, but human actors probably
play a meaningful role too. I assume that greater numbers of black leaders in
key positions of power will enhance the quality of black legislative life. Black
councilors who serve in such an environment will probably enjoy a more positive
experience because they are less isolated and they have more allies within the
political system.

Thus, I suspect that the quality of black legislative life . will

improve as the percentage of blacks on the council increases. Similarly, black
councilors will probably report a more positive experience when their city is
represented by.. a black mayor.
Another important factor to consider is the size of the black population
within the municipality. A large black population, especially when mobilized, may
have the potential to influence the behavior of white councilors through its voting
power (See, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1 984). If so, white councilors who
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represent a large black constituency may be more inclined to support the policies
advocated by the black councilors. Based on this reasoning, I assume that black
lawmakers serving in municipalities with large black populations will report a
more positive experience.
The quality of black legislative life may also reflect the racial and economic
composition of the districts that the black councilors represent (Hedge, Button,
and Spear 1996).

I anticipate that black counGilors from affluent or

predominantly white districts (or cities in the case of councilors elected at-large)
will report a more positive experience because they are likely to maintain an
agenda that enjoys the support of their white colleagues. The constituents that
these black councilors represent probably have much in common with the
constituents represented by the white councilors. Thus, whites on the council are
likely to support the black councilor's initiatives because they would advantage
their. constituents too.
The nature of the member's constituency may also determine the type of
person who gets elected and the way they set out to accomplish their policy
goals (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). A black councilor from an affluent or
predominantly white district probably has an agenda and style that is agreeable
to white lawmakers because they were elected with the support of white voters.
Thus, blacks from such districts will probably be more successful and satisfied
because they are more apt to employ a race-neutral style rather than a militant or
confrontational one. I f this argument holds true, it raises a troubling dilemma for
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civil rights activists who advocate the use of majority-minority districts as the
primary vehicle for achieving substantive representation.

That is, black

lawmakers from the majority-minority districts, by virtue of their "authenticity,"
may not be well received by their white colleagues; and, when aggressively
serving their black constituents, they may zealously advocate policies that are
too liberal t� be politically viable.

In contrast, black lawmakers from

predominantly white districts may fare better within the legislative body, but they
may lack authenticity if they are co-opted by the establishment. Hence, critics of
"race-neutral" or "deracialized" political strategies argue that these black officials
forsake a progressive agenda that is important to black citizens (Jones 199 1.
See also, Albritton et al. 1996).

Why My Research Matters: A Summary

Civil rights activists who embrace the BEST believe that black lawmakers will be
able to deliver substantive policy benefits to their black constituents.

This

position is based on the premise that these individuals will have no difficulty
assimilating into legislative bodies and convincing white lawmakers to support
their agenda. However, Guinier (1994) disputes this contention and asserts that
merely having a seat at the table is no guarantee that black lawmakers will be
satisfied or successful. Instead, she argues that many black lawmakers operate
in a hostile environment where good-faith and cooperation are atypical. In such
instances, a predominantly white council can marginalize the black lawmak· ers so
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they remain ineffective. My research is timely and relevant because it directly
addresses this important debate.

The empirical evidence I present in the

following chapters has far-reaching implications for the quality of democracy
enjoyed by ethnic minorities because it would, no doubt, be a hollow
achievement for them to win descriptive representation but fail to achieve
substantive gains because their representatives are not fully included in the
legislative process.
A small body of empirical literature addresses Guinier's concern, but there
is still much to learn. We know that black lawmakers generally have l ower bill
passage rates than whites.

We know that black lawmakers have diffi culty

obtaining assignments to powerful committees in some state legislatures. We
also know that black and white lawmakers have divergent perceptions about the
black legislative experience. Blacks generally assume a more pessimistic view
and are more likely to identify racial barriers that hamper their progress.
H owever, almost all our knowledge comes from studies of state legislatures
rather than city councils. We cannot be sure that these state-level findings apply
to the local context since city councils and their members are distinct.
Scholars who study local government have noted the importance of
structural variables.

We know that the electoral format has significant

implications for black candidates seeking office. We know that the governmental
format determines the roles played by municipal officials.

Likewise, scholars

have demonstrated that the way a city council is arranged is generall y important.
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Nevertheless, the literature has not connected these structural variables to the
experiences of black lawmakers once they assume their place on the council.
Examining whether these variables influence the quality of black legislative life is
important because the answer has significant implications for how communities
organize their governments.
Some scholars have studied the experiences of black officials in the local
context.

Their work shows that these officials have been instrumental in

delivering policy benefits to their black constituents in the form of employment
opportunities (Eisinger 1982; Kerr and Mladenka 1994), helpful welfare services
(Karnig and Welch 1980), and citizen controls being placed over police
departments (Saltzstein 1989). Even so, there is still much to learn because
most of what we know comes from studies of black mayors rather than black city
councilors. The councilors experiences are likely to be different because the
nature of their office prevents them from acting unilaterally. Moreover, it is also
possible that racial barriers prevent black officials from being more successful
than they already are. Only one study (Button, Richards, and Bethune 1998)
describes specific barriers that local officials encounter, but it is based on a
dataset that includes both city councilors and other local officials. Hence, it is
unclear whether its findings hold true once the responses of the back councilors
are separated from the data supplied by the other officials.
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I n the end, we still know relatively little about the about extent to which
black city councilors have been accepted by their white counterparts and whether
they are satisfied with their careers. Scholars have yet to adequately assess the
standing of blacks on city councils, the obstacles they face, and their ability to
accomplish their policy goals.

There is some research that speaks to these

issues, but no particular study is directly on point. Accordingly, my research is
necessary because it helps fill this gap in the literature.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
used two separate mail surveys to generate data for my study. I sent one
survey to black city councilors and I· sent the other to their white counterparts.
The two instruments were similar in content although, out of necessity, I phrased
some questions differently to account for the respondent's race. These slight
modifications only affected two questions and did not alter their meaning or
substance. Therefore, I was able to draw direct comparisons between the two
sets of lawmakers based on their responses to the overlapping items in my
questionnaires.
I found a comparative approach to be useful because, with the exception
of two innovative studies (Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996), not much is
known about how black and white lawmakers view the black legislative
experience. As the authors of one of these studies observed, it is important that
we learn how black and white legislators interact, how their backgrounds
compare, and how they perceive one another's experiences (Button and Hedge
1996). Similarities could facilitate accommodation while differences might result
in conflict andior discrimination.
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My Survey of Black Councilors

I randomly. selected the names and addresses of 1000 black councilors

from a list complied by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies
(JCPES) located in Washington, D.C. This roster was the most comprehensive
one available and it consisted of 3530 individuals who ostensibly represent the
entire population of local black lawmakers. Nevertheless, the roster had several
recognizable limitations that detracted from its usefulness.

First, and most

importantly, the large number of municipalities where black lawmakers potentially
serve makes it difficult (if not impossible) for the JCPES to update its roster to
include newly elected councilors and exclude those who have recently left office.
To some extent, I rectified this problem by placing telephone calls to each
municipality where there was a non-respondent so I could eliminate individuals
who were no longer in office. This remedy, however, was incomplete because it
could not redress situations where new black councilors recently won election.
Second, the roster contained names and addresses of black councilors who were
serving on all-black councils. This problem, if not corrected, could potentially
compromise my study's validity because many of the items in my questionnaire
assumed the presence of a mixed-race council where at least one black and one
white member were serving. For this problem, I felt the most appropriate remedy
was to exclude the 34 respondents (13.2% of my sample) who reported that they
served on an all-black council.

However, in one section of this manuscript

(p. 114), I utilized this data to compare black councilors from mixed-race councils
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to those who serve on all-black councils in terms of their personal profiles and
how they perceive the needs of their constituents.
I constructed my questionnaires according the approach outlined by Don
A. Dillman in the Total Design Method (1978) and the Tailored Design Method
(2000). I mailed them to black councilors in the fall and winter of 2002 along with
a stamped return envelope and a cover letter explaining the nature of my
research. I sent two subsequent mailings consisting of a postcard reminder and
duplicate survey packet to all non-respondents in two or three week intervals
after my initial mailing. My original sample consisted of 1000 black councilors,
but telephone calls to municipal clerks revealed that 239 of these lawmakers
were no longer in office. I excluded these individuals as potential respondents
because many clerks indicated that it was unlikely that these former lawmakers
would receive mail sent to them at city hall, and because my questionnaire
assumed that respondents were currently sitting on their council. Ultimately, 258
of the remaining 761 black councilors returned their questionnaire, which is a
33.9% response rate.
Nonresponse can threaten the inferential value of survey data. However,
this perennial concern is unlikely to pose a serious problem for my study
although its response rate was considerably lower than other recent mail surveys
of municipal officials (Clingermayer and Feiock 1994; Fox and Schuhmann 2000;
Lascher 1993; MacManus 1992).

In the study of municipal government,

response rates lower than 30% are typical of surveys mailed to political elites,
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organizations, and governmental entities (Abbe and Herrnson 2003; Cooper and
Nownes 2003; I hrke, Proctor, and Gabris 2003; Stu mm and Corrigan 1998).
Similarly, in marketing research, response rates as low as 15% are considered
acceptable when the population being su rveyed is business executives (Baldau f,
Reisinfer, and Moncrief 1999; Tomaskovic-Dewey, Leiter, and Thompson 1994).
I n short, my 33. 9% response rate appears to be typical and it does not seem to
jeopardize the inferential value of my data.

My Survey of White Councilors

There was no complete and reliable list of white city councilors so I had to

compile one. To do this, I collected the names and addresses of all the white
cou ncilors in municipalities where a where at least one black councilor
responded in my earlier su rvey. I began by examining the webpages of these
204 municipalities in hopes of finding a picture and address for each councilor. I f
this online search was unsu ccessful for a particular councilor (this occurred about
57 .8% of the time), then I placed a telephone call to the municipal clerk or council
staff to obtain the information. Not surprisingly, the u nique natu re of my request
created some difficulties even when I asked for a city hall address rather than a
home address. Clerks in five municipalities refused to assist me and four others
would not divulge the information u nless I provided them with a formal request on
university letterhead.

Despite the recalcitrance of some clerks, I obtained the

information for 96.1% of the municipalities.
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Once I assembled my list of white councilors, I sent questionnaires to all
797 individuals on the list. The primary limitation of this strategy is that the
perceptions and demographics reported are not representative of the total
population of white councilors who serve on mixed-race councils. Even so, this
flaw is apparently not fatal since Button and Hedge (1996: 201) relied on a
similar approach in their study of black and white state legislators. They selected
their sample of whites "from states with two or more black survey respondents
and the number of white legislators was selected in proportion to the number of
black legislators in each house of those states who had responded to [their]
earlier survey." More importantly, however, there is some degree of randomness
in my study because I selected my sample of white councilors from municipalities
where a randomly drawn black councilor responded to my earlier survey.

In

other words, some degree of randomness from my survey of black councilors
finds its way into my survey of their white counterparts. Therefore, the white
respondents are representative of those who serve in the municipalities where a
black lawmaker responded to the first survey.

This allows me to make

informative comparisons between the two groups so long as it is understood that
they are only valid for the narrow class of cities where a black councilor
responded to my earlier survey.
Just like my earlier survey, I constructed the questionnaires for the white
councilors according to the approach described by Dillman (2000 & 1978). I sent
the initial mailing in the summer of 2003 with a stamped return envelope and a
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cover letter explaining my study's purpose.

I sent all non-respondents two

subsequent mailings consisting of a postcard reminder and duplicate survey
packet.

Precisely when I sent the follow-ups depended upon whether I was

sending the materials to a home address or a city hall address. 3

For home

addresses (46.7% of the potential respondents), I sent the follow-ups in two week
intervals after the initial mailing, but I sent my subsequent mailings to city hall
addresses (53.3% of the potential respondents) in monthly intervals. I modified
the timing of my follow-up procedures because recent evidence suggests that
approximately 69% of city councils meet twice a month and about 20% meet
once a month (MacManus and Bullock 2003). Hence, I adopted this strategy to
avoid situations where the councilors receive the initial survey packet and the
follow-ups simultaneously. I n the end, my response rate for home addresses
was 46.77%, my response rate for city hall addresses was 41.98%, and my
overall response rate was a respectable 44.22% (352 total responses out of 796
potential respondents).
I was not surprised that my survey of white councilors had a higher
response rate than my survey of black councilors.

This can probably be

attributed to the shorter questionnaire I sent to the white lawmakers and the fact
that the timing my follow-up procedures differed. Another possible explanation,
3

For my survey of white councilors, my telephone calls to municipal clerks
revealed whether a particular address was a home address or city hall address.
However, for my survey of black councilors, I was unable to distinguish between
the two types of addresses by simply looking at the JCPES's roster.
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although less compelling, is that the some black lawmakers-especially those
who serve on predominantly white councils-may have feared that their
responses could somehow be used against them (Cf. , Abbe and Hermsen 2003 :
239). This may be the case because racial issues remain contentious and
divisive. As some public figures have learned, controversial statements about
racial issues have the potential to generate a tremendous public outcry that can
. adversely affect the status of their · employment (witness Trent Lott, Rush
Limbaugh, and Jimmy 'The Greek").

Finally, the literature on political

participation generally - demonstrates that black citizens are less inclined to
participate in politics in than white citizens (Ashenfelter and Kelley 1975;
Campbell et al. 1960; Matthews and Prothro 1963 ; Verba and Nie 1972).
Although this gap narrows when · socioeconomic variables are controlled
(Antunes and Gaitz 1975 ; Orum 1966; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), it may,
nevertheless, help to explain the difference in the two response rates.

Additional Data

I decided that a number of city-level variables-especially those pertaining
to the municipality's governmental structure and electoral · format-should be
included in my dataset given their importance to students of local politics. Even
so, I did not inquire about these variables in the aforementioned surveys because
I initially thought this information was available through archival sources;
because including additional items in my questionnaires might jeopardize my
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response rate; and, because the respondents might be unable to answer items
that applied to other political actors in their municipality. U nfortunately, as data
collection progressed, I realized that archival sources were not very helpful
because they were either incomplete or outdated (Carpenter with Provorse 1996;
I nternational City/County Management Association 1996 & 2002; Schmittroth
2001). Thus, it became necessary for me to develop an alternative strategy for
collecting this information for all the municipalities where a lawmaker respondent
to my earlier surveys.
I relied on the Census Bureau's factfinder webpage to obtain information
about the municipality's total population and racial composition (U.S. Bureau of
the Census 2000). Next, I sent a six page questionnaire to municipal clerks
asking about their municipality's governmental structure. I mailed these
questionnaires in the fall of 2003, and I sent a duplicate survey packet to non
non-responding municipalities about one month later (See Appendix C.). For this
instrument, I borrowed most of my questions from a 2001 survey of municipal
clerks administered by the I nternational City-County Management Association
(I CMA).

Likewise, Susan MacManus of the University of South Florida

generously provided me a copy this dataset, which occasionally helped me fill in
data from non-responding cities. I n the end, this strategy yielded information for
64.37% of the municipalities in my study.
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Measurement
My su rveys of black and white councilors consisted of a series of items intended
to estimate the quality of black legislative life-a concept formulated by Hedge,
Button , and Spear (1 996). Drawing heavily on their work, I took a broad view of
this concept and relied on both open and closed-ended questions to assess how
black lawmakers and their interests fare within city cou ncils. I borrowed many
questions from previous works (Barrett 1 995; Button and Hedge 1 996; Hedge,
Button , and Spear 1 996) to alleviate concerns over question wording and
facilitate comparisons between the views of the state legislators that these other
schola rs studied .

I n short, I heeded the advice of Maestas, Neeley, and

Richardson (2001 : 1 00) who encouraged researchers to "Standardize question
wording and response scales for commonly studied concepts."
I n my su rvey of black councilors, one set of items focused on the personal
experiences of these lawmakers so I could assessed their individual careers.
Here, I asked them whether they personally experienced discrimination, whether
they felt compelled to work harder than whites to gain respect, the number of
committees they chaired , and whether they were satisfied with their committee
assignments (See Appendix A.). Conversely, I asked white councilors whether
they observed one or more instances of racial discrimination against a black
councilor, and whether their black counterpart(s) must work harder than whites to
gain respect (See Appendix 8. ).
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I relied on a second set of items to determine how well black interests in
general fared within mixed-race city councils.

I asked both black and white

councilors this entire battery of questions because both groups had a basis for
responding. Specifically, I inquired about (1 ) the overall quality of race relations
within the respondent's council , (2) the amount of influence black councilors
wield, (3) whether a councilor's race influences his or her ability to obtain
leadership positions, (4) whether black councilors experience discrimination
when seeking committee assignments, and (5) the likelihood of black councilors
interacting with the mayor compared to whites. In short, these questions gave
me an overall sense of the black legislative experience and the role blacks play
within city councils.
It is important to note that I measure the quality of black legislative life in
largely subjective terms that are predicated on the lawmakers' personal opinions
and perceptions. Hence, critics will likely to point out-and rightly so-that the
respondents' perceptions may be different than the actual conditions that exist
within the councils. Like others (Welch and Bledsoe 1 985), I relied on perceptual
data because it allowed me to employ a large-N design rather than one that
restricted my focus to the small number of cities where objective measures are
available through archival sources.

I favored the large-N approach because it

provided me with a means of control and it allowed me to make broad
generalizations. However, the disadvantage of this strategy is that there are only
two

objective

measures

at

my

disposal :
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(1 )

self-reported

committee

chairmanships, and (2) self-reported bill passage raies.

However, neither

measu re proved to be especially helpful for th is project.

The committee

chairmanship va riable is of little use because only about one-third of my councils
have committees. Thus, the small nu mber of observations confounds statistical
analysis. Self-reported bill passage rates do not have this problem, but they are
probably a better measu re of su bstantive representation than the quality of black
legislative life.

Hence, it seems more appropriate to set this data aside for a

different project that narrowly focuses on that topic. Although I rely exclusively
on perceptual data, th is does detract from the significance of my work. The
lawmakers' perceptions are important in their own right because they probably
d ictate how the councilors behave (Button , Richards, Bethune 1 998; Hedge,
Button, and Spear 1 996). That is, lawmakers operate in a world where objective
information is not always at their disposal; so, to compensate, they look to their
personal experiences when decid ing how to conduct themselves.

Summary of My Methodology
The preceding sections reveal that my study, like any piece of research , has
limitations that generate some degree of uncertainty about its resu lts.

In my

view, these limitations are minor and neither compromise my study's overall
integrity nor outweigh its scholarly contribution. As one oft cited sou rce explains,
"An important topic is worth studying even if little information is available. The
resu lt of applying any research design in this situation will be relatively uncertain
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conclusions, but so long as we honestly report our uncertainty, this kind of study
can be very useful" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 6). Therefore, despite its
flaws, my data are well suited to answering the questions I pose here. Namely,
what is the quality of black legislative life on mixed-race city councils in the
United States? And, what factors account for the variance in the quality of the
black councilors' perceptions?
· I n the end, I believe that a large-N survey research strategy is best suited
for exploring these questions. I found this strategy to be superior to a case study
approach because it enabled me to make broad generalizations and control for
intervening variables. To implement this strategy, I sent 1000 surveys to black
city councilors and 797 surveys to their white counterparts throughout the United
States.4 The comparative aspect of my design allowed me to look at the black
legislative experience from two different perspectives-black and white.

This

was important because similarities between the two groups might facilitate
accommodation, while differences might result in conflict and/or discrimination
(Button and Hedge 1996). The comparative strategy also helped me to interpret
some of my findings because information collected from the white councilors
could sometimes be used as a baseline for assessing the black legislative
experience. Therefore, regardless of its limitations, my study makes a valuable
4

Although I initially sent 1,000 surveys to black city councilors, I calculated my
response rate based on a sample size of 761 individuals. I did so because
phone calls to city clerks revealed that 239 nonrespondents were no longer in
office and unlikely to receive mail sent to them at city hall.
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contribution by greatly increasing our understandi ng of the black experience in
local legislative bodies.
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CHAPTER FOUR

A COMPARISON OF BAC K AN D WH ITE COUNCI LORS
Introduction

In this chapter, my primary objective is to compare the black and white city
councilors.

I begin by using descriptive statistics to contrast their personal

profiles and constituencies. Next, I compare how they perceive the quality of
black legislative life. Finally, I identify a series of independent variables likely to
condition the responses of the two groups of councilors. I n doing so, I examine
the quality of black legislative life in . terms of region, gender, city size,
governmental structure, electoral format, and the racial composition of both the
council and the lawmaker's constituency.
My data show that black and white city councilors generally have similar
profiles. However, the two groups are fundamentally different in terms of their
constituencies and perceptions.

Although many black councilors report a

positive legislative experience, significant differences emerge when I compare
their perceptions to those maintained by white councilors. I n other words, the
black respondents generally say they are satisfied and successful, but many still
have a more pessimistic outlook than their white counterparts. This suggests a
disconnect between the two groups such that the white lawmakers neither
completely understand their black colleagues nor recognize the barriers they face
while serving. These differences remain when I control for other factors.
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A Descriptive Profi le of the Councilors
Demographic Characteristics

Black and white councilors share many of the same demographic
characteristics. Both groups are older individuals whose average age is 58.5 for
black councilors and 56.7 for white councilors. Both groups have deep roots in
their community. On average, black councilors have resided in their community
for 39.3 years while their white colleagues have resided there for 38.5 years.
Furthermore, the two groups have a comparable amount of legislative experience
and seniority. Black councilors, on average, have held their seat for just over 1O
years while their white counterparts have been serving for 8.5 years. As for
gender , both groups are predominantly male, though there are slightly more
females among the black councilors (28.8% vs. 21.3%).
Some important socioeconomic distinctions can be drawn · between the
two groups. The majority of both groups tend to be well-educated-61.8% of the
black councilors and 65.1 % of the white councilors have a college degree.
However , the black councilors are more likely to have an advanced degree
(40.6%) than their white counterparts

(31 %).

Despite this additional

achievement, they are less likely than whites to be lawyers or members of
another profession (See Table 2.). Instead, they are more likely than whites to
be governmental employees or educators such as teachers, principals,
superintendents, and college professors.
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Table 2
Principal Occupations of Black and Wh ite City Cou ncilors
Black Councilors
Retired

%
28.8

Teachers or Educators

White Councilors

55

%
24.2

79

1 5.7

30

6.1

20

Other Professionals

1 0.5

20

1 7.4

57

Government Employees

1 0.5

20

4.9

16

Business Executives or Managers

6.8

13

7.6

25

Business or Industry Employees

6.8

13

9.2

30

Self-Employed or Business Owners

5.2

10

7.3

24

Other

4.2

8

1 .5

5

Service Industry Employees

2.6

5

0.3

1

Lawyers

2. 1

4

8.3

27

Craftsmen, Tradesmen, Artists

2.1

4

4.6

15

Full-Time Councilor o r Mayor

2.1

4

5.8

19

Clergy

1 .6

3

0.6

2

Framers or Ranchers

0.5

1

0.3

1

Homemakers

0.5

1

1 .8

6

1 00%

1 91

1 00%

327

Total =

80

N

N

The two groups, as expected , differ in terms of their party identification
and ideology.

The overwhelming majority of black councilors are Democrats

(9 1 .2%) compared to just over half of white respondents (51 .7%). Conversely, a
high proportion of the white councilors are independents (1 9.9%) compared to a
low proportion of black councilors (4.4%).

Since many city councils are not

organized by partisanship, the respondent's ideology is perhaps a more
important factor to consider. Here too, the groups differ, but this gap is less
pronou nced than the one associated with party identification. On a seven-point
scale ranging very liberal to very conservative, the mean score for white
respondents is 4.63 compared to 4.0 1 for black respondents. Thus, both groups
fall in the "moderate range," and whites tend to position themselves more toward
the conservative-end of the political spectrum than blacks. This finding stands in
stark contrast to a recent study of state legislators. Using the same scale, Button
and Hedge (1 996) fou nd that their white respondents had an average score of
4.5 while their black respondents' mean score was a relatively liberal 3 . 1 . The
black councilors' more moderate ideology can be attributed to the unexpectedly
large proportion of ideological conservatives in my sample (32.7%).

The Councilors' Constituencies

The vast majority of the black councilors (71 .3%) come from the 1 1 states
that formerly belonged to the Confederacy. They also hail from cities with an
average population of 72,688. However, a closer look at the distribution reveals
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that a considerable proportion of them reside in small communities. Just over
half serve in municipalities . with less than 10,000 people, while about one-third
serve in communities with less than 5,000 people. Not surprisingly, these cities
tend to have sizeable black populations. Black councilors serve in communities
where black residents, on average, comprise 41.36% of their city's total
population. These cities generally have biracial populations composed almost
exclusively of · black and white residents.

Granted, my data show that some

municipalities in the Southwest and West do have appreciable H ispanic
populations, but this is the exception rather than the rule.

Thus, the mean

Hispanic population in cities with a black respondent is only 6.38%, the median
drops to 2.32%, and the mode is 0%.
The black and white councilors have very little in common in terms of their
constituencies.

Although about one-third of both groups represent an urban

constituency, there are noteworthy differences in non-urban settings. The black
cou ncilors are much more l ikely to represent a small-town constituency {56.6%)
and are less likely to represent a suburban constituency {6.8%) than whites
{45. 1% small-town and 18.7% suburban). Moreover, a slightly higher proportion
of the black councilors represent a rural constituency than whites (8.3% vs.
3. 4%).
The black councilors are generally elected from wards {61%) although a
healthy proportion of them (39%) have managed to win their seat in an at-large
contest.

These individuals tend to represent economically disadvantaged
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constituencies that are predominantly black. My data show that 33% of the black
respondents compared to only 8.3% of the white respondents represent a
constituency with an average family income under $20,000. Likewise, the mean
percentage of black residents represented by a black councilor is 54.99%
compared to 26.77% for white councilors. This finding came as no surprise since
Voting Rights Act litigation has encouraged (and in some cases has mandated)
the creation of majority-black wards. Nevertheless, some of white councilors (37
respondents, or 11.7%) represent a majority-black constituency and a large
number of black councilors (48 respondents, or 24%) represent a predominantly
white constituency. This suggests that, to some extent, councilors of both races
have transcended racial barriers in the electoral process.

Although my data

cannot explain why this occurs, it is very possible that these individuals are
successful because they have demonstrated their commitment to their
constituents' substantive interests.

Conversely, voters may be beginning to

attach greater importance to a candidate's qualifications and their perceived
ability to deliver substantive benefits rather than their descriptive characteristics.

Perceptions of the Quality of Black Legislative Life

My questionnaires contained a series of items designed to measure the quality of
black legislative life-the central concept in my study.

I asked both sets of

councilors about the quality of race relations within their council, the amount of
influence that black members wield, whether the black lawmakers feel they must
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work harder than whites to gain respect, whether discrimination exists, and the
likelihood of black councilors interacting with the mayor compared to whites.

Thus, I relied on many indicators so I could gain a comprehensive understanding
of the black legislative experience in local government.
The Black Councilors ' Perceptions

The black councilors' perceptions are interesting in their own right.

Hence, I explore their views in isolation before I examine them from a
comparative perspective. As Table 3 demonstrates, very few black councilors

negatively evaluate their legislative experience. Only 7.9% say race relations are

"poor'' on their council; only 15.9% say blacks councilors exert little or no
influence;

about two-thirds

say they have

not personally experienced

discrimination; only 14. 3% say they perceive a "great deal" of discrimination in

committee assignments; and, over three-fourths say they are satisfied with their
committee assignments.

These findings are certainly cause for optimism

because they evince that black councilors are generally satisfied, successful, and

operate in a collegial legislative environment. This evidence is consistent with
view espoused by the civil rights activists who embrace the BEST.

These

activists believe that, once elected, the black lawmakers will have little difficulty
assimilating into legislative bodies because the intimate setting, continuous

voting opportunities, and institutional rules promote accommodation rather than
exclusion.
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Table 3
Black City Councilors' Assessments of the Quality of Black Legislative Life
Black Councilors
N
%

Assessment
Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None
Quality of race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
Race influences leadership positions
Yes
No
Likelihood of interacting with the mayor compared to whites
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites
Perceived discrimination in committee assignments
A Great Deal
Some
None at All
Personal satisfaction w/ committee assignments
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain respect
Agree
Disagree
Personally experienced racial discrimination
Yes
No

43.5
40.7
1 2.6
3.3
1 00%

93
87
27
7
214

1 4.9
46.5
30.7
7.9
1 00%

32
1 00
66
17
21 5

55.7
44.3
1 00%

112
89
201

23.4
49.8
26.8
1 00%

49
1 04
56
209

1 4.3
27.8
57.9
1 00%

18
35
73
1 26

76. 7
23. 3
1 00%

99
30
1 29

76. 7
23.3
1 00%

1 65
50
21 5

31 .1
68.9
1 00%

65
1 44
209

Note. The N drops for some items because many councils do not have committees.
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Although there is cause for optimism, two items in my questionnaire
suggest that race still matters. A majority of the black councilors say that race is
used as a factor when leadership positions are awarded. And, over three-fourths
feel compelled to work harder to gain respect because of their race. As one
black councilor put it:
I think as an African-American elected official, you are always held
to a higher standard. You have to be more prepared and know the
issues. Other members of the group, if they belong to _the majority
race, do not have to prepare and are not held to the same
standard.
These two items clearly show that, despite their overall satisfaction, local black
lawmakers do not operate in a colorblind environment where there are no racial
obstacles left to confront.

I nstead, there remains a tension between the

accomplishments that the black lawmakers have made and the barriers they
continue to face. This tension is reflected in the comments that several black
councilors wrote on the back cover of their questionnaires. One person outlined
his legislative and political achievements, then lamented that "race is still a factor
a lot of times in decision making." Another stated, "as the junior member of the
council (in terms of tenure) many of the perceived and/or real barriers have been
resolved-almost!"
At first glance, some of my data (especially the two aforementioned items)
seem to bolster Lani Guinier's contention that the BEST is defective. However, a
closer examination shows that she overstates her case by suggesting that white
lawmakers engage in a systematic effort to render their black counterparts
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ineffective. Although my data show that racial obstacles persist , they are not
indicative of a pervasive- effort to marginalize the black councilors. First, there
cannot be a wide-spread effort of this nature because too many black councilors
claim to be satisfied and successful. Second, even the two items that imply a
poor legislative experience are not compelling evidence a systematic effort. The
fact that black councilors feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain
respect neither means they are marginalized nor precluded from succeeding at
this endeavor. Indeed, many respondents would probably agree that they have
ultimately earned the respect of their colleagues since so many report that blacks
wield "a lot" of influence on their council. Granted, the leadership item is more
problematic and should not be summarily dismissed. Nevertheless, the question
technically leaves open the possibility that blacks are awarded leadership
positions because of their race. In other words, this question's wording does not
specify how race influences leadership positions although it demonstrates that
the black lawmakers do not serve in a colorblind environment.

Even if this

question is interpreted in the light most favorable to Guinier's argument, standing
alone, it only provides weak support for her position.
Another interesting issue is whether there is a distinction between how the
respondents assess their individual career versus the collective experience of
blacks councilors. As Table 3 demonstrates, only one item suggests that this
distinction is meaningful: the item that shows over three-fourths of the black
councilors feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain respect. However,
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for other aspects of their individual career, the respondents assessments were
generally positive and consistent with their perceptions of the collective
experience of blacks. Namely, 68.9% say they have not personally experienced
discrimination, and 76. 7% say they are satisfied with their committee
assignments. In short, the "working harder to gain respect" item seems to be an
anomaly because, aside from it, there does not appear to be much difference
between the personal and collective experiences of black lawmakers.

The Black Legislative Experience From A Comparative Perspective

Bivariate crosstabulations reveal remarkable differences in how the two

sets of councilors view the black legislative experience (See Table 4.). In fact,
their perceptions are so divergent that two-tailed chi-square tests show
statistically significant differences for all of the indicators. 5 Moreover, with only
once exception (black influence on the council), the differences are significant at
the .00 1 level.

White councilors overwhelmingly report that their black

colleagues have a positive experience and encounter few barriers or inequalities
that might hamper their legislative effectiveness. Although many black councilors
concur with this assessment, blacks still tend to be more cynical than whites
about their standing on their council, and they are still more likely than whites to
identify racial barriers that impede their progress.
5

To perform these chi-square tests, I was required to merge my black and white
datasets together.
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Table 4
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the
Quality of Black Legislative Life
Assessment

Black
(N = 1 99)

White
(N = 325)

Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

43.5%**
40.7
1 2.6
3.3

52. 1 %
41 .3
6.0
0.6

Quality of race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 4.9%***
46.5
30.7
7.9

51 .2%
38.7
8.6
1 .5

Blacks must work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

76.7%***
23.3

1 1 .5%
88.5

Likelihood of interacting with the mayor compared to whites
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

23.4%***
49. 8
26.8

1 9.4%
71 . 1
9.5

Race influences leadership positions
Yes
No

55.7%***
44.3

1 6. 9%
83. 1

Experienced or observed racial discrimination
Yes
No

34. 1 %***
65.9

2.4%
97.6

Perceived discrimination in committee assignments
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 4.3%***
27.8
57.9

0.3%
4.0
95.7

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed).
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I asked both groups several questions designed to gain an overall sense
of how blacks and their interests fare. Specifically, I prompted each group about
the amount of influence that blacks wield and the quality of race relations within
their councils (See Table 4.). Disparities narrowed between the groups when I
inquire about the amount of influence that black councilors hold. Just over half of
the white councilors report that their black colleague(s) maintain "a lot" of
influence compared to 43.5% of the black councilors. Approximately 40% of both
groups agree that the black councilor(s) possess at least "some" influence. On
its face, this finding is encouraging because it suggests that many black
councilors experience some indicia of legislative success.

Unfortunately, this

optimism quickly evaporates once I place this finding in a broader context. A
small yet meaningful percentage of the black councilors (approximately 16%) say
they possess little or no influence on their council, and the differences between
the two groups are statistically significant at the .01 level.
Perhaps more disconcerting are my findings about the quality of race
relations on the city councils. Almost 90% of the white respondents say that race
relations are either "good" or "excellent, " while only about 60% of black
responses fall into these two categories.

I nstead, the remaining black

respondents classify the race relations as either "fair'' or "poor."

Further, the

overwhelming majority of black councilors (76. 7%) agree that they must work
harder than whites to gain respect. Taken together, these findings suggest that
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although many black councilors believe they are influential, many also feel they
must su rmount additional hurdles in their quest for influence.
I also prompted the two groups about specific barriers that black
lawmakers might encounter. Over one-third of the black respondents say they
have either experienced or observed discrimination on their council, while very
few white respondents acknowledge instances of discrimination . Respondents
also had an opportunity to describe the discrimination they experienced or
witnessed . The open-ended responses show that discrimination manifests itself
in many forms ranging from "subtle" to "overt."

The most commonly cited

conduct was disparaging remarks directed at black councilors. One person, for
example, reported that a white col league called him an "Uncle Tom" because he
objected to the location of a traffic signal.

In another jurisdiction, a black

councilor described an egregious incident that occurred after he and another
black councilor found themselves on opposing sides of a divisive issue. During
the next council meeting, the city's white mayor displayed a picture of two black
jackasses with their tails bound together pulling in opposite directions.
A more serious problem was that some black councilors complained that
they were not fully included in the decision-making process. These individuals
insisted that their white colleagues discounted their input even when the policies
being d iscussed had a direct impact on black citizens. Similarly, it was common
for black councilors to report that they were intentionally kept out of the loop
when decisions were made.

A few respondents claimed that they were not
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informed of meeting times while another contended that his white colleagues
intentionally withheld important information from him.

Other black councilors

indicated that they had difficulty winning support for their legislation and that
discrimination was evident from their colleagues' voting patterns.
Black councilors in some municipalities reported that their white
colleagues were actively seeking- to institutionalize inequality or at least preserve
their hegemony on the council.

One person wrote that discrimination was

institutionalized on his council because, at council meetings, white lawmakers
were recognized to speak before the black lawmakers.

Conversely, black

councilors frequently complained about discrimination during the redistricting
process. I n fact, one respondent felt that his white colleagues attempted to have
their municipality annex land adjacent to their community with a large white
population so that they could preserve their majority on the council.
I t is especially important to learn about barriers that black councilors face
when

seeking

committee

assignments and leadership

positions

since

committees, those who chair them, and other legislative leaders have a
heightened ability to influence the content and passage of legislation (Davidson
and Oleszek 2004). Therefore, I relied on several closed-ended questions to tap
the councilors' perceptions on these topics. Again, the data show there is a
tremendous gap between the perceptions of the black and white councilors (See
Table 4. ).

Over 40% of the black councilors perceive at least some

discrimination in how committee assignments are awarded, but less than 5% of
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the white councilors agree with this assessment.

Likewise, a majority of the

black respondents say that race is a factor in the selection of leaders compared
to only 16.9% among whites.

Admittedly, this question leaves open the

possibility that white councilors may be denied leadership positions because of
their race and that race may be an asset to black councilors seeking a leadership
position. Hence, the item is not useful in establishing the precise nature of the
relationship although, at the very least, it demonstrates that many councilors
believe that they do not serve in a colorblind environment where race is never a
factor in how legislative spoils are allocated.

Explaining the Perceptual Gap

The preceding sections demonstrate that black and white councilors share many
of the same background characteristics, but their perceptions of the political
world are dissimilar. White councilors generally see the political landscape in
neutral terms where all lawmakers, regardless of race, have an equal opportunity
to participate in the legislative process. Although many black councilors agree
with this view (perhaps even a majority), a meaningful proportion of them do not.
Thus, black councilors, as a group, are more inclined than whites to report
discrimination and other racial barriers that detract from the quality of their
legislative experience. In this section, I use bivariate crosstabulations to identify
key factors that might influence the perceptions of the two groups and thereby
account for the perceptual gap between them.
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The literature generally shows that at-large electoral formats make it

difficult for black cand idates to succeed when the black population is relatively

small and racially polarized voting exists (See generally, Jones 1 976; Welch
1990; Zax 1990). Scholars, however, have not taken the next logical step by

asking whether the electoral format affects the quality of black legislative life

once black cand idates secure a place for themselves on the council. In Chapter

Two, I pred icted that this independent variable would play a critical role shaping
the black councilors' perceptions and that it is associated with a positive

legislative experience. Blacks who succeed in at-large contests probably do so
because they are able to cultivate the support of their city's white voters. If so,

this means they have an agenda and leadership style that is amenable to whites.

These individuals may find it easier to build bridges with their white colleagues on
the council, and they probably command more respect because the community

as a whole has sanctioned their presence on the council.

My data are consistent with this argument. Table 5 shows that black

councilors elected at-large view their legislative experience more positively than
those elected from wards. This trend is pervasive (all seven ind icators) and

typically robust such that this independent variable seems to be more meaningful

than the other ones I consider in this section. Black at-large councilors are more
likely than black ward councilors to say black lawmakers exert "a lot" of influence

(48. 6% vs. 40.4%). They are much more likely to say race relations are either
"excellent" or "good" (70.8% vs. 54.9%). A smaller proportion of them claim that
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Table 5
Black and Wh ite City Counci lors' Assessments of the Quality
of Black Legislative Life by Electoral Format
At-Large
Councilors

Ward
Councilors

Black
{N = 67)

White
{N = 1 86)

Black
{N = 1 02)

White
{N = 1 35)

48.6%
43. 1
5.6
2.8

55.5%
37.7
6.8
0

40.4%*
40.4
1 5.6
3.7

48.2%
46.0
4.4
1 .5

Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

20.8%**
50.0
25.0
4.2

43.2%
43.2
1 1 .5
2. 1

1 0. 8%***
44. 1
35. 1
9.9

6 1 .4%
32. 9
5.0
0.7

Must work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

69.0% ***
31 .0

1 1 .5%
88. 5

83.8%***
1 6.2

1 1 .0%
89.0

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

38.6%***
41 .4
20.0

1 8.3%
72.0
9.7

1 0.3%***
57.0
32.7

21 .5%
69.6
8.9

Race influence leadership positions
Yes
No

38.2%***
61 .8

1 7. 0%
83.0

65.7%***
34.3

1 7.2%
82.8

Experience or observe discrimination
Yes
No

23.6%***
76.4

1 .6%
98.4

44.5%***
55.5

3 .6%
96.4

9.5% ***
1 9.0
71 .4

0%
4.6
95.4

1 7.2%***
31 .3
51 .6

0.8%
3. 1
96.1

Assessment
Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Discrimination in committee assign.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < . 05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed).
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they must work harder than whites to gain respect (69% vs. 83.8% ).

A

significantly lower proportion of them say that race influences leadership
positions (38.2% vs. 65.7%). And, they are less likely to report discrimination
(23.6% VS. 44.5%).

It is important to note that statistically significant differences remain
between the black and white councilors regardless of whether they are elected
at-large or from a ward. This suggests that the electoral format conditions the
views of the black councilors, but it does not fully account for the perceptual gap
between blacks and whites. I nterestingly, the electoral format variable seems to
have little impact on the white respondents' perceptions. For them, it is only of
consequence (opposite direction than expected) when I prompted them about the
quality of race relations on the council. I could not identify an cogent argument
that explains this unusual finding.
The quality of black legislative life may also be a function of the racial
composition of the lawmakers' districts (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996). Here
too, the argument is that black councilors who represent a predominantly white
constituency enjoy greater support from whites on the council because they
possess an amenable agenda and leadership style. H ence, the perceptual gap
between black and white councilors should shrink or widen based on the racial
composition of the respondent's constituency. Specifically, I expect that blacks

96

representing majority-white constituencies will have perceptions that closely
resemble those of their white colleagues.
As Table 6 demonstrates, the racial composition of the lawmaker's
constituency is important. For six of the seven aspects of black legislative life,
blacks who represent a predominantly white constituency report a more positive
experience than those who represent a majority-black constituency. Accordingly,
black councilors who represent a majority-white constituency are less likely to
experience or observe discrimination than blacks who represent a predominantly
black constituency (25% vs. 33% ). They are less likely to report "a great deal" of
committee assignment discrimination (3.6% vs. 1 8%). They are less likely to say
race influences leadership positions (48.9% vs. 60.6%). A h igher percentage of
them say that blacks are more likely than whites to interact with the mayor
(30.4% vs. 21 . 8%). They are more inclined to classify race relations as either
"good" or "excellent" (66.7% vs. 57.1 %). And, they are less likely to agree that
blacks must work harder than whites to gain respect (72.3% vs. 80.5%). Despite
these find ings, it is important to note that statistically significant differences
remain between blacks and whites regardless of their constituencies' racial
composition. Therefore, in the end, the racial composition of the lawmaker's
constituency seems to modify the black councilors' perceptions, but it does not
close the pronounced perceptual gap between the black and white respondents.
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Table 6

Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the Quality of Black
Legislative Life by the Racial Composition of their Constituencies
Assessment

Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Majority White
Constituency
Black
White
(N = 43) (N = 222)

Majority Black
Constituency
White
Black
(N = 1 03) (N = 36)

45.8%*
39.6
8.3
6.3

50.4%
42.9
6.2
0.4

45.5%
39.3
1 2.5
2.7

69.4%
22.2
8.3
0

Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 8.8%***
47.9
22.9
1 0.4

51 . 1 %
38.4
8.7
1 .7

1 1 .6%***
45.5
34.8
8.0

62.2%
32.4
5.4
0

Work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

72.3%***
27.7

1 1 .0%
89.0

80.5%***
1 9.5

1 1 .4%
88.6

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

30.4%***
43.5
26. 1

1 8.0%
72.5
9.5

21 .8%*
50.0
28.2

27.0%
64.9
8. 1

Race influences leadership positions
Yes
No

48.9%***
51 . 1

1 5.3%
84.7

60.6%***
39.4

21 .9%
78. 1

Experience or observe discrimination
Yes
No

25.0%***
75.0

2.2%
97.8

33.0%**
67.0

5.4%
94.6

3.6%***
35.7
60.7

0.5%
3.4
96. 1

1 8.0%**
1 8.0
63.9

0%
6.1
93.9

Discrimination in committee assign.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).

98

Based on research pertaining to blacks and other disadvantaged groups
(Barrett 1997; Button and Hedge 1996; Kanter 1977; Thomas 1991 ), I assume
- that the rate at which blacks are represented in legislative bodies affects the
quality of their experiences. As Button and Hedge (1996: 213) explain, there is
a point at which black lawmakers "reach a critical mass or threshold beyond
which minority political influence will increase and discrimination will decrease."
For my analysis, it is probably unwise to use the proportion of black councilors as
the independent variable since that percentage can be quite large on small
councils even when there is only one black serving. As an alternative, I use the
number of black councilors as the independent variable, and I compare councils
with only one black member to those with two or more black members. In the
latter situation, black councilors are less politically isolated and they probably
wield more power by casting their votes as a bloc.
Table 7 demonstrates that the racial composition of the legislative body
matters. Blacks who serve on a council with at least one other black colleague
tend to report a more positive experience than solitary black councilors. In many
instances, this pattern is also evident in the responses of the white councilors
who acknowledge that blacks enjoy a better experience when multiple blacks are
serving.

Thus, the perceptual gap is apparently affected by the racial

composition of the council although statistically significant differences persist
between blacks and whites.
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Table 7
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the Qual ity of Black
Legislative Life by the Racial Composition of the City Council
One Black
Member
Wh ite
Black
(N = 45) (N = 90)

Two or More
Black Members
Black
White
(N = 1 51) (N = 234)

36.7%*
36.7
20.4
6.1

24.2%
61 .1
1 3.7
1 .1

45.5%***
41 .8
1 0.3
2.4

63.3%
33.3
3.0
0.4

8.2%***
53. 1
26.5
1 2.2

52.6%
39.2
7.2
1 .0

1 6.9%***
44.6
31 .9
6.6

50. 6%
38.5
9.2
1 .7

Must work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

88.0%***
1 2.0

1 9. 1 %
80.9

73.3%***
26.7

8.4%
91 .6

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

22.4%**
51 .0
26. 5

1 3.7%
75.8
1 0.5

23.8%***
49.4
26.9

2 1 .7%
69. 1
9. 1

Race influences leadership positions
Yes
No

6 1 .7%***
38.3

1 1 .1%
88.9

53.9%***
46. 1

1 9. 1 %
80.9

Experience or observe discrimination
Yes
No

30.6%***
69.4

2.0%
98.0

35.2%***
64.8

2.6%
97.4

Discrimination in committee assign.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 0. 0%***
40.0
50.0

1 .3%
5.3
93.4

1 5.6%***
24.0
60.4

0%
3.5
96.5

Assessment
Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None
Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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Judging by the data supplied by the black respondents, th is pattern clearly
holds true for three of the seven indicators-whether blacks must work harder to
gain respect, whether race influences leadership positions, and especially for the
amount of influence that blacks maintain on the council. Two other indicators
point toward this same conclusion, but the patterns are less pronounced. First,
black respondents who serve with another black colleague are more likely say
race relations are "excellent," and less likely to classify them as "poor'' than black
councilors who serve in isolation. Even so, this trend is reversed for the "good"
and ''fair'' categories. Second, black councilors who serve with at least one other
black colleague are less inclined to report discrimination in the awarding of
committee assignments than blacks who serve alone.

But a slightly higher

proportion of them say there is a "great deal" of committee assignment
discrimination compared to solitary black councilors (1 5.6% vs. 1 0.0%).
I nterestingly, two other items do not fit this general pattern. The racial
composition of the council seems to have no effect on the likelihood of black
councilors meeting with the mayor compared to white councilors (See Table 7.).
This seems to imply that the racial composition of the council only influences
things that occur within the council itself, not in the broader political environment.
The · other item that breaks with the general trend is the one dealing broadly with
discrimination.

Here, solitary black councilors are less likely to observe or

experience discrimination than black councilors who have at least one black
colleague on their council.

The most likely explanation for this is that the
1 01

presence of mu ltiple black cou ncilors, by virtue of their larger nu mber, gave
respondents more opportunities to witness discrimination being directed against
others.
Next, I examine whether the size of the municipality's black population
affects the qu ality of the black cou ncilors' experiences. My assu mption is that
black councilors will be more satisfied and successful if they serve in a city with a
large black popu lation. I n these places, white cou ncilors will have more black
constituents who vote on their tenure. Thus, the black commu nity, especially
when mobilized, can influ ence which whites are elected and how they behave
once they are in office. The literature does not explicitly make this connection,
bu t it points in this direction.

For example, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's

(1984) seminal work indicates that a mobilized black community is one key factor
that leads to the political incorporation of ethnic minorities.
As Table 8 shows, the size of the black community is important for certain
aspects of black legislative life. According to both black and white respondents,
black cou ncilors serving in cities with large black popu lations have greater
influ ence and are more likely to interact with the mayor.

Similarly, black

cou ncilors from communities with large or medium-sized black populations
perceive less discrimination (in general, and probably in the awarding of
committee assignments) than those from cities with small black populations.
This pattern, however, is not definitive for the remaining indicators and it is
reversed for the item regarding leadership positions on the council. H ence, for
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Table 8
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the Quality of Black
Legislative Life· by the Proportion of the City's Population that is Black
Proportion of the City's Population that is Black
Small
0 to 25%

Assessment

Medium
26 to 50%

Large
51 to 1 00%

(N=46)

Black

White
(N=99)

(N=86)

Black

White
(N=1 51 )

{ N=62)

Black

White
(N=58)

28.6%
51 .0
1 4.3
6.1

33.0%
55.0
1 1 .0
1 .0

43.6%*
39.4
1 3.8
3.2

57.4%
37.4
4.5
0.6

56. 1 %
33.3
9.1
1 .5

65.0%
31 .7
3.3
0

Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 8.4%***
40.8
26.5
1 4.3

53.9%
37.3
7.8
1 .0

1 3.7%***
46.3
33.7
6.3

51 .6%
38.1
8.4
1 .9

1 3.6% ***
51 .5
30.3
4.5

47.5%
39.3
1 1 .5
1 .6

Work haroer to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

72.9%***
27.1

1 3.9%
86.1

76.8%***
23.2

1 1 .1 %
88.9

77.6% ***
22.4

1 1 .7%
88.3

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

1 7.0%***
46.8
36.2

1 4.3%
77.6
8.2

21 .5%***
50.5
28.0

1 8.2%
72.7
9. 1

31 .3
51 .6
1 7.2

32.1
53.6
14.3

Race influences leadership
positions
Yes
No

51 . 1 %***
48.9

1 2.2%
87.8

55.2%***
44.8

1 4.0%
86.0

58. 1 %**
41 .9

30.4%
69.6

Experience/observe discrim.
Yes
No

40.8%***
59.2

2.9%
97.1

31 .9%***
68. 1

0%
1 00

31 .3%***
68.7

5.0%
95.0

Committee assign. discrim.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 2.9%***
35.5
51 .6

0%
4.4
95.6

1 0 .9%***
34.8

0.7%
3.6
95.7

1 5.6%***
1 7.8
66.7

0%
3.6
96.4

Black influence on council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

54.3

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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certain items, the black community's size influences how extensive the
perceptual gap is between the black and white respondents.

Gender may also cond ition the respondents' perceptions. Some scholars

have argued that black female lawmakers may be disadvantaged once by virtue

of their race and once by virtue of their gender (Button and Hedge 1996; Darcy

and Hadley 1988). Hence, I anticipate that black female councilors will be more
apt to report discrimination and have a more pessimistic outlook than black
males.

My results lend only partial support for my assumption _(See Table 9.).

Black female councilors are much more likely than black male councilors to

report d iscrimination in the awarding of committee assignments. Furthermore,

they are slightly more likely to experience or observe discrimination and say race

relations on their council are "poor." Nevertheless, there is hardly any d ifference

between how black male and female councilors perceive black influence on their

cou ncil and whether race influences one's ability to obtain leadership positions.
For the two remaining items (respect, and interacting with the mayor), the

relationship is in the opposite direction. Major d ifferences also persist between
black and white respondents even when gender is held constant. Simply put,

gender only accounts for some of the perceptual gap between the black and

white councilors and only for a few aspects of black legislative life.
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Table 9
Black and White City Councilors' Assessme nts of the
Quality of Black Legislative Life by Gender
Assessment
Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Men
White
Black
(N =1 39) {N = 251 )

Women
White
Black
( N = 56) (N = 67)

43.4%**
40.8
1 2.5
3.3

53. 1 %
41 . 1
5.4
0.4

42.6%
41 .0
1 3. 1
3.3

51 .5%
38.2
8.8
1 .5

Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 4.5%***
48.0
32.2
5.3

50.4%
39.6
8. 1
1 .9

1 6 . 1 %***
41 . 9
27.4
1 4.5

52.9%
35.7
1 1 .4
0

Must work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

78.3%***
2 1 .7

8.7%
91 .3

72.6%***
27.4

1 9.7%
80.3

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

20. 1 %***
53.7
26 . 2

20.0%
71 .2
8.8

30.5%**
40.7
28.8

1 8. 8%
69.6
1 1 .6

Race influ. leadership positions
Yes
No

56.6%***
43.4

1 5.7%
84.3

54.4%***
45.6

22.7%
77.3

Experience/observe discrimination
Yes
No

32.9%***
67. 1

2.7%
97.3

37.7%***
62.3

1 .4%
98.6

Discrimination in committee assign.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 1 . 1 %***
24.7
64.2

0%
3.4
96.6

20. 5%***
34. 1
45.5

1 .6%
6.3
92. 1

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed).

1 05

At the outset, I assumed geographic region would be important and that
black councilors serving in the South (especially in the Deep South) would
encounter more racial obstacles.

Moreover, I expected that the perceptual

disparities between black and white councilors would be the widest in the Deep
South because of that region's history of racial strife. My data did not support my
assumptions. Table 10 shows statistically significant differences between the
black and white councilors, but these differences transcend all three geographic
regions.
White councilors have remarkably similar perceptions regardless of
region.

The black councilors perceptions differ from region-to-region, but no

clear pattern equates the South with a lower quality of black legislative life. The
only item consistent with this assumption is the one asking whether a councilor's
race influences his or . her ability to obtain leadership positions.

Here, black

councilors from the Deep South and Rim South are more likely to answer
affirmatively than those from the Non-South.

Black councilors from the Deep

South are also more likely to report a "great deal" of discrimination in the
awarding of committee assignments. However, this evidence is not as powerful
because a higher percentage of blacks from the N on-South reported more
committee discrimination than those from the Rim South.
Contrary to my initial assumption, there are several instances where black
councilors from the Non-South report a poorer experience than those from the
two southern regions. First, a larger proportion of blacks from the N on-South
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Table 1 0
Black and White City Cou ncilors' Assessments of the
Quality of Black Legislative Life by Region
Deep South
Assessment

Region
Rim South

Non-South

Black influence on council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Black
(N=78)

White
(N=1 04)

Black
(N=61 )

White
(N=1 1 6)

Black
(N=58)

White
(N=105)

41 .2%*
41 .2
1 4.1
3.5

57.4%
36. 1
5.6
0.9

43.3%
43.3
1 0.4
3.0

54.3%
41 .4
3.4
0.9

46.8%
37. 1
1 2.9
3.2

44.4%
46.3
9.3
0

Race relations on council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 4.0% ***
45.3
32.6
8.1

55. 1 %
38.3
3.7
2.8

1 7.9% ***
53.7
26.9
1 .5

49.2%
38.3
12.5
0

12.9%***
40.3
32.3
1 4.5

49.5%
39.4
9.2
1 .8

Work harder for respect
Agree
Disagree

77.0%***
23.0

1 1 .1 %
88.9

77.3%***
22.7

7 .8%
92.2

75.8% ***
24.2

1 5.9%
84. 1

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

24.7%*
48.2
27.1

1 9.4%
68.0
1 2.6

1 8.8%*
57.8
23.4

1 9.0%
71 .6
9.5

26.7%***
43.3
30.0

1 9.8%
73.6
6.6

Race influ. leadership posit.
Yes
No

63.3%***
36.7

1 5.5%
84.5

58.1 % ***
41 .9

16.7%
83.3

43.3% **
56.7

1 8.4%
81 .6

Experience or observe
discrimination
Yes
No

32 . 9 %***
67.1

0%
1 00

29 . 9 %***
70.1

4.2%
95.8

40 .3 % ***
59.7

2.8%

Discrimination in committee
assignments.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 9.6%***
23.9
56.5

1 .1 %
5.5
93.4

9.4%***
28. 1
62.5

0%
2.7
97.3

1 2.5%***
31 .3
56.3

0%
4.0
96.0

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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97.2

(14 . 5%) say that race relations are "poor'' in comparison to the respondents from
the other regions (8.1% for the Deep South, and 1.5% for the Rim South).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, black councilors from the Non-South are
more likely to experience or observe racial discrimination. I n the end, the results
provide no compelling evidence that black councilors from any particular region
have a more positive experience.
I also attempted to link the type of city government to the quality of black
legislative life. The literature provides little guidance although one authoritative
work argues that the mayor-council format favors minority lawmakers by
increasing the likelihood that they will be incorporated into the council's dominant
decision-making coalition (Browning, Marshall , and Tabb 1984). These scholars
also point out that the mayor-council format benefits minority councilors by
increasing their individual power, which would also seem to improve their
experience.
Table 11 shows that a city's governmental format is of little consequence
to the black l egislative experience. The white councilors' views are remarkably
similar regardless of their city's governmental format.

Likewise, only minor

differences distinguish the perceptions of black councilors hailing from mayor
council cities and those from council-manager cities.

A closer l ook at these

differences shows that black respondents from council-manager cities are slightly
more positive in. their assessment of race relations, interacting with the mayor,
and discrimination (both indicators). I n contrast, only two indicators (must work
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Table 1 1
Black and White City Counci lors' Assessments of the Quality of
Black Legislative Life by Governmental Format
Assessment
Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Mayor-Council
White
Black
(N = 91 ) ( N = 1 72)

Council-Manager
Black
White
(N = 74) (N = 1 20)

43.4%*
40.4
1 2. 1
4.0

52.8%
41 . 5
5.1
0.6

43.0%
43.0
1 1 .4
2.5

52.4%
39.5
7.3
0.8

Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 6.2%***
40.4
3 1 .3
1 2. 1

49.7%
42.4
6.8
1 .1

1 5. 0%***
50.0
31 . 3
3.8

52.4%
32.5
1 3.5
1 .6

Must work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

75. 0%***
25.0

1 1 .4%
88. 6

82. 3%***
1 7.7

9.7%
90.3

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

22.7%***
45.4
32.0

20.0%
72.9
7. 1

20.8%*
53.2
26.0

1 7. 1 %
71 .5
1 1 .4

Race influences leadership positions
Yes
No

52. 1 %***
47.9

1 6. 1 %
83.9

58.4%***
41 .6

1 8.0%
82.0

38. 0%***
62.0

2.9%
91 .7

32.9%***
67. 1

2.4%
97.6

1 3. 8%***
29.3
56.9

0%
4.2
95.8

1 2.2%***
22.4
65.3

0%
2.8
97.2

Experience or observe discrimination
Yes

No

Discrimination in committee assign.
A Great Deal
Some
None at AH

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < . 001 (all tests two-tailed).
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harder to gain respect, and race influences leadership positions) seem to favor
the mayor-council format, but these differences were trivial as well.

I n short,

governmental format does not seem to matter much and it is of little use
explaining the perceptual gap between the black and white councilors.
Students of local politics generally believe that city size is an important
variable to consider although nobody has established an empirical or theoretical
connection between it and the quality of black legislative life. Therefore, in the
absence scholarly guidance, I analyzed the variable because researchers
generally find it to be important. As with my other independent variables, there
are statistically significant differences between black and white councilors for
almost every item.
No clear pattern helps explain the perceptual gap between the two groups
of lawmakers (See Table 12.). Three of the seven indicators suggested that
black councilors from large cities enjoy a more positive experience in terms of
their overall influence, . interacting with the mayor, and leadership positions. I n
contrast, data supplied by just the black respondents shows that council race
relations are better in small and mid-sized communities. The items dealing with
discrimination are also inconsistent. Black councilors from large cities are more
likely than blacks serving in small or medium-sized cities to report they have
either experienced or observed discrimination.

But the opposite is true of

discrimination narrowly pertaining to committee assignments. I n short, my
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Table 1 2
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the
Quality of Black Legislative Life by City Size
City Size

Small
0 to 1 4,999

Assessment

Medium
1 5,000 to 89,999

Large
90,000+

Black
(N=1 1 1 )

White
(N=1 30 )

Black
(N=54)

White
(N = 1 1 4)

Black
(N=34)

White
(N=80)

45. 1 % *
37.7
1 3. 1
4.1

51 .5%
43.2
3.8
1 .5

36.8%
43.9
1 5.8
3.5

42.0%
46.2
1 1 .8
0

48.6%
45.7
5.7
0

67.9%
30.9
1 .2
0

Race relations on council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 6.3% ***
47.2
29.3
7.3

56.3%
37.0
5.2
1 .5

1 2.3% ***
49. 1
31 .6
7.0

52. 1 %
37.0
9.2
1 .7

1 4.3% **
40.0
34.3
1 1 .4

41 .5%
43.9
1 3.4
1 .2

Work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

74.0% ***
26.0

1 3.5%
86.5

78 .9% ***
21 .1

1 1 .0%
89.0

82.9% ***
1 7.1

8.8%
91 .3

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

25.8% **
50.0

24.2

1 6.8%
72.5
1 0.7

1 0.7%**
57. 1
32. 1

1 6.4%
71 .6
1 2. 1

36.4% ***
36.4
27.3

28.2%
67.9
3.8

Race influences leadership
positions
Yes
No

55.9% ***
44.1

1 6.7%
83.3

60.7% ***
39.3

1 3.3%
86.7

47. 1 % **
52.9

22.2%
77.8

Experience or observe
discrimination
Yes
No

27.6% ***
72.4

2.2%
97.8

39.3% ***
60.7

0%
1 00

48.6% ***
51 .4

6.2%
93.8

Committee assign. Discrim.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 7.2%***
29.3
53.4

0.8%
4.1
95. 1

1 5.0% ***
32.5
52.5

0%
5. 1
94.9

7.1 % **
1 7.9
75.0

0%
2.5
97.5

Black influence on council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item .
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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findings for city size are mixed. This incoherent pattern makes it difficult for me
to formulate a logical explanation for what is occurring.
Finally, I consider the partisan nature of the council (partisan vs. non
partisan) as a potential explanation for the perceptual gap between black and
white councilors. Although the literature provides no guidance, I believe that this
variable might be connected to the black legislative experience. Black councilors
might thrive in a non-partisan environment because, in the absence of overt
partisanship, there is probably less wrangling among the members.
As Table 13 demonstrates, my data do not support my hypothesis.
Statistically significant differences persist between the black and white
respondents for almost all aspects of black legislative life. But the respondents'
perceptions within their particular group are virtually the same regardless of
whether their council is partisan or non-partisan. This is especially true for the
white councilors (all seven indicators) and generally true for the black councilors
(five of the seven indicators). For the black councilors, the only two exceptions
are with race relations and committee discrimination. The former suggests that
black legislative life is better in non-partisan councils while the latter favors
partisan councils. Consequently, the partisan variable does not seem to be
associated with the black legislative experience, and it does little to explain the
perceptual gap between blacks and whites.
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Table 1 3
Black and White City Councilors' Assessments of the Qual ity
of Black Legislative Life by Council Partisans hip

Assessment

Partisan
Councils
Black
White

Non-Partisan
Councils
Black
White

(N = 42)

(N = 71 )

(N = 92)

(N = 1 67)

40.9%
45.5
1 1 .4
2.3

44.6%
50.0
5.4
0

43.6%
38.6
1 2.9
5.0

53.2%
38.6
7.0
1 .2

Race relations on the council
Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor

1 3.0%***
37.0
39. 1
1 0.9

50.7%
43.8
2.7
2.7

1 5.8%***
51 .5
25.7
6.9

52.9%
37.4
9.2
0.6

Must work harder to gain respect
Agree
Disagree

76. 1 %***
23.9

1 2.5%
87.5

80.0%***
20.0

9.8%
90.2

20.5%*
52.3
27.3

23.9%
69.0
7.0

2 1 .4%***
53. 1
25.5

1 5.5%
76.8
7.7

Race influence leadership positions
Yes
No

53.3%***
46.7

1 8.8%
81 .2

55.2%***
44.8

1 5.5%
84.5

Experience or observe discrimination
Yes
No

37 .0%***
63.0

1 .4%
98.6

36 .0%***
64.0

2.9%
97.1

Discrimination in committee assign.
A Great Deal
Some
None at All

1 4 .3%***
1 7.9
67.9

0%
4 .4
95.6

1 2.3%***
31 .6
56. 1

0%
5.2
94.8

Black influence on the council
A Lot
Some
Only a Little
None

Interacting with the mayor
More Likely than Whites
As Likely as Whites
Less Likely than Whites

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < . 05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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Entirely Black City Councils: An Afterthought

I n my survey of black city councilors, thirty-four respondents - (13.12% of my
sample) serve on a council where all their colleagues are black. In the other
sections of this manuscript, I excluded these individuals from my statistical
analyses . because most items in my questionnaire focus on the nature of
black/white race relations.

However, in this section, I utilize this untapped

resource ·to explore whether blacks who serve on all-black councils are different
than those who serve on mixed-race councils. I begin by comparing the two
groups in terms of their personal profiles and constituencies. Next, I examine
whether they perceive their constituents' policy interests differently.

Finally, I

describe what issues seem to be most important to black citizens based on the
perceptions of their representatives.
The two sets of black councilors have remarkably similar profiles. I n terms
of age, both groups are in their mid to late fifties. Both groups have resided in
their community for a considerable length of time (about 40 years for blacks
serving on mixed-race councils and about 36 years for those serving on all-black
councils).

Both groups are well-educated since approximately 60% of each

group has earned a college degree.

Moreover, the two groups are

indistinguishable in terms of their partisanship and ideology. Over 90% of each
group are Democrats and both groups consider themselves to be ideological
moderates.

I n fact, on a seven-point scale ranging from very liberal to very

conservative, both groups have an almost identical score (4.1 vs. 4.0). Finally,
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there is almost no difference between the two groups in terms of the economic
well-being of their constituencies. The vast majority of both groups represent
economically disadvantaged constituencies where the average annual family
income does not exceed $40,000.
On the other hand, important distinctions can be still be drawn between
the two groups. Black councilors from mixed-race councils are predominantly
male (7 1 .2%), but those from all-black councils are predominantly female
(51 . 5%). The two groups also differ in terms of their seniority. Blacks from
mixed-race councils have served for a slightly longer time (1 0.07 vs. 7.71 years).
They also represent very different constituencies. A much larger proportion of
the black councilors from mixed-race councils serve in the South (7 1 .3%) than
those serving on all-black councils (52.9% ). They also serve in larger cities.
Black councilors from mixed-race councils serve in cities where the average
population is 72,688 (the median is 9,862), while those from all-black councils
serve in smaller communities where the average population is 4,404 (the median
is 1 ,346). Not surprisingly, the percentage of black residents in the municipalities
where the two groups serve is very different. On average, blacks serving on
mixed-race councils reside in communities where 41 .36% of the total population
is black.

I n contrast, black councilors serving on all-black councils hail from

communities where 79.35% of the residents are black.
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In light of these differences, a more interesting question is whether the two

sets of councilors have divergent views as to what issues are important to their

constituents. To explore this question, I relied on a series of items that asked the

respondents to assess the importance of urban renewal, jobs, housing, public
education, public assistance, and representation in office.

The bivariate

crosstabulations I present in Table 1 4 show there is virtually no distinction

between how the two groups perceive their constituents' needs. Chi-square tests

show that there is a statistically significant difference for only one of the seven
dependent variables-urban renewal.

This finding was unanticipated since

councilors serving on all-black city councils tend to live in smaller communities

than those serving on mixed-race councils. Perhaps this can be explained by the

fact that municipalities with small populations can still be located in major
metropolitan areas. Likewise, councilors from smaller, non-urban communities

may have interpreted "urban renewal" as encompassing any type of community

beautification project rather than those undertaken exclusively in urban settings.

Comparisons between councilors from mixed-race councils and all-black

councils are informative, but they are not without their limitations. The major
drawback is that these comparisons ignore the fact that the proportion of blacks

on mixed-race councils fluctuates greatly.

In response, I ran additional

crosstabulations where I divided the mixed-race councils by those where blacks
hold a majority and those where blacks remain a minority.

As Table 1 5

demonstrates, this distinction does not have much effect on how the respondents
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Table 1 4
Issues Im portant to Black Citizens: Perceptions of Blacks Serving on
Al l-Bl ack Councils and Those Serving on Mixed-Race Councils

Assessment

Urban renewal
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Jobs & economic opportunities
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Housing
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Public education
Very important
Somewhat important
Not Very important
Police accountability
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Public assistance
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Representation in office
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important

Respondents From
Mixed-Race Cou ncils
N
%

Respondents From
Al l-Black Councils
N
%

59.9*
28.4
1 1 .7
1 00%

118
56
23
1 97

82. 1
1 7.9
0
1 00%

23
5
0
28

90.5
5.7
3.8
1 00%

1 90
12
8
21 0

93. 1
6.9
0
1 00%

27
2
0
29

79.2
1 7.9
2.9
1 00%

1 64
37
6
207

78.6
1 7.9
3.6
1 00%

22
5
1
28

84.0
1 3. 1
2.9
1 00%

1 73
27
6
206

86.2
1 3.8
0
1 00%

25
4
0
29

81 .3
1 3.9
4.8
1 00%

1 69
29
10
208

86.2
1 3.8
0
1 00%

25
4
0
29

53.9
36.3
9.8
1 00%

110
74
20
204

67.9
28.6
3.6
1 00%

19
8
1
28

66.2
28.5
5.3
1 00%

1 37
59
11
207

86.2
1 3.8
0
1 00%

25
4
0
29

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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Table 1 5

Issues Im portant to Black Citizens: Perceptions of Black Councilors
By the Proportion of their Council that is Black
Assessment

Urban renewal
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Jobs & economic opportunities
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Housing
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Public education
Very important
Somewhat important
Not Very important
Police accountability
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Public assistance
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Representation in office
Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important

1 - 50% Black
(N = 1 50)

51 - 99% Black
(N = 56)

1 00% Blac,k
(N = 29)

58.0
30. 1
1 1 .9
1 00%

64.8
24. 1
1 1 .1
1 00%

82. 1
1 7.9
0
1 00%

89.6
7. 1
3.2
1 00%

92.9
1 .8
5.4
1 00%

93. 1
6.9
0
1 00%

76.8
20.5
2.6
1 00%

85.7
1 0.7
3.6
1 00%

78.6
1 7.9
3.6
1 00%

83.4
1 3.9
2.6
1 00%

85.5
1 0.9
3.6
1 00%

86.2
1 3.8
0
1 00%

79.6
1 5.8
4.6
1 00%

85.7
8.9
5.4
1 00%

86.2
1 3.8
0
1 00%

52.7
37.8
9.5
1 00%

57. 1
32. 1
1 0.7
1 00%

67.9
28.6
3.6
1 00%

64.9
29.8
5.3
1 00%

69.6
25.0
5.4
1 00%

86.2
1 3.8
0
1 00%

Note. Numbers enclosed in parentheses are approximations and vary by item.
*p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .001 (all tests two-tailed).
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assess their constituents' needs. Once again, chi-square tests show there are
no statistically significant differences between the black councilors assessments.
The crosstabulations in Tables 1 4 and 1 5 show that the majority of black
councilors, regardless of the proportion of blacks serving on their cou ncil ,
classify all the aforementioned issues as being "very important" to their
constituents. However, there is still enough differentiation in their responses to
determine what issues matter most to black citizens.

Jobs and economic

opportunities are clearly take precedence over other issues since approximately
90% of both groups of councilors say this is "very important" to their constituents.
This · is not surprising since jobs and economic opportunities can have a direct
and immediate effect on the well-being of black citizens. Education is also of
high priority, but it still is not quite as important as jobs and economic
opportunities. This probably is attributable to the fact that that the economic
benefits delivered by education are less immediate than those delivered by high
paying jobs or helpful economic opportunities.

Similarly housing is of great

concern, but it is still not quite as critical as jobs and economic opportunities.
This is, no doubt, attributable to the fact that the presence of high paying jobs will
assist black citizens in finding better housing. I n short, black councilors seem to
believe that jobs and economic opportunities are the key to the well-being of their
constituents.
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Interestingly, blacks serving on mixed-race councils are less likely to say

that representation in public office is as important to their constituents as some of
the other issues. This was unexpected since the literature suggests that most

civil rights activists believe that descriptive representation is the key to black

empowerment and substantive representation. One possible explanation is that

the black councilors feel that, by virtue of their presence on the council, their
constituents already have descriptive representation. They may also realize that

additional gains

in descriptive representation are unlikely

given racial

composition of their cities, past efforts to increase black representation, and the
racial climate within their community. However, this argument is undermined by

the fact that 86.2% of the black councilors from all-black councils say that

representation in public office is "very important."

A rival explanation can be derived from the from black economic

empowerment literature.

Empowerment theorists believe that the key to

achieving parity with whites is the development the black community's economic
resources. The idea is that "Black capitalists, entrepreneurs, and consumers

must develop a group consciousness with respect to economic development; the
black dollar has to stay in the black community longer than it presently does

(Hanks 1987: 158). Thus, an economically healthy black community can do

more for itself and can make more gains than the those that are realized through
black representation in public office. As Hanks explains (1987: 158), "Although

there is a role for government in the black economic facilitation process, there is
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a growing consensus that the ultimate answer to black economic inequality must
come within the black community." Therefore, black councilors may prioritize the
economic well-being of their constituents not only because it helps them get
reelected , but also because they subscribe to this view of black empowerment.

Discussion

My resu lts show that black and white city councilors have similar backgrounds
and personal profiles. Both groups are similar in age, have deep roots in their
community, and have served on the council for about the same length of time. A
significant proportion of both groups are well-educated and, surprisingly enough,
they both fall in the moderate range on the political spectrum (although black
councilors are still more liberal than their white colleagues). These commonalties
are important because they are likely to be a basis for cooperation between the
two g roups .
Despite this potential for bridge-building, fundamental differences still
remain between the two groups that are likely to be sources of friction. The two
groups are markedly different in their party affiliations, although this probably
matters less in the local context where many jurisdictions no longer use
partisanship as a mechanism for organizing their councils. More importantly, the
two groups represent vastly different constituencies that almost certainly have
different needs.

The black councilors tend to represent economically

disadvantaged d istricts with large black populations, while white councilors'
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districts tend to be more affluent with large white populations. It is therefore easy
to conceive of situations where the two sets of councilors might come into conflict
over how and where to spend their municipality's limited resources. The "where"
is particularly important in local race politics because black communities usually
live in a geographically confined area within their municipality rather than being
dispersed throughout it (Harrigan and Vogel 2000). Indeed, this argument is
supported by some of the open-ended responses provided by the black
councilors. One respondent, for example, commented that his white colleagues
sometimes grumbled when municipal funds were expended in the black
community and sarcastically asked, "Who pays the most taxes?" Another black
councilor indicated that his white colleagues disregarded the most urgent needs
(apparently in the predominantly black ward) when deciding how to dispense city
services.
The two groups also have strikingly different views about the quality of
black legislative life.

Wh ite councilors overwhelmingly say that their black

colleagues' experiences are positive and, only on rare occasions, do they identify
discrimination or report that race relations are impaired.

These sentiments

extend to all aspects of black legislative life and they appear consistently in the
"additional comments section" located at the very end of my questionnaires. In
this open forum, the main theme expressed by the white respondents is that their
council operates in a race-neutral manner where no invidious barriers encumber
their black colleagues' ability to participate in the legislative process. Granted,
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many black councilors concur with this assessment (perhaps even a majority),
but statistically sign ificant differences still remain between the two groups of
councilors. Blacks tend to be more pessimistic than whites about their legislative
experience, and they are more likely identify racial barriers. The survey item on
discrimination is ind icative of this contrast, as 34.4% of the black respondents
compared to only 2.4% of the white respondents reported instances of
discrimination (See Table 5. ).
These findings beg the question: who is right? Unfortunately, there is no
way of knowing which groups' perceptions come the closest to the actual
conditions that exist within local legislative bodies. Although objective measures
would be informative, the perceptions of the two groups should not be discounted
simply because they are perceptions. Councilors operate in an environment with
limited and i mperfect information such that they must rely on their perceptions
when deciding how to behave. My data are important because they suggest that
black and white councilors view the world through very different lenses and they
may not completely understand each other. These perceptual differences could
have far-reaching implications for how city councils handle racial issues. Whites
may be less willing to accommodate the needs of black citizens because they
seem to be less sensitive and aware of the perceived obstacles that ethnic
minorities face.
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A related question, but perhaps a better one to ask is: why are the two

groups' perceptions so divergent?

One argument is supplied by Edward E.

racial tensions of the late 1960s.

He argues that prejudice against African

Banfield in The Unheavenly City, a controversial classic published a midst the

Americans has diminished since World War I I while other impediments (primarily
socioeconomic ones) have increased.

He explains that the typical African

American does not appreciate these subtle changes, and "naturally, he
concludes that the same old cause---"Whitey"-is still producing the same old
effects" (p. 85). He goes on to write that:

Negro leaders cannot be expected to explain that prejudice is no
longer the obstacle. Even those of them who understand that it is
not are bound to pretend otherwise. Like every specialist, the
Negro leader is prone to magnify himself as well as to others the
importance of his specialty, seeing every problem in terms of it.
Even when he recognizes that the situation of most Negroes would
not be fundamentally different even if there were no racial prejudice
at all, the logic of his position as a leader prevents him from saying
so. To acknowledge nonracial factors are more important than
racial ones would cool the zeal of his supporters, give aid and
comfort to the enemy, and destroy his very reason for being. So
long as there is any racial prejud ice at work, the leader cannot risk
seeming to tolerate it, as he would if he emphasized those other
(nonracial) aspects of the situation which from a practical (but not a
moral) standpoint are vastly more important. For the race leader,
there is everything to gain and nothing to lose by treating all
problems as if they derived solely from the racial one.
Banfield's eloquently written argument falls short of explaining the

perceptual gap between black and white councilors because it is based on three
dubious assumptions. First, he assumes that black leaders raise racial issues
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because doing so helps ensure their electoral success and political viability. I n
the context of my study, this assumption i s without merit because I promised the
respondents that I would not associate their name with the information they
provided .

Black respondents, therefore, gained nothing politically by altering

their responses so as to inflate the number and extent of the barriers they face.
Second , Banfield assu mes that black leaders' jobs are insecure and their
constituents show no loyalty to incumbents. This point is also debatable. Carol
Swain (1 993: 73), for example, writes:
Electoral accountability is so weak in some historically black
districts that one black representative told me unabashedly: 'One
of the advantages, and disadvantages, of representing blacks is
their shameless loyalty to their incu mbents. You can al most get
away with raping babies and be forgiven. You don't have any_
vigilance about your performance.
Finally, Banfield assu mes that black leaders, motivated by blatant self-interest,
are willing to compromise their personal integrity by purposely recharacterizing
political and social realities. This contention , as applied to city cou ncilors, loses
some of its force because the monetary benefits derived from that office are
usually very small. My data show that 8.2% of the black respondents receive no
monetary compensation and the ones who do only receive an average salary of
$8 ,91 5.94. Thus, it is unlikely that black councilors seek reelection for financial
gain, so it would seem that the next likely motive behind their willingness to serve
is intangible psychological benefits . In other words, they probably motivated by
the sense of well-being that comes from helping constituents and participating in
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community affairs ( See generally, Cam pbell et al. 1 960; King and Walker 1 992 ;
Moe 1 980; Verba and Nie 1 972; Wilson 1 973). If psychological benefits are the
motivation behind· their · service, it is unrealistic that black councilors would
willingly encounter the

psychological "low" that comes from providing

disingenuous survey responses and being deceitful about social and political
realities (i. e. , people feel bad when they lie).
As for whites, Banfield contends that they too "find prejudice a peculiarly
satisfying explanation for the troubles of the Negro" (p. 86). According to him,
upper and middle class whites try to better society and assume moral blame for
not doing enough to improve it. Thus, emphasizing racial barriers does little
harm and probably does some good , so it is better "to err on the side of seeing
more prejudice than is really there." (p. 86).
supported by my data.

This argument is simply not

Very few white councilors report instances of

discrimination and they generally adopt an extremely positive view of the black
legislative experience . Therefore, if he is right and whites do inflate the extent of
prejudice, then based on my results, there must be absolutely no prejudice
whatsoever on American city councils. As most students of politics would admit,
this formulation is not rooted in reality.
I n contrast to Banfield's argument, my data show that race is the primary
factor explaining the perceptual gap between the black and white councilors. I
controlled other factors that might influence the councilors' perceptions, but even
the most relevant variables only moderated the effect of race while not totally
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accounting for it. The type of district that the respondents represent (at-large vs.
wards) and the racial composition of a councilor's constituency (majority-white
vs. majority-black) had the most discemable effect across all seven aspects of
black legislative life. · The racial composition of the council, the racial composition
of the city, and gender also conditioned the councilors' responses, but only for
certain aspects of black legislative life. In contrast, other factors seemed to be of
little or no consequence including geographic region, governmental format, city
size, and the partisan nature of the council (partisan vs. nonpartisan).
My data can also be used to evaluate the BEST and Lani Guinier's (1994)
argument for why the theory fails. The BEST asserts that black lawmakers, by
virtue of their personal experiences, have a better appreciation of the black
community's needs and can translate this knowledge into minority-friendly
policies. It predicts that black lawmakers will succeed because the institutional
rules, the intimate legislative setting, and continuous voting opportunities
promote accommodation rather than exclusion. Guinier, however, rejects the
BEST because she believes that many white lawmakers are unwilling to act in
good-faith and engage in a meaningful dialogue with their black counterparts.
Therefore,

she believes

that

many

black

lawmakers

become

token

representatives because they operate in a hostile legislative environment where
racial barriers preclude them from being effective.
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Al though my results do not specifically address the substantive
representation issue, they do shed light on perceived racial barriers in local
legislative bodies. Black councilors tend to have a more pessimistic outlook than
whites, and they are more likely than whites to identify obstacles that encumber
their progress. However, Guinier's argument is only valid for about one-third of
the black respondents if the discrimination variable is used as the baseline for
making this assessment. I t would, therefore, be over-reaching to label all black
lawmakers as tokens, or to say that they are generally marginalized within
legislative bodies.

I ndeed, a many black respondents report a positive

experience and feel they are key players on their councils. Given this state of
affairs, it would seem that the BEST is a viable strategy for accomplishing the
minority community's objectives, but there are still municipalities where it will
probably be ineffective due to the hostile legislative environment.
Perhaps more troubling for the BEST is my finding that the quality of black
legislative life (as reported by black councilors) is conditioned by the racial
composition of the respondent's constituency and the type of district that the
person represents (at-large vs. ward). That is, blacks elected from majority-black
wards are more inclined to have a negative experience and encounter more
barriers in the course of their service. The reason this is troubling is because the
civil rights activists frequently lobby for the creation of majority-black wards to
ensure black representation on city councils.

I ronically, however, my

crosstabulations suggest that the very strategy they use to achieve electoral
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success increases the likelihood that the victor from the predominantly black
ward will be victimized once they are on the council .
This criticism of majority-black districts i s consistent with Carol Swain's
(1 993) conclusion that so called "influence districts" are the best hope for the
future in terms of black political empowerment (although her argument is based
on different reasoning). Influence districts, compared to majority-black districts,
may be preferable because their representatives seem to have a more positive
legislative experience.

However, I do not mean this to be an unequivocal

endorsement of the influence district strategy, which too is flawed in several
important respects. First, the exclusive use of influence districts as the primary
vehicle for black empowerment discounts the value of descriptive representation
and the legitimacy that it brings to the political system. Second, lawmakers from
influence districts may be less likely share the original civil rights vision since
they must appeal to white voters if they hope to be elected and reelected.

Summary and Conclusion

Black and white councilors have similar backgrounds and personal profiles, but
there are still important differences that must be acknowledged. The two groups
differ substantially in their party identifications and their constituencies. They
also see their political world in very different terms.

Whites generally

characterize the black legislative experience in positive terms and they say there
are few, if any, barriers that encumber black progress. Although many black
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councilors agree and claim to be satisfied and successful, as a group, they still
are more cynical about their standing and they are still more likely than whites to
identify inequalities that detract from their legislative experience.

Bivariate

crosstabulations show that race is the primary factor explaining the perceptual
gap between the black and white respondents.

I controlled for a host of

intervening variables (gender, region, city size, electoral format, and the racial
composition of the councilor's constituency, council, and city); however, even
these factors only moderated the effects of race.
My findings have far reaching implications for black councilors and the
constituents they represent. I t is encouraging that black and white councilors
have similar personal profiles because these commonalties could potentially
serve as a basis for cooperation between the two groups. However, differences
in their party affiliations and constituencies are potential sources of friction. For
example, anecdotal evidence from my open-ended questions shows that
tensions can arise when councils debate which ward will receive benefits that
cannot be shared. The divergence between the two groups' perceptions is also
troubling. I t suggests that white councilors may not fully understand their black
colleagues or appreciate their needs. I f so, it follows that white councilors may
not fully understand the needs of the black citizens who live in their community.
This, of course, might result in indifference when the council is asked to consider
issues that have a direct and substantial impact on their city's black community.
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My findings also can be used to evaluate whether the BEST is a viable
strategy for black political empowerment. This strategy is based on the premise
that black lawmakers have little difficulty assimilating into legislative bodies. My
data generally support this view as most black councilors say they are satisfied
and successful. Even so, some of my findings reveal the BEST's limitations.
First, it is clear that a small proportion of the black respondents operate in a
hostile environment where their white colleagues are unwilling to bargain in
good-faith .

In these places, it seems that Lani Guinier's view of the black

legislative experience is more accurate and these councilors will probably have
difficulty providing substantive benefits to their constituents.

Second, my

crosstabulations reveal that the racial composition of the respondent's
constituency and the type of district that the person represents (at-large vs. ward )
affects the councilors' legislative experiences. Specifically, blacks who represent
majority-black wards are more inclined to report a negative experience and say
they encounter more barriers. Thus, the lobbying for the creation of majority
black wards may be counterproductive because the candidate who prevails is
more l i kely to have a negative experience once they begin serving .
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CHAPTER FIVE

EXPLAIN ING THE BLACK COUNCILORS' PERCEPTION S
The Necessity of this Chapter

Like any piece of research, the previous chapter has methodological
shortcomings that detract from its utility. Perhaps the greatest limitation is my
use of bivariate crosstabulations to explain the perceptual gap between the two
sets of councilors. I selected this method for its descriptive value and its ability to
demonstrate that race is the predominant factor explaining the perceptual gap
between blacks and whites. However, these crosstabulations provided only a
crude means of control and the time-consuming nature of their application
prevented me from examining other independent variables that might be of
importance (e.g., seniority, age, education, ideology, the mayor's race, and
council size).

I n this chapter, I remedy these shortcomings by using more

sophisticated methodology. I also shift my focus to a slightly different issue so
my analysis does not plow the same field twice. I nstead of describing the quality
of black legislative life or trying to explain the perceptual gap between blacks and
whites, I account for the variance in the quality of black legislative life by looking
only to the responses of the black councilors. I make no effort to explain the
variance among the white councilors because little differentiation, if any, is found
within their responses. I n the end, this analysis provides a more comprehensive
understanding of the black legislative experience in local politics.
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Methodology
I rely on d ichotomous logistic regression to explain the variance in the quality of
black legislative life because rival techniques are incompatible with my data .
First, traditional linear regression is inappropriate because many of my
dependent variables are categorical. I n some instances, it is tech nically possible
for me to apply OLS regression to my ordinal dependent variables. However, I
decided against this because they are not normally distributed , and changing
their fu nctional form via logging or cu bing does not remedy this problem.
Second , logistic regression is more useful than crosstabulations because it is
better-suited

for continuous independent variables ;

it provides a

more

sophisticated means of control; and it generates helpfu l su mmary statistics. As
one scholar put it, legit analysis "provides a global test for the significance of a
given predictor controlling for all other predictors in the model , as well as a test
for the significance of a set of predictors, controlling for other effects" (Demaris
1 992 : 1 ).
Researchers commonly apply logistic regression to qualitative data where
the dependent variable is dichotomous.

Here, the variable's value is not

intrinsically interesting since the researcher assigned it as a matter of
convenience. However, as Scott Menard (2002: 1 2) notes, "What is interesting
is whether the classification of cases into one or the other of the categories of the
dependent variable can be predicted by the independent variable." Furthermore,
he explains, "Instead of trying to predict the arbitrary value associated with a
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category, it may be useful to reconceptualize the problem as an attempt to
predict the probability that the case will be classified into one as opposed to the

other of the two categories of the dependent variable (2002: 12). In short, logistic

regression has more to do with probability and odds ratios than identifying a
linear relationship between the variables.

I also utilize "robust" or "heteroskedasticity-corrected" standard errors in

conjunction with my logit analysis. Social scientists are relying on this procedure

with greater frequency because they have realized that it is helpful when working
with clustered data.

For instance, psychologists sometimes employ this

technique when their subjects are nested within a larger group or entity such as a

family, school, class, firm, worksite, clinic, or community (Gibbons and Hedeker

1994; Norton et al. 1996). Although robust standard errors are relatively new to
political science, their use has become more prevalent as more practitioners

become aware of their benefits. For instance, political scientists have used them

to account for state-specific factors that affect how individuals vote (Carsey and

Wright 1998), nation-specific factors that influence homicide rates (Neumayer
2003), and case-specific factors when analyzing judicial decisions (Brenner and
Heberlig 2002).

The impetus behind robust standard errors is that clusters have unique

attributes that either defy quantification or are unknown to the researcher. As a

result, researchers are unable to control for these variables by incorporating

them into their statistical models. Unfortunately, the idiosyncratic nature of these
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variables means that the observations within a cluster are correlated rather than
being independent.

Normal. standard errors ignore these correlations and

wrongly assume that the observations are from unrelated individuals. The likely
result is inefficient coefficients (Brenner and Heberlig 2002) and "overly
optimistic" standard errors (Gibbons and Hedeker 1 994: 286).

The robust

· standard errors technique corrects this problem by "treat[ing] each cluster as a
'super-observation', considering first variability within each cluster and then
summing across clusters for the final adjustment" (Zorn 2003: 3). I n the end,
researchers who fail to take clusters into account increase the likelihood that they
will commit a Type I error by rejecting a true null hypothesis (Norton et al. 1 996).
Robust standard errors are appropriate for my research because my
observations seem to be correlated. The strongest evidence of clustering is that
multiple respondents sometimes serve on the same city council. This problem
affects 22 respondents who serve in 1 1 different municipalities. Likewise, many
of my cities are in close geographic proximity to each other such that their
councilors are probably exposed to the same environmental conditions. By using
robust standard errors in response to this problem, I am less likely to over or
under-represent the information contained in my data and I will probably have
more accurate parameter estimates (Zorn 2003: 3).

1 35

My Primary Models

The models I present in subsection are superior to rival formulations and best
account for the variance in the black councilors' perceptions. These models are
especially attractive because they strongly predict how the dependent variable is
classified. I n fact, all four models successfully predict the dependent variable
over 80% of the time, and their predictive power is a considerable improvement
over the computer's guess based solely on the modal category (See Table 16. ).
Unfortunately, my goodness of fit measure yields less satisfying results. The
Wald Chi-Square is only significant for one of the four models (Personally
Experienced Discrimination) and approaches significance in another (I nteracting
with the Mayor). This probably occurs because municipal governments differ
considerably; a large number of independent variables are relevant; and I omitted
some of these variables to avoid multicolinearity problems.

Although my

goodness of fit measure is not outstanding, I believe the predictive power of my
models justifies their use especially since the sine qua non of logistic regression
is prediction.
Table 16 shows that the factors explaining the variance in the black
legislative experience tend to differ from one model to the next. I n other words,
the quality of black legislative life turns largely on which aspect of the black
legislative experience is being discussed. For example, gender matters in the
context of personal discrimination, but it is not important in the other three
models. Region is significantly related to black influence on the council, but not
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Table 1 6
Logit Analysis of the Quality of Black Legislative Life

lndhlidual Explanatiao&
Gender ( 1 =Male)

Age
Education ( 1 =College Degree)
Ideology (1 -7 Liberal to Conserv.)

Contgxtual Explanation�
Region (1 =Deep South)

Mayor's Race (1 =Black)
Elec. Format (1 =Elec.At-Large)
Council Size
Council Salary
% Council Black
Council Race Relations (1 =Good)
District Race (1 =Majority Black)
Dist. Income (1 =Under $20,000)

Summa� Statistic&

N
Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Wald Chi-Square
Probability Chi-Square
2
Pseudo R
Modal Category
% Correctly Predicted
Reduction in Error

Personally
Exp. Disc.
{1 =Yes)

Must Work
Harder for
Respect
{1 =Agree)

Black
Influence
(1 =lnfuential)

B

B

B

Interacting
w/ Mayor

(1 =More
Likely or as
Llkel�)

B

(Rob. SE)

(Rob. SE)

{Rob. SE)

{Rob. SE)

-1 . 3*
(0.65)
0.02
(0.02)
-1 .35
(0.76)
-0. 1 7
(0. 1 7)

0.89
(0.76)
0.02
(0.03)
-1 .62
(0.95)
-0.96**
(0.36)

-2.00
(1 . 1 7)
0.05
(0.04)
-1 . 1 8
(0.92)
0.02
(0.20)

0.07
(0.73)
0.01
(0.03)
0.38
(0.75)
0.50 *

-0. 1 8
(0.56)
-0.50
(0.86)
-1 .76*
(0.85)
0.1 1 *
(0.04)
0.00*
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.0 1 )
-2. 1 2**
(0.62)
-1 .74**
(0.63)
0.33
(0.71 )

-1 .48
(0.90)
-1 .45
(1 .05)
-0.56
(0.78)
0.09
(0.08)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.03
(0.02)
-1 .77
(0.96)
0.87
(0.72)
0.52
(0.94)

-2.82*
( 1 .25)
3.79*
( 1 .78)
3.21 *
( 1 .40)
0.01
(0.2 1 )
-2.67e-06
(0.00)
0.05
(0.03)
4.0 1 **
(1 .36)
4.06
(2.22)
-2. 1 9
(1 .65)

0.70
(0.93)
3 . 1 0**
(0.99)
-0.45
(0.76)
-0.09 *
(0.04)
0.00*
(0.00)
0.00
(0.02)
2.24 **
(0.73)
-0 .56
(0.83)
-0.99
(0.85)

87
-35.32

88
-30.63
1 9.64
0.1 046
0.2907
76.74
87.50
46.25

88
-20.51
1 4.33
0.3507
0.5085
84. 1 1
92.05
49.93

87
-32.49
21 .1 4
0.0702
0.2884
73.21
80.46
27.07

28.42

0.0079
0.3622
68.90
82.76
44.56

Note. *p < .05. **p < .0 1 . ***p < .00 1 (all tests are two-tailed ).
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(0.24)

discrimination. I n short, my results suggest that the dependent variables are for
the other three models.

The mayor's race is significantly related to black

influence on the council · and interacting with the mayor, but it is of little
consequence when the respondents are asked whether they must work harder
than whites to gain respect . and whether they have personally experienced
distinct; and, to fully understand the quality of black legislative life, it is necessary
to take a very broad view of the concept.
The first two models in Table 16 focus on the black respondents'
individual experiences while the second two models relate to the collective
experiences of black councilors. This raises a provocative question: is there is a
meaningful distinction between how the respondents assess their individual
career versus the collective experience of black councilors?

Like the

crosstabulations in the previous chapter, my legit models show that this
distinction in not very important. Only one independent variable, the mayor's
race, seems to be affected by this distinction. That is, the presence of a black
mayor is significantly related to black influence on the council and the likelihood
of black councilors interacting with the mayor. Conversely, the mayor's race is
not significantly related to the two items dealing with the respondents' individual
careers (i. e. , whether they have · personally experienced discrimination and
whether they personally feel compelled to work harder than whites to gain
respect). Even this distinction seems to be more a function of the mayor's role in
city government than the difference between the respondents' individual versus
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collective experiences. Many mayors are independent executives. Thus, their
sphere of influence probably extends to occurrences in the broader political
environment rather than those that unfold within the narrow confines of the city
council .

This may be a more plausible explanation for why a black mayor

matters in terms of black influence on the council and interacting with the mayor,
but not when discrimination and working harder to gain respect are at issue.
In Chapter Two, I hypothesized that individual and contextual explanations
account for the quality of black legislative life. As Table 1 6 demonstrates, both
individual and contextual factors matter, but the contextual explanations largely
overshadow the individual ones. In fact, only two individual factors-gender and
ideology-are significant in any of my models. Women are more likely to say
they have personally experienced discrimination. This may occur because black
women confront both a race and gender bias (Clayton and Stallings 2000;
Githens and Prestage 1 977) and they are the more politically alienated than
black men, white men, and white women (Baxter and Lansing 1 983). However,
this finding provides only weak support for the "double disadvantage" argument
because gender is not statistically significant in the three remaining models.
Regarding ideology, the more conservative the respondent, the less likely they
are to agree that they must work harder than whites to gain respect and the more
likely they are to interact with the mayor. Granted, the ideology variable is less
theoretically meaningful in the "working harder for respect" model. It says more
about how conservatives think as opposed to explaining the black legislative
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experience. However, ideology is theoretically interesting in terms of interacting
with the mayor. Here, the statistically significant relationship can probably be
attributed to the fact that a large portion of my sample comes from the South
where the incidence of conservative mayors is probably greater. Thus, a shared
ideological outlook between conservative black councilors and conservative
mayors probably serves as a basis for cooperation.
I also hypothesized that other individual factors like seniority and status
(leadership positions) would be important.

Specifically, I predicted that

councilors with more seniority and those who hold leadership positions
(Committee Chairs and the Mayor Pro Tempores) would have a more positive
experience than those with less seniority and those who are not leaders. While
running various iterations, I learned that seniority is never statistically significant
in any of my models. I eventually decided to replace it with the councilor's age
because that variable, although never significant, improves my models' goodness
of fit. I did not include both variables simultaneously in the interest of parsimony
and to avoid a serious multicolinearity problem. As for status, I was unable to
test my hypothesis because only one-third of the councils have committees. This
confounds statistical analysis because the committee chairmanship variable
drastically reduces the number of observations in my models.
Although different contextual variables are important for each model, there
are still some noteworthy commonalties. Most importantly, the quality of race
relations on the council is clearly the most important contextual variable
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explaining the variance in the quality of black legislative life. It is statistically
sig nificant in three of the four models, and it tends to be more significant than the
other independent variables. This finding clearly supports Guinier's (1 994)
contention that quality of race relations determines the extent of minority political
empowerment within legislative bodies. Black councilors who report "good" race
relations are (1 ) less likely to say they have been personally discriminated
against, (2) more likely to say that black councilors are influential, and (3) more
likely to say that black councilors are more likely or as likely than whites to
interact with the mayor. However, this finding only means that there is a
relationship between the race relations and the quality of black leg islative life. It
does not imply that race relations are generally impaired on city councils or that
blacks tend to have a poor legislative experience. The crosstabulations I
presented in the previous chapter (Table 4) demonstrate that many black
councilors have a positive experience despite the fact that their assessments are
still more pessimistic than those of their white colleagues. Accord ingly, Guinier
correctly argues that the quality of race relations determines the extent of black
empowerment within legislative bodies, but poor race relations, as perceived by
the black councilors, are apparently the exception rather than the rule.
A related issue is whether geographic region helps explain the variance in
the quality of black legislative life. At the outset of my research, I expected that
black councilors from the Deep South would report a more negative experience
given their region's history of racial tensions. However, Table 1 6 disproves my
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hypothesis.
models.

The Deep South variable is not significant in three of my four

In the fourth model, my data show that black councilors from other

regions are less likely to say they are influential.

Th is finding is certainly

encouraging because it suggests that the South has moved in a new · direction
and is now more hospitable to ethnic minorities. Perhaps it no longer deserves
the negative stigma that is associated with its historical legacy.

Despite this

optimistic outlook, there is still cause for concern. Black councilors from regions
other than the Deep South are less l ikely to say that blacks are influential on their
council .

Although I am not certain why this occurs, at the very least, th is

suggests that racial barriers may be pervasive rather than being confined to a
particular region.
Another important issue is whether the presence of black officials
improves the qual ity of black legislative life. From the outset, I predicted that
black councilors would be more l ikely to have a positive experience when their
city' s mayor is black and when there is a higher percentage of blacks on the
council . In these situations, the respondents are probably less isolated because
they have more allies within their city's government. My crosstabulations in the
previous chapter bolstered this contention by showing that, in a bivariate context,
black councilors who serve with at least one other black colleague say they have
a more positive experience than those who serve in isolation (See Table 7.).
However, my legit findings are mixed and only partially support my initial .
hypothesis. Table 16 shows that the proportion of blacks on the city council is
142

not significantly related to any of the dependent variables, but the presence of a
black mayor matters in certain situations.

The presence of a black mayor

increases the likelihood that black councilors will say that blacks are influential.
The presence of a black mayor also increases the likelihood that black cou ncilors
will say they are more likely or as likely than whites to interact with the mayor.
Nevertheless, no meaningful connection is present between black mayors and
the respondents' perceptions about discrimination and working harder than
whites to gain respect on their council. These findings suggest that black mayors
have more of an impact on occurrences in the broader political environment
rather than those that unfold within the narrow confines of the council. This is not
surprising since many mayors are independent executives rather than legislators.
Table 1 6 also shows that a municipality's electoral format has important
implications for the quality of black legislative life. Black councilors elected at
large are less likely to experience discrimination, and they are more likely to say
that black councilors are influential.

This probably occurs because black

candidates who succeed in at-large contexts have garnered community-wide
support rather than just the support of the black community. As a result, these
lawmakers probably view the political process as being even-handed and less
divided along racial lines. The fact that these councilors enjoy community-wide
support means they probably command more respect, and that they have an
agenda and leadership style that is agreeable to their white colleagues.
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Most civil rights activists, according to Guinier (1994), believe that the
election of black lawmakers is the key to substantive representation of minority
interests. These activists insist that prejudice is the result of unfamiliarity, which
the black lawmakers can surmount in the intimate settings found in most
legislative bodies. This argument assumes that white lawmakers will fully include
their black counterparts in the legislative process once the two sets of lawmakers
become acquainted and once black lawmakers demonstrate they are skilled
legislators. Two of my logit models clearly show that black councilors fare better
in more intimate legislative settings. As council size decreases, respondents are
less likely to say they have personally experienced discrimination.

And, as

council size decreases, respondents are more likely to interact with the mayor
compared to whites. Hence, for these two indicators, black councilors tend to
have a better experience on smaller councils than larger ones. This bolsters the
contention that more intimate legislative settings encourage inclusion and
facilitate interracial cooperation.
In Chapter Two, I predicted that the quality of black legislative life will
improve as the level of council professionalism increases. Professional councils
almost certainly provide councilors with more opportunities for advancement.
They may also attract more educated lawmakers because service on these
councils is more desirable. I f so, these lawmakers, by virtue of their increased
level of education, may possess more tolerant attitudes toward ethnic minorities.
relied on council salary as a measure of professionalism, but this measure
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prod uced mixed results. As cou ncil salary increases, the black respondents are
more likely to interact with the mayor than whites. I n contrast, respondents are
more likely to report discrimination as their salary increases.
reconcile these findings.

It is difficult to

Perhaps they suggest that my initial assu mption is

flawed or that a rival hypothesis has merit. Perhaps more professional councils
are more competitive councils. Competition, taken too far, may manifest itself in
the form of racial d iscrimination . Regardless of why this occurs, these mixed
results show that not much is known about how professional ism relates to the
black legislative experience and they clearly underscore the need for future
research in th is area.
Finally, I hypothesized that the nature of the respondent's constituency
would affect the quality of their legislative experience. Specifically, I expected
that black cou ncilors who represent an affluent or a predominantly white
constituency would have a more positive experience than those representing a
less affluent or a predominantly black constituency. As others have suggested
(Hedge,

Button,

and

Spear

1 996),

black legislators

from

wealthy or

predominantly white districts probably possess an agenda and leadership style
that is agreeable to white lawmakers because they are elected with the support
of white voters. I found strong support for this argument in the previous chapter
using bivariate crosstabulations (Tables 6). I ndeed, for six of the seven aspects
of black legislative life, blacks who represented a majority-white constituency
reported a

more

positive experience than those with a majority-black
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constituency. H owever, my legit models produ ced very different results. District
income is not significantly related to any of the dependent variables. And, the
racial composition of the councilor's district is only significant in one of the
models (Personally Experienced Discrimination) and this . relationship is in the
opposite direction than I anticipated.
I could not identify a compelling explanation for these mixed results. My
crosstabulations show that this relationship exists in a bivariate context.
However, once the racial composition of the district is examined in a multivariate
context, other independent variables push the relationship in the opposite
direction.

Although multicolinearity is probably the culprit, removing suspect

variables from my model did not remedy the problem. Therefore, my findings on
this issue (especially those in the previous chapter) shou ld be accepted
cautiously. My mixed results u nderscore the fact that the relationships here are
very complex and there needs to be additional research to fully understand them.

Addressing the Shortcomings of My Primary Models

My primary models (Table 16) are superior to riv�I formulations because they
have a stronger ability to predict how the dependent variable is classified.
Despite their enhanced predictive power, they are not without shortcomings. I n
this su bsection, I identify the limitations of my models in the spirit of fu ll
disclosu re. Next, I present alternative formulations that address these problems.
I n the end, these alternative models replicate many of my earlier findings
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although there are also instances where they do not. Therefore, I am confident
that the relationships for the unchanged variables are real, but I am more
skeptical of variables that experienced a profound change in their p values.

The Tautology Issue

One noteworthy criticism is that my original models are tautological
because they include council race relations as an independent variable.
derived this variable from a survey question that asked respondents how they
perceived the quality of race relations on their city council. Therefore, critics can
argue that this independent variable is too similar to my dependent variables, and
that it is inappropriate to use perceptions to explain perceptions. This variable
becomes more troublesome when used in conjunction with the district income
variable. As one of my colleagues informally explained to me, "saying that a low
district income, which is related to bad city council relations, manifest themselves
in bad race relations is tautological."
Although this critique certainly has merit, I believe that the problem is
overstated. First, one of the seminal works about the black legislative experience
uses both a district income variable and a race relations variable (based on
perceptions) in its OLS models (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1 996:

90-91 ).

Hence, relying on perceptions to explain perceptions is apparently not fatal and
there is a basis for doing so in the literature. Second, and more importantly, my
race relations variable seems to be measuring something different than my
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dependent variables. I n Table 17, I present bivariate correlations between this
variable and the four dependent variables I use in my primary models. The
Pearson correlation should approach "1" if the quality of race relations is indeed
the same as these other variables. H owever, as Table 17 demonstrates, none of
the Pearson correlations even approach "1" although two-tailed tests show they
are still statistically significant.

Accordingly, there is no tautology in a

mathematical sense although there appears to be one in an analytical sense. I n
light of this evidence, it seems more appropriate to include the race relations
variable in my analysis to avoid problems associated with an underspecified
model (i. e. , biased coefficients).

Table 1 7

Bivariate Correlations for the Quality of Race Relations
Dependent Variable or Model

Pearson Correlation

N

Personally Experjenced Discrimination

-0.490**

208

Must Work Harder for Respect

-0.322**

214

Black Influence on the Council

0.424**

21 3

Interacting with the Mayor

0.381 **

208

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 (all tests are two-tailed).
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I n response to this critique, I removed the two suspect variables from my
models and reanalyzed my data.
produce similar results.

In many instances, my revised models

Once again, the electoral format variable remains

statistically significant in two of my four models.

Black councilors who are

elected at-large are still less likely to say they have experienced discrimination,
and they are still more likely to say that blacks are influential on their council (See
Table 1 8.). As with my original models, gender and council salary both remain
statistically significant in the context of personal discrimination . Again, women
are more likely than men to have personally experienced discrimination during
their legislative service.

And , respondents are still more likely to report

discrimination as their council salary increases. Finally, my ideology variable
behaves in the same way in my revised models.

Here too, the more

conservative the respondent, the less likely they are to agree that they must work
harder than whites to gain respect.
Although my revised models replicate some of my earlier findings , there
are instances where they do not. Education becomes statistically significant in
two of the four revised models. 6

As Table 19 demonstrates, this variable

approached significance in my two original models and jt crosses the threshold
once I omit the quality of race relations and district income variables from my
6

I also ran all my legit models with education treated as an ordinal variable
rather than a dichotomous one. In doing so, I combined the categories for "some
college" and "technical school. " This did not change my results in terms of
whether this variable is statistically significant.
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Table 1 8
Alternative Logit Models that Exclude the Council Race
Relations and District Income Variables

Indi vidual ExplanatiQD&
Gender ( 1 =Male)

Age .
Education (1 =College Degree)
Ideology (1 -7 Liberal to Conserv.)

Contextual ExglanatiQns
Region ( 1 =Deep South}

Mayor's Race ( 1 =Black)
Elec. Format (1 =Elec.At-Large)
Council Size
Council Salary
% Council Black
District Race ( 1 =Majority Black}

Summary Statistics
N

Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Wald Chi-Square
Probability Chi-Square
Pseudo R2
Modal Category
% Correctly Predicted
Reduction in Error

Interacting
w/ Mayor

Personally
Exp. Disc.
(1 =Yes)

Must Work
Harder for
Respect
(1 =Agree)

Black
Infl uence
(1 =1nfuential)

B
(Rob. SE)

B
(Rob. SE)

B
(Rob. SE)

B
(Rob. SE)

-1 .25*
(0.55)
0.01
(0.02)
-1 .69**
(0.62)
-0. 1 3
(0. 1 6)

0.53
(0.72)
0.02
(0.03)
- 1 .97*
(0.85)
-0.75**
(0.27)

0.23
(0.72)
0.01
(0.03)
0.73
(0.67)
-0.02
(0. 1 7)

0.64
(0 .59)
0.00
(0.02)
0.95
(0.59)
0.27
(0. 1 8)

-0.37
(0.58)
-0.54
(0.79)
-1 .65*
(0.70)
0.08
(0.04)
0.00**
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.01 )
-1 .06
. (0.59)

-1 .67
(0.86)
-1 .26
(0.77)
-0.96
(0.76)
0.09
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.02)
1 .00
(0.78)

-1 . 1 3
(0.62)
1 .72
(1 .3 1 )
2.08*
(0.83)
-0.02
(0.04)
-5.85e-06
(0.00)
0.04
(0.02)
1 .49*
(0.75)

0.43
. (0.60)
1 .67
(0 .90)
0.01
(0.70)
-0.04
(0.04)
0.00
.(0.00)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.59
(0.65)

90
-44.32
27. 1 5
0.0044
0.2352
68.90
78.89
32. 1 2

91
-35.24
1 7 .62
0.0908
0 .22 1 3
76.74
84.62
33 .84

91
-34.33
1 9.29
0.0561
0.1 886
84. 1 1
82.42
-1 0.67

90
-42.57
1 3.05
0.2900
0.1 070
· 73.2 1
77.78
1 7 .06

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p � .00 1 (all tests are two-tailed).
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(1 =More
Likely or as

Ukely)

Table 1 9
Com parison .of the p.Values that Resulted i n a Change in the Sign ificance
of an Independent Variable After Council Race Relations and District
I ncome Variables are Removed
Model

Variable

Primary Model's
p Value

Revised Model's
p Value

Difference

0.048

-0.01 9

0.067

Influence

District Race

Influence

Region

0.024

0.066

-0.042

Discrimination

Council Size

0.01 0

0.053

-0.043

Int. w/ Mayor

Mayor's Race

0.002

0.064

-0.062

Discrimination

District Race

0.006

0.074

-0. 068

Discrimination

Education

0.075

0.006

0.069

Respect

Education

0.090

0.020

0.070

Int. w/ Mayor

Ideology

0.039

0. 1 28

-0.089

Int. w/ Mayor

Salary

0.032

0. 1 73

-0. 1 41

Influence

Mayor's -Race

0.034

0. 1 87

-0. 1 53

Int. w/ Mayor

Council Size

0.039

0.371

0.332
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analysis. Specifically, black councilors with a college degree are less likely to
experience racial discrimination, and they are less likely to agree that they must
work harder than whites to gain respect on their council. Perhaps this occurs
because more educated councilors are more formidable lawmakers who
command greater respect by virtue of their scholarly achievement. Perhaps they
are unlikely targets of discrimination because they are more skillful orators who
can effectively call attention to such abuses and turn the tables on would be
discriminators.
In contrast, some independent variables lose their significance in my
revised models.

Council size and the racial composition of the respondent's

district are no longer significant in terms of personal discrimination. Region is no
longer significant in terms of black influence on the council.

And, even the

mayor's race is no longer significantly related to the likelihood of the black
councilors interacting with the mayor compared to whites.

These results are

problematic because they suggest that I am more likely to accept a false null
hypothesis (Type 2 error) if I continue to assume that these independent
variables are meaningful . Even so, shifts in the statistical significance of these
variables reflect only minor changes in their p values {See Table 1 9.). In fact, the
mean change in the p values for the four aforementioned variables is only 0.054.
Thus, the danger of committing a Type -2 error increases, but only marginally. It
is also important to note that social scientists usually select their alpha levels as
a matter of convention {Frankfort-Nachmias and N achmias 2000).
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In most

cases, this means there is not a substantial difference between a variable that
dips slightly below this threshold and one that barely surpasses it.
Admittedly, there are other variables in my revised models that pose a
more serious problem because they experience a substantial change in their p
values (See Table 1 9 .). These incidences are largely confined to the revised
model dealing with the likelihood of the black councilors interacting with the
mayor.

No variables are statistically significant in the revised model, which

reflects a fundamental change in the p values for ideology, salary, and council
size.

Likewise, in the model dealing with black influence, the mayor's race

variable experienced a dramatic increase in its p value. As a result, conclusions
about these variables should be made with extreme caution because the average
change in their p values is 0 . 1 79.

The Missing Data Issue

Sample size is if of critical importance in inferential statistics. Logistic
regression is no exception and conclusions based on log it models are only
meaningful if the sample size is sufficient. As Demaris (1 992: 4 1 ) explains,
Statistical inference in logit modeling rests largely upon the
asymptotic behavior of sample statistics-behavior that obtains as
the sample size increases toward infinity. In order for these
asymptotic properties to be approximately valid, the sample must
be relatively large.
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Although there are over 200 cases in my sample, missing data still compromises

the integrity of my original models. This occurs because I supplemented the

survey. data I collected from the black councilors with additional data from

municipal clerks. About 65% of the clerks provided the necessary information so

my N decreases dramatically when I include any variable derived from the city
clerks. In other words, the listwise deletion feature in my statistics package omits

cases where there is a missing value for any of the variables in my model.

The missing data problem is confined to two variables in my original

models-salary and the mayor's race. I n response, I omitted these variables and

reanalyzed my data. In many instances, my revised models yield similar results
(See Table 20.). The quality of council race relations is again significantly related

to personal discrimination, black influence, and interacting with the mayor. As

with my original models, the electoral format variable is significant in terms of
personal discrimination and black influence on the council.

The councilor's

ideology continues to play an important role in determining the likelihood of black

councilors interacting with the mayor. And , black councilors from majority-black

districts are still less likely to report discrimination than those from d istricts where
blacks citizens do not hold a majority.

Although my revised models replicate some of my earlier findings, there

are also instances where they do not. Three variables experienced a minor
change in their p values that resulted in a change in their statistical significance
(See Table 21.). The quality of race relations on the council is now statistically
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Table 20
Alternative Logit Models that Exclude Variables for
Salary and the Mayor's Race
Personally
Exp. Disc.
(1 =Yes)

B

Individual Exulanatign1
Gender (1 =Male)
Age
Education ( 1 =College Degree)
Ideology ( 1 -7 Liberal to Conserv.)

CQntixtual ExglanatiQn&
Region ( 1 =Deep South)

Elec. Format (1 =Elec.At-Large)
Council Size
% Council Black
Council Race Relations (1 =Good)
District Race ( 1 =Majority Black)
Dist. Income (1 =Under $20,000)

Summa� Statisti�s
N

Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Wald Chi-Square
Probabili� Chi-Square
2
Pseudo R
Modal Category
% Correctly Predicted
Reduction in Error

Must Work
Harder for
Respect
(1 =Agree)

B

Black
Infl uence
(1=Infuential)

B

Interacting
w/ Mayor
(1 =More
Likely or as
Likel�)

B

(Rob. SE)

(Rob. SE)

(Rob. SE)

(Rob. SE)

-0.73
(0.54)
-0.00
(0.02)
-0.58
(0.51 )
-0.02
(0.1 4 )

0.14
(0.51 )
0.00
(0.02)
-0.33
(0.52)
-0.22
(0 '. 1 7)

0.29
(0.63)
-0.04
( 0.04)
· -0. 1 2
(0.64)
-0.22
(0. 1 7)

-0.03
(0.47)
-0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.44)
0.29*
(0. 1 4)

0.06
(0.47)
-1 . 1 8*
(0.55)
0.06
(0.04)
0.00
(0.01 )
-2.44***
(0 .48)
-1 .08*
(0.45)
-0.22
(0.51 )

-0.51
(0.55)
-0.72
(0.50)
-0.00
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01 )
-1 .57**
(0.58)
-0.44
(0.51 )
0.40
(0.54)

-0.49
(0.58)
1 .51 *
(0.71 )
-0.04
(0.06)
0.04*
(0.02)
2.73***
(0.65)
1 .50*
(0.75)
-1 .57*
(0.74)

0.42
(0.53)
0. 1 7
(0.47)
0.02
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.01 )
1 .34**
(0.43)
-0.09
(0.48)
-0.60
(0.48)

1 39
-63.89
32.88
0.0006
0.2637
68.90
79.86
35.23

1 43
-65.37
1 8.25
0.0760
0.1 256
76.74
78.32
6.78

1 43
-38.30
28.53
0.0027
0.3382
84. 1 1
88.81
29.58

141
-68.62
1 8. 1 8
0.0776
0.1 1 90
73.21
78.72
20.59

Note. · *p < .05. **p < .01 . ***p < .00 1 (all tests are two-tailed).
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Table 21
Comparison of the p Val ues that Resulted i n a Change in the Significance
of an Independent Variable After Salary and Mayor's Race Are Removed
Revised
Model's
p Value
0.007

Difference

Respect

Race Relations

Original
Model's
p Value
0.068

Influence

% Council Black

0. 1 09

0.044

0.065

Discrimination

Council Size

0.01 0

0.085

-0.075

Discrimination

Gender

0.049

0. 1 73

-0. 1 24

Respect

Ideology

0.008

0. 1 92

-0. 1 84

Influence

Region

0.024

0.397

-0.373

Mayor

Council Size

0.039

0.714

-0.675

Model

Variable

0.06 1

related to whether black councilors feel compelled to work harder than whites to
gain respect. The proportion of black councilors becomes statistically significant
in terms of black influence on the council.

And, council size is no longer

sign ificantly related to whether respondents report they have personally
experienced discrimination.

Given the slight change in their p values (an

average change of 0 .067), it is fairly safe to assume that these variables are
meaningful.
On the other hand, other variables experienced a fundamental change in
their p values. Gender is no longer significant in terms of whether the councilor
personally experienced discrimination. Ideology is no longer significant in terms
of whether the councilor feels they must work harder than whites to gain respect.
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Region is no longer significant in terms of black influence on the cou ncil . And ,
the council size is no longer significant in terms of the likelihood of black
cou ncilors interacting with the mayor.

Therefore, conclusions about these

variables should be made with extreme caution because the average change in
their p values is 0.339.

Com paring My Findings Across All Three Iterations
In the beginning of this chapter, I presented my primary models which best
explain the variance in the quality of black legislative life. Next, I presented some
alternative models that addressed the shortcomings in my primary models
namely, the tautology problem and the missing data problem. The alternative
models replicated my many of my initial findings such that I am confident that
these relationships are real. Even so, there are instances where the alternative
models prod uced different results. These differences are not especially troubling
when the p values for a particular variable experience only a slight change.
However, in other instances, profound changes raised concerns about the
validity of some relationships. In this section, I examine all three iterations of my
models looking for consistencies and differences. Once again , relationships that
appear consistently are probably real, but fundamental differences in the p value
for a given variable across the three iterations suggest that the relationship is
ten uous.
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Table 22 demonstrates that three independent variables are consistently
significant when I attempt to explain what factors affect the likelihood of black
councilors saying they have personally experienced discrimination. As a result, I
am confident that these relationships are real. First, and most importantly, the
electoral format is significant in my primary model as well as the two alternative
models. Black councilors who are elected at large are less likely to report racial
discrimination than those who are elected from a ward. Second, the qu ality of
race relations on city councils is highly significant in my primary model and the
model that I ran in response to my missing data problem. Black councilors are
less likely to say they have experienced racial discrimination when race relations
on their council are "good."

Finally, council salary (my measu re of

professionalism) is significant in my primary model and in the model that
addresses the tautology issue. As council salary increases, black councilors are
more likely to say they have experienced racial discrimination.
In contrast, there are other independent variables that may be of
importance although evidence to this effect is weaker and caution should be
exercised when drawing conclusions about these variables.

In two models,

gender is statistically significant, and this relationship shows that black women
are more likely to say they have experienced racial discrimination than black
men. The gender variable, however, loses its significance (a dramatic change in
its p value) once I remove "mayor's race" and council size" from my models.
11

Next, black councilors who represent a majority-black constituency are less likely

1 58

Table 22
Com parison of the p Values in the Three Models Dealing
with Personal Discrimi nation
Independent
Variable

p Value

Model Responding
to the Tautology
Issue
p Value

Model Responding
to the Missing Data
Issue
p Value

Gender

0.049

0.023

0. 1 73

Age

0.507

0.609

0.962

Education

0.075

. 0.006

0.252

Ideology

0.31 8

0.414

0.872

Region

0.739

0.524

0.897

Mayor's Race

0.566

0.498

Variable Omitted

Electoral Format

0.039

0.01 9

0.030

Council Size

0.01 0

0.053

0.085

Council Salary

0.01 5

0.006

Variable Omitted

% Council Black

0.1 69

0.064

0.801

Race Relations

0.001

Variable Omitted

0.000

District Race

0.006

0.074

0.01 7

District Income

0.639

Variable Omitted

0.670

Primary
Model
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to report discrimination. This variable is significant in two models, but not in the
third. The relationship is in the opposite direction than I expected and it conflicts
with the results of my crosstabulations (See Table 6.). Finally, there is some
evidence that bl ack councilors with a college degree are less likely to report
discrimination.

However, this evidence is weak because the relationship was

only significant in one model, close to significant 1n another, and far from
significant in the remaining model.
Table 23 shows that my models produce similar results when I attempt to
identify the factors that relate to whether black councilors feel they must work
harder than whites to gain respect. Here, all three models (even my primary one)
demonstrate that very few independent variables are statistically significant. The
most important of these variables seems to be race relations on the council. It is
highly significant in one model and it approaches significance in another. I am
confident that this relationship exists because this variable is consistently
significant for the other dependent variables in this chapter, showing that blacks
have a more positive experience when race relations on their council are good.
Next, ideology seems to be important. It is highly significant in two models, but
not very significant in the third.

Hence, conservative black councilors are

probably less likely to agree that they must work harder than whites to gain
respect.

Finally, there is some basis for believing that more educated

respondents are less likely to agree that they must work harder than whites to
gain respect. Education is significant in one model; it approaches significance in
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Table 23
Comparison of the p Values in the Three Models Dealing
with Working Harder to Gain Respect
Independent
Variable

Primary
Model
p Value

Model Responding
to the Tautology
Issue
p Value

Model Responding
to the Missing Data
Issue
p Value

Gender

0.243

0.467

0.791

Age

0.555

0.454

0.843

Education

0.090

0.020

0.527

Ideology

0.008

0.006

0. 1 92

Region

0.1 01

0.053

0.355

Mayor's Race

0. 1 68

0.099

Variable Omitted

Electoral Format

0.476

0.208

0. 1 47

Council Size

0.234

0.224

0.993

Council Salary

0.481

0.428

Variable Omitted

% Council Black

0.225

0. 1 83

0.1 06

Race Relations

0.068

Variable Omitted

0.007

District Race

0.227

0. 1 98

0.392

District Income

0.578

Variable Omitted

0.458
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another; but it is far from significant in the remaining model . Hence, there is
some basis for believing that education is meaningful although the evidence is
relatively weak.
Next, I focus on factors that account for black influence on city councils.
Table 24 shows that two independent variables-electoral format (at-l arge vs.
wards) and qu ality of race relations-are always statistically significant in terms
of black influence. Hence, I am very confident that bl ack councilors elected at
large are more likely to say blacks are influential . Similarly, there is good reason
to believe that black councilors who serve on councils with good race relations
are more likely to say that bl acks are influential.
In contrast, other independent variables are significant in some models but
not others.

Conclusions about these variables are less certain and there is

clearly a need for additional research to determine whether the rel ationships that
I have identified exist. First, two of the three models show there is a statistically
significant relationship between the racial composition of the councilor' s district
and the amount of black influence. However, this relationship is in the opposite
direction than I expected because it suggests that majority-bl ack districts are
associated with increased black influence. Second, region is significant in one
model; it is nearly significant in another; but it is· far from significant in the third.
This suggests that back councilors from the Deep South are more likely to say
they are influential . Third, only my original model suggests that the presence of a
black mayor enhances the black councilors' influence. This variable lost its
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Table 24
Comparison of the p Values i n the Three Models Dealing
with Black Infl uence on the Council
Independent
Variable

Primary
Model
p Value

Model Responding
to the Tautology
Issue

Model Responding
to the Missing Data
Issue

p Value

p Value

Gender

0.095

0.749

0.643

Age

0.228

0. 706

0.287

Education

0.201

0.279

0.853

Ideology

0.907

0.891

0. 1 94

Region

0.024

0.066

0.397

Mayor's Race

0.034

0. 1 87

Variable Omitted

Electoral Format

0. 022

0.01 2

0.032

Council Size

0.979

0.709

0.542

Cou ncil Salary

0.934

0.825

Variable Omitted

% Council Black

0. 1 09

0.060

0.044

Race Relations

0.003

Variable Omitted

0.000

District Race

0.067

0.048

0.047

District I ncome

0. 1 84

Variable Omitted

0.035
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significance when I omitted the race relations variable and district income
variables in response to the tautology problem.

Finally, there is only weak

evidence that district income is associated with black influence. In a lone model,
the data showed that blacks from less affluent districts were less likely to say
they are influential.
The final set of models deals with the likelihood that black councilors will
interact with the mayor in comparison to whites. My primary model indicates that
five independent variables are important, but my alternative models do not
substantiate these findings (See Table 25.). No significant relationships exist in
the model I ran in response to the tautology issue, and only two significant
relationships exist in the model that I ran in response to the missing · data issue.
Clearly the most important variable is the quality of race relations. It is highly
significant in two models and it shows that blacks are more likely to interact with
the mayor if the race relations on their council are good. Ideology is also likely to
be important.

It is statistically significant in two models although its p value

moderately increases in the remaining one.

Here, the more conservative the

black councilor, the more likely they are to interact with the mayor.
Aside from the aforementioned relationships, other independent variables
might be important although this evidence is weak. In my primary model, the
presence of a black mayor increases the likelihood of interaction with black
councilors. This relationship is highly significant in my primary model, but it only
approaches significance in the model I ran in response to the tautology issue.
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Table 25
Comparison of the p Values in the Three Models Dealing
with the Likelihood of Black Councilors Interacting with the Mayor
Independent
Variable

p Value

Model Responding
to the Tautology
Issue
p Value

Model Responding
to the Missing Data
Issue
p Value

Gender

0.924

0.284

0.946

Age

0.71 8

0.961

0.891

Education

0.61 1

0. 1 08

0.979

Ideology

0.039

0. 128

0.037

Reg ion

0.452

0.474

0.429

Mayor's Race

0.002

0.064

Variable Omitted

Electoral Format

0.552

0.985

0.71 5

Council Size

0.039

0.371

0.71 4

Council Salary

0.032

0. 1 73

Variable Omitted

% Council Black

0. 784

0.409

0.958

Race Relations

0.002

Variable Omitted

0.002

District Race

0.505

0.368

0.846

District Income

0.244

Variable Omitted

0.21 1

Primary
Model
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Cou ncil size and salary are only significant in my primary model . I am skeptical
whether these variables are related to the likelihood of black councilors
interacting with the mayor because their p values in the remaining models are far
from significant.

Summary
I relied on dichotomous logistic regression with robust standard errors to explain
the variance in how black city councilors assess the quality of their legislative
experience.

I developed a series of models (all using the same independent

variables) that seems to best explain the variance in the black councilors'
perceptions (See Table 1 6.).

This combination of independent variables is

superior to rival combinations because it can accurately pred ict how various
dependent variables are classified over 80% of the time. My analysis shows that
different factors are significant from one model to the next. This suggests that it
is necessary to take a broad view of the quality of black legislative life if one
hopes to fully understand the concept. My primary models also demonstrate that
contextual explanations are superior to ind ividual explanations.

Only two

individual-level variables-gender and ideology-are significant in any of my
primary models. However, a host of contextual factors are significantly related to
at least some aspect of the black legislative experience. These variables include
the quality of race relations on the city council, electoral format, region, council
size, salary, the mayor's race, and the racial composition of the cou ncilor's
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district.

Other contextual variables are of little consequence including district

income and the proportion of blacks on the council.
Despite their strong predictive power, my primary models have limitations
that detract from their utility. Critics can argue that these models are tautological
because they include the quality of race relations and district income as
independent variables. Critics will also point out that missing data compromises
the inferential value of my data.

Although I believe neither critique is fatal, I

omitted variables that created these problems and I reanalyzed my data .

My

revised models replicate many of my initial find ings; however, there are still
instances where they produce different . results. Admittedly, this means that one
must exercise caution when d rawing conclusions about these variables
especially when there is a profound change in a variable's p value. Thus, my
alternative models are useful because they help identify areas of u ncertainty in
my original models.
Keohane, and Verba.

This strategy is consistent with advice issued by King ,
They assert that "All good social scientists . . . report

estimates of uncertainty of their inferences" (1 994:

32).

They also caution

researchers that, "We can make a valid inference in almost any situation , no
matter how limited the evidence, . . . but we should avoid forging sweeping
conclusions from weak data" (p. 32).
Consistent with this advice, l close by using all three iterations of my
models to identify areas of certainty and u ncertainty. I begin by summarizing my
findings in regard to personal discrimination. I am very confident that salary (my
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measure of professionalism), electoral format (at-large vs. ward), and the quality
of race relations on the council are important and significantly related to whether .
black councilors say they have experienced discrimination.

There is also

evidence that gender, education, and the racial composition of the respondent's
constituency are related to perceived discrimination. However, this evidence is
not as strong and caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions about
these variables.
My models dealing with "working harder to gain respect" show that very
few independent variables are relevant.

The evidence here is less reliable

because the patterns are less pronounced across all three iterations. Ideology
and race relations on the council seem to be the most meaningful variables
because they are significant (or close to it) in several models . . Education may
also be of some consequence although it was only significant in one model.
As for black influence on city councils, many independent variables
matter. I am confident that electoral format and race relations on the council are
important because they are statistically significant in all three models. Other
variables may also be important, but this evidence is weak because the p values
for these variables are not consistently significant.

These variables include

region, district income, the mayor's race, and the racial composition of the
councilor's district. Hence, I am less certain that these relationships are real and
this finding underscores the need for future research on these relationships.
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Finally, I examined factors that relate to the likelihood of black councilors
interacting with the mayor compared to whites. My original model show that five
independent variable are significant (ideology, mayor's race, council size, salary,
and council race relations), but few of these relationships maintain themselves at
a statistically significant level in my subsequent iterations. I am fairly certain that
ideology and the quality of race relations matter because these variables were
significant in two of the three iterations. I am also confident that the mayor's race
matters.

This variable was highly significant in my original model and it

approached significance in another. I am skeptical of the remaining variables
(salary and council size) because their p values experienced large fluctuations
from one model to the next and they were not consistently significant.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

Context and Background

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 began a new era of political empowerment for
blacks in American politics by dismantling the system of barriers that had
effectively deprived them of the franchise.

The Act facilitated a substantial

increase in the number of black elected officials throughout the country, which, in
turn, provided scholars new research opportunities.

The first generation of

studies subtly extolled the value of descriptive representation and attempted to
identify aspects of a municipality's governmental structure that hampered or
facilitated the election of black councilors (e.g. , Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel
1978). More recently, scholars turned their attention to different issues as they
came to realize that the descriptive representation of minorities was virtually
assured. These scholars began inquiring about the goals of these newly elected
leaders and whether they could deliver · policy benefits to their constituents
(Combs, Hibbing, and Welch 1 984; Epstein and O'Halloran 1 999; Sharpe and
Garand 2001).
Despite these advances and the high quality of scholarship in this area,
there is still much to learn. Scholars have not adequately assessed the role
blacks play in legislative bodies and, with a few notable exceptions (Button and
Hedge 1996; Button, Richards, and Bethune 1998; Hedge, Button, and Spear
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1 996), they have devoted little attention to the barriers they face during the
cou rse of their service. This void is pronou nced at the local level of government
where there has been very few empirical studies that focus on black city
councilors once they begin serving their term of office . New forays into this area
are imperative because city cou ncils play a central role in the allocation of
ind ispensable commu nity services (police, fire streets, parks, refuse disposal
etc. ), and local legislative bod ies are qu ite distinct from their institutional
counterparts at the state and national levels of govern ment.

Therefore, my

dissertation has significant implications for the substantive representation of local
minority interests; and , it is important because our much of our existing
knowledge is not read ily generalizeable to the local context.

Summary of My Findings
My primary objectives were to describe and explain the quality of legislative life
experienced by black lawmakers who serve on mixed-race city councils in the
United States.

I conducted two nation-wide surveys to establish how city

councilors perceive the black legislative experience. I sent one survey to black
councilors and another to their white counterparts. The two instru ments were
similar in content and question wording so I cou ld compare the two grou ps'
personal profiles and perceptions.

1 71

My surveys reveal that black and white councilors share many attributes in
their backgrounds and personal profiles. Both groups are close in age, have
deep roots in their community, and hold their office for a similar length of time.
Both groups have a similar level of education and they both fall into the
"moderate" range on the political spectrum. These commonalties are important
because they could perhaps serve as a basis for interracial cooperation.
Unfortunately, pronounced differences (a potential source of friction) overshadow
these commonalties. Black councilors, who are overwhelmingly Democrats, tend
to represent economically disadvantaged constituencies with large black
populations.

By contrast, white councilors generally represent more affluent

constituencies with large white populations, and they are not fiercely loyal to the
Democratic Party like blacks (only 51.7% are Democrats).
Black councilors generally assess their legislative experience in positive
terms. Only about 8% say race relations are "poor" on their C(?Uncil; only 15. 9%
say black cou ncilors wield little or no influence; about two-thirds say they have
not personally experienced discrimination; only 14.3% say there is a "great deal"
of discrimination in committee assignments; and, over three-fourths say they are
satisfied with their committee assignments.

These findings evince that black

councilors are satisfied, successful, and generally operate in a collegial
legislative environment. Nevertheless, two items in my questionnaires suggest
that race still matters and that black councilors do not operate in a colorblind
environment. A majority of the black councilors say that race is used as a factor
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when leadership positions are awarded. And, over three-fourths feel that they
must work harder than whites to gain respect on their council .
Although black councilors are generally optimistic about their experience,
they still perceive their political environment very differently than whites. White
councilors almost always agree that their black colleagues' experiences are
positive and that they rarely encounter barriers such as discrimination and
impaired race relations.

These sentiments extend to all aspects of black

legislative life and they consistently appear in the "additional comments section"
at the end of my questionnaires. Here, the dominant theme expressed by whites
is that their council operates in a race-neutral manner where no invidious barriers
encumber their black colleagues' legislative process.

Many black councilors

concur with this assessment, but blacks are still more cynical than whites about
their standing on the council. The item about discrimination is an excellent
example of this contrast between the two sets of councilors. Approximately one
third of the black councilors say they either experienced or observed racial
discrimination, while only 2.4% of the white councilors acknowledge that
discrimination occurs.
Bivariate crosstabulations demonstrate that race is the primary factor
explaining the perceptual gap between the black and white respondents.
Although I controlled for intervening factors, even these factors only moderated
the effects of race. My crosstabulations show that the type of district that the
respondent represents (at-large vs. wards) and the racial composition of the
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councilor's constituency (majority-white vs. majority-black) have the most
discernable effect across the seven aspects of black legislative life that l
examined. Other factors were of lesser importance. The racial composition of
the council, the racial composition of the city, and gender condition the
councilors' responses, but only for certain aspects of black legislative life. Other
factors seem to be of little or no consequence including region, the governmental
format, city size, and the partisan nature of the council (partisan vs. nonpartisan).
Next, I developed a series of logit models that explain the variance in the
black councilors' perceptions (See Table 16. ). Different independent variables
are significant from one model to the next.

This suggests my dependent

variables are unique and that different factors are meaningful for various aspects
of the black legislative experience. My primary models also demonstrate that
contextual explanations eclipse individual explanations. Ideology and gender are
the only individual-level variables that are statistically significant in any of my
primary models. I n contrast, many contextual variables are significant i n one or
more of my primary models. These include region, salary, council size, electoral
format, the mayor's race, the racial composition of the councilor's district, a nd the
quality of race relations on the city council. This is important for policymakers
because they can change some of these contextual factors in an effort to
facilitate the black councilors' success (e.g. , council size, electoral format, and
the racial composition of the council).

Other variables-both individual and

contextual-are never of consequence in any of my primary models.

1 74

These

include age, edu cation, seniority, district income, and the proportion of blacks on
the cou ncil .
I prefer my primary models to rival formulations because they have a
strong ability to pred ict how the dependent variables are classified . However,
they still have two notable limitations.

First, missing data for some variables

undermine the inferential value of my data . Second , critics can argue that my
primary mod els are tautological because they include the quality of race relations
and d istrict income as independent variables.

Although I believe neither

limitation outweighs my model's usefulness, I omitted the variables that created
these problems and I reanalyzed my data. My revised models corroborate many
of my original find ings, but my results differ for some independent variables. I n
such cases, one must exercise caution when making inferences about these
variables, especially when a variable's p value changes profou ndly.
I compared the p values across all three versions my models to identify
areas of certainty and uncertainty. As a result, I am confident that salary (my
measu re of professionalism), electoral format (at-large vs. ward), and the quality
of race relations are important and significantly related to whether black
councilors say they have personally experienced discrimination.

Gender,

education , and the racial composition of the respondent's constituency may also
be important.

However, the relationsh ip between these variables and perceived

discrimination is not consistently significant so I am less certain that these
relationships are real.
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Few independent variables are significant in any of my models dealing
with the black councilors' perceptions about working harder to gain respect. I n
this context, race relations and ideology seem to be the most promising variables
because they are significant (or close to it) in several models. I am less certain
that education is of consequence because it was only significant in one model .
Many independent variables seem to be important in terms of black
influence on city cou ncils. I am confident that electoral format and race relations
help explain black influence because these variables are statistically significant in
all three models. I suspect that other variables may also be important, but I am
less certain of this because their p values are not consistently significant. These
variables include region , district income, the mayor's race, and the racial
composition of the councilor's d istrict.
Another important aspect of the black leg islative experience is the ability
of black councilors to interact with the mayor. My original model shows that five
independent variable are significant (ideology, mayor's race, council size, salary,
and council race relations).

Even so, few of these relationships maintain

themselves at a statistical ly significant level in my revised models. I a m fairly
certain that ideology and the quality of race relations matter because these
variables were significant in two of the three iterations. I am also convinced that
the mayor's race matters. This variable is highly significant in my original model;
it approaches significance in another; and strong intu itive logic supports the
existence of this relationship (i.e. , black councilors are more likely to interact with
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a black mayor). I am skeptical that a relationship exists betw�en the rema ining
varia bles (salary and council size) and the likelihood of black cou ncilors
interacting with the mayor, because their p values fluctuate greatly from one
model to the next.

Implications
My research has fa r reaching implications for local black lawmakers and the
constituents they represent. Specifically, it addresses an ongoing debate within
the civil rights community about how minorities should pursue political
empowerment. Most civil rights activists-advocates of the B EST-insist that the
key to black empowerment is the election of "authentic" black lawmakers who are
neither indebted to wh ite voters nor co-opted by the white establishment. These
activists believe that such lawmakers, by virtue of their personal experiences,
have a better appreciation of the black community's needs and can translate this
knowledge into policies that are especially beneficial to the black community.
They also assume that black lawmakers will be successful because the intimate
legislative setting, institutional rules, continuous voting opportun ities, and
ongoing relationships with colleagues promote accommodation.
I n contrast, Lani Guinier (1 994) criticizes the dominant strategy because it
does not guarantee blacks will be effective lawmakers.

She predicts that this

strategy will fail if whites are unwilling to treat their black colleagues as equals,
act in good-faith , and compromise. Therefore, she concludes that many black
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lawmakers become "token" representatives because they operate in a hostile

legislative environment that precludes them from being influential.

My findings suggest that the dominant view among civil rights activists is

more accurate than Lani Guinier's formulation.

Black lawmakers positively

assess many aspects of their legislative experience. Very few black councilors

say race relations are impaired; an overwhelming majority claim that blacks wield
"some" or "a lot" of influence; two-thirds say they have not experienced

discrimination; and three-fourth are satisfied · with their committee assignments.

In light of these findings, it appears that black councilors are generally satisfied

and successful lawmakers rather than tokens. These findings also imply that

most black lawmakers operate in a collegial environment where there is no

systematic effort to undermine black influence.

Race continues to play a meaningful role in the black legislative

experience although interracial cooperation appears to be the norm. A majority

of the black councilors say that race is used as a factor when leadership

positions are awarded. And, over three-fourths feel compelled to work harder

than whites to gain respect on their council. Black lawmakers may, therefore,

operate in a collegial environment, but this does not imply that their environment

is always a colorblind one. Furthermore, black and white councilors have very

divergent views concerning the black legislative experience. Although black
councilors are generally optimistic about their standing, they are still more cynical

than whites. Race remains the primary factor behind this perceptual gap even
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when I control for other relevant variables. This discrepancy between the two
groups suggests that whites may not fully appreciate the obstacles that their
black colleagues encou nter. If wh ite lawmakers have difficulty understand ing the
needs of their black colleagues, it fol lows that they do not fu lly appreciate the
needs of black citizens. If so, th is does not bode well when predominantly wh ite
cou ncils add ress "black issues" or consider policies that directly impact the black
community.
It is also importa nt to recognize that Guinier's argument is probably
meritorious for some jurisdictions ( See, e.g. , Kincaid 1 986). Over 30% of the
black councilors say they have experienced discrimination; 26.8% say they are
less likely to interact with the mayor than whites; 23.3% are dissatisfied with their
committee assignments; 1 4.3% say there is a great deal of discrimination in the
way committee assignments are awarded; 7 .9% report poor race relations; and
3.3% say blacks have no legislative influence. This evidence of marginalization
may be the exception rather than the rule, but that does not mean that the plight
of these councilors should be overlooked . It is important to recognize that these
individuals seem to operate in a hostile environment where their presence
provides black constituents with symbolic benefits rather than meaningful,
substantive influence.
U p to this point, I have focused on the big pictu re by broadly discussing
the quality of the black councilors' experiences. Now, I tu rn my attention to some
important details so I can further evaluate whether the BEST is a viable strategy
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for black empowerment. As the reader may recall, the essence of this strategy is
to elect authentic black leaders so they can deliver policy benefits to their black
constituents. Interestingly, my legit models show that increasing the proportion
of blacks on city councils has no appreciable effect on the quality of black
legislative life.

The proportion of blacks on the council is almost never

significantly related to any of the dependent variables including black influence
on the council. Thus, in a multivariate context, more descriptive representation
(quantity) does not necessarily translate into additional influence or a more
positive experience (quality). On the other hand, the presence of a black mayor
is clearly more important. I am fairly certain that black councilors are more likely
to interact with the mayor if the mayor is also black. There is also some evidence
(albeit weaker evidence) that a black mayor increases the likelihood that
respondents will say blacks are influential on their council.

These findings

suggest that a black mayor may be able to enhance the black lawmakers'
standing on the cou ncil and help them to become more intimately involved in
their mu nicipality's political affairs.
The BEST assumes that unfamiliarity produces prejudice. Therefore, it
predicts that intimate legislative settings will work to the advantage of black
lawmakers by helping them become acquainted with whites on a more personal
level. This ostensibly gives the black councilors an opportunity to showcase their
legislative skills and gives them more opportunities to build bridges. Hence, it
follows that the smaller the city council, the less likely blacks lawmakers are to
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experience discrimination. My logit models support this contention. As council
size decreases, respondents are less likely to say they have personally
experienced discrimination. This relationship is significant in my primary model
as well as my two revised versions. However, council size only seems to matter
in terms of personal discrimination and not for other aspects of the black
legislative experience.
As I just mentioned, the BEST assumes that black lawmakers will be
successful largely because they will be operating within the intimate setting found
in most legislative bodies. Although the amount of intimacy (measured in terms
of council size) reduces the likelihood of discrimination, the legislative setting
itself is no guarantee that blacks will be influential.

Guinier (1994) correctly

argues that the quality of race relations within the legislative body determines the
extent of minority political empowerment. My logit models clearly show that the
quality of race relations on the council is the most important contextual variable
explaining the variance in the quality of black legislative life. This variable is
significantly related to most aspects of black legislative life including the amount
of influence that black councilors wield. However, this finding only means that
there is a relationship between the race relations and the quality of black
legislative life. It does not imply that race relations are generally impaired on city
councils or that blacks tend to have a poor legislative experience.

181

Guinier (1994) observes that the main objective for most civil rights
activists is to elect authentic black lawmakers.

I ronically, despite the all

encompassing nature of this goal, activists pay surprisingly little attention to how
this goal is accomplished. I t seems they often accord the same weight to most
political and electoral strategies so long as the strategy in question produces the
desired result-black representation. H owever, the circumstances under which a
black councilor is elected are important and should not be overlooked.

My

crosstabulations as well as my logit models clearly and unequivocally show that
black councilors elected at-large have a better legislative experience than those
elected from wards.

At-large councilors, for example, are less likely to

experience discri mination and they are more likely to say that blacks are
influential on their council. Thus, descriptive representation should . be one of
many important considerations. The civil rights community needs to devote more
attention to the circumstances by which a black lawmaker ascends to office
because these circu mstances probably affect how satisfied and successful the
lawmaker will be once they begin serving . .
My suggestion that the civil rights community should consider the
circumstances under which black councilors are elected should not be
misinterpreted as an endorsement of at-large systems over ward systems. I t is
well-established that at-large districting arrangements make it more difficult for
black candidates to win election. Likewise, black councilors who are elected at
large in predominantly white cities, no doubt, ascended to their position because
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they ga rnered support from the white community.

However, these black

lawma kers may lack authenticity if they have embraced a deracialized strategy to
cu ltivate white su pport. For example, they might adopt a non-th reatening image,
embrace issues that appeal to the entire electorate , and avoid direct overtures
designed to mobil ize the black commu nity (Underwood 1 997). As the authors of
one seminal work observed, "it would be na"ive to think that black legislators and,
for that matter, black interests would somehow be better off if African-American
lawmakers . . . could become more like their wh ite counterparts" (Hedge, Button,
and Spear 1 996 : 96). In the end , more research is necessary to determine what
pre-electoral factors influence the experiences of black lawmakers after they
assume office.

Once researchers clarify what factors are important, the civil

rights community shou ld take these findings into account when pursu ing its
political objectives.
A related issue is whether civil rights activists should lobby for the creation
of majority-black wards to ensure black representation on city councils.

This

strategy is attractive because such wards virtually assu re the election of a black
lawmaker. However, some of my findings suggest that this strategy may also be
counterproductive. My crosstabulations show that the quality of black legislative
life (as reported by black councilors) is conditioned by the racial composition of
the respondent's constituency.

Blacks elected from majority-black wards are

more inclined to have a negative experience and encou nter more barriers in the
cou rse of their service. Nevertheless, my legit analysis calls into question the
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results of my crosstabulations. On several occasions the racial composition of
the lawmaker's district is significantly related to whether the councilor personally
experienced discrimination, but the relationship is in the opposite direction.
Mul ticolinearity is probably the culprit, but removing suspect variables from my
models does not reverse the relationship's direction. My mixed results clearly
underscore the need for future research on this important issue. I f majority-black
districts are indeed associated with a poor legislative experience, it would not be
prudent for the civil rights community to lobby for the creation of these districts if
their primary goal is substantive representation.
I n the end, the BEST may be a viable strategy for black empowerment in
some respects. I t correctly assumes that local legislative bodies are generally
collegial and that intimacy reduces discrimination.

Nevertheless, civil rights

activists must address some important shortcomings that are inherent in this
approach.

First, some black councilors (albeit a small proportion) operate in

hostile l eg islative environments where they encounter formidable barriers.
Second, increasing the proportion of blacks on the council neither enhances their
perceived influence nor improves the quality of their experience. Third, blacks
and whites have divergent perceptions about the black legislative experience.
This implies that whites may not fully appreciate the needs of their black
colleagues or the constituents they represent even when the black councilors
have presumably had an opportunity to sensitize white_s to these concerns.
Finally, BEST largely ignores the circumstances that bring a black candidate to
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office although these factors apparently affect their experience once they begin
serving.
Reg rettably, my critique raises more questions than it answers.

It

suggests that civil rights activists need to fundamentally rethink whether
descriptive representation should be their central focus. However, it does not
identify a rival strategy that is unequivocally superior to the BEST.

One

alternative is the use of influence districts as a means of black empowerment.
This appr�ach calls for the creation of wards where blacks wield some electoral
clout but not quite enough to hold a majority. This could enhance the overall
influence of the black commu nity by reducing the number of wards where blacks
enjoy sizeable majorities in favor of additional "influence" wards. This strategy
seems to be more likely than the B EST to induce wh ite legislators become
sensitive to the black community's needs because they have institutional
incentives to do so. Despite this benefit, the influence district strategy discounts
the value of descriptive representation because the black commu nity will not
always be able to elect its preferred candidate.
Another alternative, one advocated by Guinier (1 994 }, is the use of
"cu mulative" or "bullet" voting. Here, voters are allowed to cast the same number
of votes and this nu mber is equivalent to the number of available seats on the
cou ncil. The voters may cast all their votes for the same candidate or they may
distribute them among different candidates.

This strategy can prod uce

descriptive representation if the black community (which I presume is minority)
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votes as a cohesive bloc for a black candidate. I t also has the potential to
sensitize white councilors to the black community's· concerns if the black
community distributes its votes between some of the white candidates. However,
the success of this strategy · turns on a well-organized black community that
communicates to its members how they should vote. I t also assumes that white
candidates who receive electoral support from the black community will realize
that they are indebted to black voters. I f neither premise is valid, the strategy
may be ineffective.

Directions in Future Research

My dissertation has limitations that provide future researchers ample
opportunities to improve upon my work. Most importantly, my work is largely
descriptive and exploratory because not much is about my research topic.
Therefore, future researchers could make a substantial contribution by using my
research as a vehicle for developing a conceptually rich theory that explains the
black legislative experience. Structural or neoinstitutional theories are promising
since my logit models suggest that contextual factors have a greater impact on
the black legislative experience than individual ones. I n other words, the way
governments are arranged clearly plays an important role in the black legislative
experience.
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Another limitation is that I rely exclusively on perceptions to assess the
quality of black legislative life. Perceptions are, no doubt, important because
they most likely govern how the councilors behave.

Even so, my approach

leaves open the possibility that the respondents' views do not reflect the
objective conditions that exist on their city council.
passage

are

promising

although

they

Self-reported rates of bill

probably

measure

substantive

representation rather than the quality of black legislative life.

Committee

chairmanships might also be an appropriate variable to consider although doing
so can greatly reduce the number of observations in any multivariate model (only
one-third of city councils have committees). In sum, future researchers would
greatly contribute to our understanding of the black legislative experience in local
government by identifying and utilizing objective measures.
Future researchers could also improve upon my data collection
procedures. First, they should recognize that, aside from Census data, archival
sources containing basic information about city governments are either
incomplete or outdated. My failure to recognize this ultimately created missing
data problems that reduced the N in my legit models. It is therefore imperative
that researchers collect all necessary information in their initial surveys rather
than trying to obtain it from other sources. Second, researchers should be aware
that any large mailing list of city councilors probably needs to be updated. Most
organizations simply cannot do this because the number of municipalities is large
and they hold their elections sporadically. Researchers who fail to update their
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mailing list risk a low response rate because councilors who leave office are
unlikely to receive mail sent to them at city hall. Perhaps the best way to address
this problem is to use a stratified sampling technique where the researcher
randomly selects cities, assembles a list of the councilors from those cities
through phone calls to municipal clerks, then randomly chooses councilors from
this list. This technique might also be useful in generating a random sample of
white councilors since no list comprehensive list is currently available.
Another major obstacle that I confronted was the uniqueness of city
councils. The essence of this problem is captured in the age old debate between
nomothetic and idiographic researchers (See generally, Przeworski and Teune
1982). The idiographic scholars emphasize the importance of spatiotemporal
location and they argue that social systems are too unique to be compared (e.g. ,
Winch 1958: 133).

This ostensibly occurs because the characteristics or

variables within each social system interact to create a unique pattern that defies
comparison. I n contrast, nomothetic researchers believe that this problem can
su rmounted when the relevant variables are know and can be included in a
multivariate model where spurious relationships can be controlled.

I n such

instances, nomothetic scholars believe they are justified when drawing random
samples without regard to the respondent's group or subsystem (Przeworski and
Teune 1982).
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My research clearly implicates the idiographic-nomothetic debate since
city councils are very different from one municipality to the next. Some councils
are highly professional bodies with large staffs, high salaries, and permanent
committees, while others lack these attributes.

Some councils are organized

according to partisanship while others are not. Some councils are large while
others are relatively small. Consistent with the nomothetic tradition, I controlled
many of these variables in my logit models. Unfortunately, however, there were
other variables that I could neither tap with survey instrument nor quantify in my
statistical analyses. Most importantly, it was impossible for me to fully account
for the group dynamics and individual personalities on the various councils. To
some extent, I took these unquantifiable factors into consideration by utilizing
robust standard errors in conjunction with my logit models, but even this remedy
was not a perfect fix. As a result, the uniqueness problem may explain why I did
not find more statistically significant relationships in my data.

Given this

limitation, future researchers would make a valuable contribution by devoting
greater attention to this issue. Perhaps the most appropriate way to do this is to
conduct a small-N, qualitative study that narrowly focuses on group dynamics.
In closing, I wish to identify two additional topics that are worthy of
scholarly exploration. First, my research focused predominately on the barriers
that black councilors face during the course of their service. However, it would
greatly contribute to our knowledge if someone devoted more attention to
interracial cooperation and the extent that it occurs.
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Second, and more

importantly,. scholars would make a monumental contribution by · studying the
decision-making coalitions that ostensibly exist on city councils. Much of what
we know about legislative coalitions comes from formal theory rather than
empirical data (Banks 2000; Baron 1989; Bianco 1989; Groseclose and Snyder
1 996; Stratmann 1995). Thus, it would be informative to learn (1) whether these
coalitions are permanent or temporary, (2) the nature of the cleavages that the
coalitions center around (ideology, partisanship, issues, race, gender, etc.), and
(3) whether black councilors have been able to infiltrate these coalitions. This
information is critical because the incorporation of minorities into the dominant
coalition is thought to play a major role in the substantive representation of
minority interests (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).

I included some

coalition questions in my survey of black councilors, but these questions yielded
unusable data. I unwisely placed this section in the middle of my instrument so
many respondents skipped it, and my question wording apparently confused
some respondents. To avoid these problems, future researchers shou ld pretest
their instrument, clearly and succinctly define terms such as "coalition" and
11

voting bloc," and they should limit the length of their questionnaire so

respondents can concentrate on the individual questions.
I n the end, my dissertation goes far in filling a significant gap in the
literature and it greatly enhances our understanding of the black legislative
experience on city councils. H opefully, my efforts will spark a renewed interest in
the local race politics literature and entice scholars to conduct more research in
190

this area.

Clearly such research would be timely and necessary given the

limitations of my work and the topic's importance to black councilors and the
constituents they represent.

Perhaps my study will help future researchers

develop a conceptually rich theory that explains race relations within legislative
bodies or one that accounts for the quality of black legislative life. Such a theory
would, no doubt, be a monumental achievement and welcome contribution to the
literature.
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APPEN DIX A

QU ESTION NAIRE FOR BLACK COU NCILORS
A. Researchers know very l ittle about the amount of influence that
African-American legislators have i n city councils. Therefore,
we are very interested in your insights.
1. I n your opinion, how much influence do African-American legislators have in
your city council? (Please circle one answer)
1 A LOT
2 SOME
3 ONLY A LITTLE
4 NONE AT ALL
5 NO OPI NI ON
2. I n the past 10 years, have African Americans on your council become more
influential, less influential, or have they maintained the same amount of
influence?
1 MORE I NFLU ENTIAL
2 LESS I NFLUENTIAL
3 MAI NTAI NED THE SAME AMOU NT OF I NFLU ENCE
4 NO OPI NION
3. Are African-American council persons more likely, as likely, or less likely to
interact with the mayor i n comparison to their white cou nterparts?
1 MORE LI KELY
2 AS LIKELY
3 LESS LI KELY
4 NO OPINION
4. Would you agree or disagree that you, as an African-American, have to work
harder than your white colleagues to gain respect within your city council?
1 STRONGLY AGREE
2 AGREE
3 D I SAGREE
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE
5 NO OPI NION
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5. In your opinion, does a council-person's race influence his/her opportunities
to obtain leadership positions on the council?
1 NO
2 YES
3 NO OPINION
4 NOT APPLICABLE
B. Another i mportant pu rpose of this study is to understand the
quality of race relations in city councils.

6. In general, how would you describe the quality of black-white relations in your
city council?
1 EXCELLENT
2 GOOD
3 FAI R
4 POOR
5 NO OPI NION
7. Have race relations improved, stayed about the same, or deteriorated since
you were first elected to the city council?
1 I MPROVED
2 STAYEO ABOUT THE SAME
3 DETERIORATED
4 NO OPINION
8. Did anyone introduce legislation that, in your opinion, was overtly hostile to
African-Americans in the last legislative session?
1 NO
2 YES
lllli If "YES" please briefly describe the legislation below.
9. Can you think of one or more instances in which you personally experienced
some form of racial discrimination in your city council during the last
legislative session?
1 NO
2 YES, SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION
3 YES, OVERT DISCRIMINATION---------•
4 YES, BOTH SUBTL� AND OVERT DISCRIMINATION
lllli
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1t ·ve s," p lease
���e�i ��:��:on
s
you experienced.

1 0. Did you observe one or more instances of racial discrimination that occurred
against other members of your city council during the last legislative session?
1 NO
• It ..Yes," please
2 YES, SU BTLE DISCRI MI NATION
e
3 YES, OVERT DISCRI MI NATI ON --------� ��� �is�����:on
4 YES, BOTH SU BTLE AN D OVERT DI SCRI MI NATI ON -+ you experienced.

C. Next, we would like to ask you about policy issues that may be
important to African-Americans, the likelihood that these
policies will be adopted, and the barriers you might face i n
gain ing support for you r legislation.
1 1 . Please indicate how important each of the following issues is to your African
American constituents. (Please circle one answer for each issue)
Issue

Urban renewal
Jobs & economic opportunities
Housing
Public education
Police accountability
Public assistance
Representation in public office

VERY
IMPORTANT

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SOMEWHAT
IMPORTANT

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

NOT VERY
IMPORTANT

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1 2. I n your opinion, is it necessary to have African-American representatives on
city councils to ensure African-American concerns are addressed?
1 NO
2 YES
3 NO OPI N I ON
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1 3 . Do you feel that people are best represented in politics by leaders from their
own race, or do you feel that the leader's race does not make much
difference?
1
2

3

PEOPLE ARE BEST REPRESENTED BY LEAD ERS FROM TH EIR OWN RAC E
THE LEADER'S RACE DOES NOT MAKE MUCH D IFFERENCE
NO OPIN ION

1 4 . Please indicate whether your city council passed a policy favorable to African
Americans du ring its last legislative session for each of these different issues.
Issue
Urban renewal
Jobs & economic opportunities
Housing
Public education
Police accountability
Public assistance
Representation in public office

YES
2
2
2
2
2
2
2.

NO
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

I DON'T KNOW
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

1 5. How many ordinances did you introduce in the last legislative session? _
How many were passed into l aw? __
1 6. How many ordinances did you introduce that were especially important to
African-Americans du ring the last legislative session? ___
How many of these ordinances were passed into l aw? ____
1 7 . Overall, how difficult is it to persuade white members of the city council to do
each of the following?
NOT VERY
DIFFICULT

SOMEWHAT
DIFFICULT

VERY
DIFFICULT

NO
OPINION

b. Co-sponsor legislation that

1

2

3

4

Co-sponsor legislation that is
to
important
especially
African-Americans

1

2

3

4

a.

Vote for leg islation that you
favor
you would like to introduce

C.

1

21 1

2

3

4

1 8. How often do council members from each of the following groups support the
policies that you advocate?
VERY
OFTEN

NOT
APPLICABLE

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

NOT VIERY
OFTEN

OFTEN

2
2
2

3
3
3

1
1
1

2
2
2

1
1
1

2
2
2

Group

NEVER

Liberal Whites
Moderate Whites
Conservative Whites

1
1
1

Liberal African-Americans
Moderate African-Americans
Conservative African-Americans
Liberal Hispanics
Moderate Hispanics
Conservative Hispanics

4
4
4

5
5
5

D. Presently, researchers have limited knowledge about the role that
African-Americans play in legislative coalitions. You r insights
would g reatly enhance our understanding of this issue.
1 9.Do well-defined voting blocs exist on your council?
1 NO
• (Skip to Question 32)
------L
2 YES
.
20. How many of these voting blocs are there? ___

21 .Are you a member of one of these voting blocs?
1 NO
• (Skip to Question 23)
2 YES
22. I n your opinion, do
by your bloc?
1
2
3

you receive a fair share of the policy benefits distributed
NO
YES
NO OPI NION
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23. In your city council, is there a dominant voting bloc that usually controls what
policies are adopted?
1 NO
2 YES

24. What is the racial composition of the dominant voting bloc?

Number of People

African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .___

25. In your opinion, to what extent do the following characteristics influence one's
ability to become a member of the dominant voting bloc in your city council?
Characteristic
A member's race
A member's party affiliation
A member's ideology
The characteristics of a member's
district or ward
The member's policy preferences
Personal friendships with members of
the dominant voting bloc
Respect by a member's colleagues
The member's occupation outside the
council

A GREAT
DEAL

SOMEWHAT

N OT AT
ALL

NO
OPIN ION

26. Do you agree or disagree that this dominant voting bloc hinders the progress
of African-Americans in your city?
1 STRONGLY AGREE
2 AGREE
3 DISAGREE
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE
5 NO OPINION
27. How frequently does the dominant voting bloc accommodate the needs of the
city's African-American community?
1 VERY FREQUENTLY
2 FREQUENTLY
3 NOT VERY FREQUENTLY
4 NEVER
5 NO OPI N ION
2 13

28. How willing is the dominant voting bloc to accommodate the African-American
council-persons who are members of this bloc?
1 VERY WILLI NG
2 SOMEWHAT WI LLI NG
3 NOT VERY WI LLI NG
4 NO OPI NI ON
5 NOT APPLICABLE
29. ls there another voting bloc on your city council that competes with the
dominant bloc?
1 NOi---�
• (Skip to Question 32)
YES

!�-----2

30. Are you a member of this competing bloc?
1 NO
2 YES
31. What is the racial composition of the competing voting bloc?
Number of People
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --32 . Would you agree or disagree that African-Americans on your council must

vote as a unified
group to be successful?
.
1 STRONGLY AGREE
2 AGREE
3 DISAGREE
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE
5 NO OPI NI ON
6 NOT APPLICABLE
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33 . ls there a black caucus in your city council?
1 NO·------� (Skip to Question 36)
....------2 YES
1
34.
Question
Does your black caucus have officers?
Does your black caucus hold regular
meeti ngs?
Does your black caucus have a list of priorities
it hopes to pass into law?

NO
1
1

YES

I DON'T KNOW

1

2

3

2
2

3
3

35. I n your opinion, how much influence does your black caucus have in the
matters listed below?
NO
OPINION

NONE AT
ALL

VERY
LITTLE

SOME

2

3

Developing legislation

1

2

3

4

Passing legislation important to
African-Americans

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1

Committee assignments

Socializing new members

Helping
election

its

members

win
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E. Researchers know very l ittle about whether African-Americans
face barriers in city council committees. Therefore, we would
like to ask you about your committee experiences.

1------2

36 . Does your city council have permanent committees?
1 NO __________,. {Skip to Question 43)
YES

37. Overall, how satisfied are you with your committee assignment(s)?
1 VERY SATISFI ED
2 SATI SFI ED
3 DI SSATI SFI ED
4 VERY DI SSATISFI ED
5 NO OPI NION
38 . To what extent does racial discrimination prevent African-Americans from
obtaining the committee assignments they prefer?
1 A GREAT DEAL
2 SOME
3 NONE AT ALL
4 N O OPI N I ON
39.To what extent do the following characteristics influence committee
assig nments for African-Americans serving on your city cou ncil?
Characteristic

The member's
The member's
The member's
preferences
The member's

party affiliation
seniority
assignment
race

A GREAT
DEAL

SOMEWHAT

1
1
1

2
2
2

1

2
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NOT AT
ALL

NO
OPINION

3

4

3
3
3

4
4
4

40. To what extent do the following characteristics influence committee
assignments for whites serving on your council?
Characteristic
The member's party affiliation
The member's seniority
The member's assignment
preferences
The member's race

A GREAT
DEAL

SOMEWHAT

1
1
1

2
2
2

1

2

NOT AT
ALL

NO
OPINION

3

4

3
3
3

4
4
4

41 . What committees are most important to African-Americans on your city
council?
Most Important: _________________
Second Most Important: _____________
Third Most Important: ______________

42 . Please identify the committees on which you serve, how long have you
served , and whether you are the committee chairman or ranking opposition
· member.
Committee Name

# Of YEARS
ON THE
COMMITTEE
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COMMITTEE
CHAIR?

RANKING
OPPOSITION
MEMBER?

YES / NO

YES / NO

YES / NO

YES / NO

YES / NO

YES / NO

YES / N O

YES / NO

F. This section asks about your district and city.

43. Which of the following best describes your district or ward?
1 MAI NLY U RBAN
2 MAI NLY SUBURBAN
3 MAI NLY SMALL TOWN
4 MAI NLY RURAL
44. What is the approximate average annual family income in your district or
ward?
1 U NDER $20,000
2 $ 20,001 - $40,000
3 $40,001 - $60,000
4 $60,001 - $80,000
5 OVER $80,000
45.Approximately what percentage of your district or ward is comprised of
African-American, white, and Hispanic residents?
% in Your District or Ward
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .___

Number

46. How many people serve on your city council? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___
H ow many of these members are African-Americans? . . . . . . . . . ___
How many of these members are white? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___
H ow many of these members are Hispanic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___
47. Which statement best describes the political climate in your home district or
ward?
1 STRONGLY DEMOCRATI C
2 TWO PARTY COMPETITIVE
3 STRONGLY REPUBLICAN
4 OTHER {Please Specify): _____
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48 . How would you describe the quality of race relations in your city?
1 EXCELLENT
2 GOOD
3 FAI R
4 POOR
5 NO OPI NION
49 . In your opinion, how likely are the white voters in you r dty to support the
political objectives of the city's African-American community?
. 1 VERY LI KELY
2 SOM EWHAT L IKELY
3 NOT VERY LI KELY
4 NO OPI NION
50 . H as your city changed how it elects its council members due to a Voting
Rights Act lawsuit?
1 NO
2 YES
3 I DON 'T KNOW

G. Fi nally, we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself
for statistical purposes.

51 . What is you r gender?
1 MALE
2 FEMALE
52 . What year were you born? ___
53. Please indicate your highest level of education?
1 H IGH SCHOOL
2 SOM E COLLEGE
3 T ECHNICAL SCHOOL
4 COLLEGE DEGREE
5 GRADUATE OR PROFESS IONAL SCHOOL
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54. What is your principal occupation? ___________

55.About how long have you been a resident in the city in which you serve? _

56. How many years have you served on your city council? __
57. What is your political party identification?
1 DEMOCRAT
2 REPU BLI CAN
3 OTHER (Please Specify): ________
4 NONE
58. How would you describe your ideology?
1 VERY CONSERVATIVE
2 CONSERVATIVE
3 SLI GHTLY CONSERVATIVE
4 MODERATE-MIDDLE OF THE ROAD
5 SLIGHTLY LI BERAL
6 LI BERAL
7 VERY LI BERAL
59. Please indicate the frequency with which you do each of the following
activities in an average week while your city cou ncil is in session? (Check
one for each statement)
Activity
Speak on the floor
Speak in committee or sub-committee
Negotiate with other council members
Meet with wh ite council members
Meet with African-American council members
Meet with office holders not on the council
Meet with residents of your d istrict or ward

NEVER

220

1 -2
TIMES

3-1 0
TIMES

OVER 1 0
TIM ES

APPENDIX B
QU ESTIONNAIRE FOR WH ITE CITY COU NCILORS

A. Researchers know very little about the amount of i nfl uence that
African-American legislators have WITH IN city councils.
Therefore, I am very interested in your insights .
1 . I n your opinion, how much influence do African-American legislators have in
your city council? {Please circle one answer}
1 A LOT
2 SOM E
3 ONLY A LITTLE
4 NONE AT ALL
5 NO OPI N ION
2.

In the past 1 0 years, have African-Americans on your city council become
more influential, less influential, or have they maintained the same amount of
influence?
1
2
3
4

MORE INFLUENTIAL
LESS INFLUENTIAL
MAINTAINED TH E SAM E AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE
NO OPINION

3. Are African-American council-persons more likely, as likely, or less likely to
interact with the mayor in comparison to their white counterparts?
1 MORE LI KELY
2 AS LI KELY
rW hat is the mayor's race
3 LESS LIKELY
or ethnicity? -4 NO OPI N ION
4.

In your opinion , does a council-person's race influence his/her opportunities
to obtain leadership positions on the council?
1 NO
2 YES
3 NO OPIN ION
4 NOT APPLICABLE
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5. Would you agree or disagree that African-American councilmembers must
work harder than their white counterparts to gain respect within your city
council?
1 STRONGLY AGREE
2 AGREE
3 DISAGREE
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE
5 NO OPIN ION
6. Would you agree or d isagree that African-Americans on your city council
must vote as a unified group to be successful?
1 STRONGLY AGREE
2 AGREE
3 DISAGREE
4 STRONGLY DISAGREE
5 NO OPIN ION
B. Another important purpose of this study is to understand the
quality of race relations within city councils.

7. In general, ·how would you descri_be the quality of black-white relations in your
city council? (Please circle one answer)
1 EXCELLENT
2 GOOD
3 FAI R
4 POOR
5

NO OPI N I O N

8. Have race relations improved , stayed about the same, or deteriorated since
you were first elected to the city council?
1 I M PROVED
2 STAYED ABOUT TH E SAM E
3 DETERIORATED
4 N O OPINION
9. To what extent does racial discrimination prevent African-Americans from
obtaining the committee assignments they prefer?
1
2
3
4

A GREAT DEAL
SOME
NONE AT ALL
NO OPINION . . (My council doesn't have committees)
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10. Did anyone introduce legislation that, in your opinion, was overtly hostile to
African-Americans in the last legislative session?
1

NO
2 YES __�
lll-

If "YES," please briefly describe the
legislation below.

11 . Did you observe one or more instances of racial discrimination that occurred
against an African-American councilmember during the last legislative
session?
1

NO

2 YES, SUBT LE DISC RIM I NATION ------�
3 YES, OVERT DISCRI MI NATION-------�
4 YES, BOTH SUBTLE & OVERT DISCRIMINATI ON -+

lf "YES," please
briefly describe
the discrimination
you observed.

C. Next, I would like to ask you about some i mportant issues
concerni ng representation.

12. In your opinion, is it necessary to have African-American representatives on
city councils to ensure African-American concerns are addressed?
1

NO

2 YES
3 NO OPINION
13. Do you feel that people are best represented in politics by leaders from their
own race, or do you believe that the leader's race does not make much
difference?
1
2
3

PEOPLE ARE BEST REP RESENTED BY LEADERS FROM TH EIR OWN RACE
THE LEADER'S RACE DOES NOT MAKE MUCH DI FF ERENCE
NO OPIN ION
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D. This section asks about your city and district.

1 4. How would you describe the quality of race relations in you r city?
1
2
3
4
5

EXCELLENT
GOOD
FAI R
POOR
NO OPI N ION

1 5. I n your opinion, how likely are white voters in your city to support the political
objectives of the city's African-American commu nity?
1 VERY LIKELY
2 SOMEWHAT LIKELY
3 NOT VERY LIKELY
4 NO OPI N ION

1 6 . Has you r city changed how it elects its council members due to a Voting
Rights Act lawsuit?

1 NO
2 YES
3 I DON 'T KNOW

1 7. Which of the following best describes you r district or ward?
1 MAI N LY URBAN
2 MAI N LY SU BU RBAN
3 MAI N LY SMALL TOWN
4 MAI N LY RURAL

If elected at
large, please
answer using
your city as
your refrence
point

1 8. What is the approximate average annual family income in you r district or
ward?
1 U N DER $20,000

2 $20,001 - $40,000
3 $40,001 - $60,000
4 $60,001 - $80,000
5 OVER $80,000

1 9. Which statement best describes the political climate in your home district or
ward?
1 STRONGLY DEMOCRATIC
2 TWO PARTY COMPETATIVE
3 STRONGLY REPUBLICAN
4 OTHER (Please specify): ______
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20. Approximately what percentage of your district or ward is comprised of
African-American, white, and Hispanic residents?
% in your district or ward
African-Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___%
Hispanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___%
Whites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___%
Number
21. How many people serve on your city council? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .___
How many of these members are African-Americans? . . . . . . . . .___
How many of these members are white? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .___
How many of these members are Hispanic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .___

E. Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about yourself
for statistical purposes.

22. What is your gender?
1 MALE
2 FEMALE
23. What year were you born? 1 9 _ _
24. Please indicate your highest level of education.
1 HIGH SCHOOL
2 SOME COLLEGE
3 TECHNICAL SCHOOL
4 COLLEGE DEGREE
5 GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL SCHOOL
25. What is your principal occupation? _________
26. About how long have you been a resident of the city in which you serve?
27. How many years have you served on your city council? ___
28. Were you elected by a ward/district within your city, or by the city as a whole?
1 ELECTED BY A WARD OR DISTRICT
2 ELECTED BY THE CITY AS A WHOLE
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29. What is your political party identification?
1 DEMOCRAT
2 REPUBLICAN
3 OTHER (Please specify): __
4 NONE
30. How would you describe your ideology?
1 VERY CONSERVATIVE
2 CONSERVATIVE
3 SLI GHTLY CONSERVATIVE
4 MODERATE-MI DDLE OF THE ROAD
5 SLI GHTLY LI BERAL
6 LI BERAL
7 VERY LI BERAL
31 . How many ordinances did you introduce in the last legislative session? _
How many were passed into law? __
32. How many ordinances did you introduce that were especially important to
African-Americans during the last legislative session? __
How many of these ordinances were passed into law? __
33. Please indicate the frequency with which you do each of the following
activities in an average week while your city council is in session? (Check
one for each statement}
Activity
Speak on the floor
Speak in committee or sub-committee
Negotiate with other council members
Meet with white council members
Meet with African-American council members
Meet with office holders not on the council
Meet with residents of your district or ward
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NEVER

1 -2
TIMES

3-1 0

TIMES

OVER 1 0
TIMES

APPENDIX C
CITY CLERK QUESTIONNAIRE

A. The following questions ask about the overall structure of your
municipality's government.

1.

2.

Please ind icate your current form of government as defined by you r charter,
ordinance, or state law. (Please circle one answer)

1

Mayor-Council-An elected council serves as the legislative body.
The ch ief elected official (e.g., the mayor) is the head of government,
holds significant administrative authority, and is usually elected
separately from the cou ncil.

2

Council-Manager-An elected council and chief elected official (e.g. ,
Mayor) are responsible for policy making , but a professional
ad min istrator is appointed to ru n the government's day-to-day
operations.

3

Commission-Mernbers of a board of elected commissioners serve
as the heads of specific departments and collectively sit as the
legislative body of the government.

4

Town Meeting-Qualified voters convene to make basic policy and to
choose a board of selectmen . The selectmen and elected officers
carry out the policies establ ished by the govern ment.

5

Representative Town Meeting-Voters select citizens to represent
them at the town meeting. All citizens may attend and participate in
debate, but only the representatives may vote.

Does your municipality have a chief appointed offician (i.e. , city manager,
city ad ministrator, chief administrative officer, town ad ministrator, village
manager, or a similar title).

1 Yes
2 No ____
• (If "No," skip to Question 4)
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3.

I f your municipality has a chief appointed official, who appoints this
individual?
1 The chief elected official
2 The council
3 Combination of the chief elected official & council
4 Other (Please specify) _____

4.

Who is responsible for developing and making recommendations for the
budget submitted to the council?
1
2
3
4
5

The chief elected official
The chief appointed official
A combination of the chief elected and appointed officials
The chief financial officer
Other (Please specify) ______

5.

Are department heads elected or appointed?
.,. (If "Elected," skip to Question 7)
1 Elected
2 Appointed
3 Some elected and some appointed

6.

I f any of your department heads are appointed, who appoints them?
1
2
3
4
5

The chief elected official
The chief appointed official
A combination of the chief elected and appointed officials
The council
Other (Please specify) _____

B. Next, I would like to ask you some important questions about
your m unicipality's chief elected official (this person usually
holds the title "mayor," "president," or "board chair."

7.

How is your chief elected official selected? (Circle only one.)
1 The voters elect directly
2 The council selects from among its members
3 Council members rotate into the position
4 The council members with the most votes in the general
election wins the position
5 Other (Please specify) ____
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8.

Is the chief elected official in your municipality officially full-time or part-time?
1 Full-time
2 Part-time

9.

Is the chief elected official a member of the city council?
1 Yes
2 No

1 0. Under what circumstances does the chief elected official have the authority
to vote in council meetings?
1 On all issues
2 Only to break a tie
3 Never
4 Other (Please specify.) ____
1 1 . Does the chief elected official have the authority to veto council-passed
measures?
1 Yes
�
2 No
� If so, can the council overturn a
veto with a "super majority" vote?
D Yes,

D No

1 2. Does the chief elected official have the authority to: (Circle all applicable)
1
2
3
4
5

Assign council members to chair or serve on committees
Appoint citizens to advisory boards, commissions, etc.
Make an annual report to the council and citizens on the state of the community
Initiate the hiring and/or involuntary termination of the chief appointed official
Receive the annual budget developed by the chief appointed official and present it with
comments and suggestions to the council for consideration

1 3. How many staff work directly for the chief elected official?
Full-time staff:
Part-time staff:
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C. Finally, I would like to ask you some questions about your
municipal cou ncil (some mu nicipalities call it the "board of
selectmen," "board of trustees," or "board of aldermen."

1 4. Does the political party affiliation of council candidates appear on the ballot
in a local general election?
1 Yes
2 No
1 5 . How many positions (or seats) are there on your council? __ (Include
the chief elected official only if that person is an actu al member of the
council)
1 6. How many current council members fall into the following age groups? (The
total number _should equ al the number in Question 1 5 unless there are
vacant seats on the council)
Under 22 -22 to 29 --

30 to 39 -40 to 49 --

50 to 59 --60 and over

1 7 . How many of your current council members are:
Male: -Female:
1 8 . How many council members are selected by the following methods?
Elected At-Large: ___
Elected by Ward or District: ___
1 9 . Was _________ elected at-large or by a district or ward?
1 Elected at-large
2 Elected by a district or ward
20. How many incumbents ran for reelection to the council in the last general
election? __ How many of these incumbents were reelected? __
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21. How many current council members are in each of these occupational
categories? (Count memqers only once. If any member has more than one
occupation, include that person in the category where he/she spends the
greatest amount of time).
_
_
_
_
_

Lawyers
Other professionals (medicine, etc. )
Business executives/managers
Business/industry employees
Service industry employees
Farmers and ranchers

Homemakers
_ Teachers & education personnel
_ Clergy
_ Retired persons
Other

22. Indicate the length of term for council members?
A. Council members elected at-large: .
D 2 Years, D 3 Years, D 4 Years, D 6 Years, D Other:

---

B. Council members elected from districts or wards:
D 2 Years, D 3 Years, D 4 Years, D 6 Years, D Other: ___

23. Are terms of office for the council staggered or concurrent?
1 Staggered
2 Concurrent

24. Is there a legal limit to the number of terms a council member may serve?
1 Yes
2 No

If "Yes," what is the maximum
number of terms a council
member may serve? ___
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25. How often does the council meet in formal session?
1 More than once a week
2 Once a week
3 Three times a month
4 Twice a month
5 Once a month
6 Less than once a month
7 Other (Please specify) ______
26. How many staff are employed by the council to work exclusively on council
business?
Full-time staff: --Part-time staff:
27. Are any council members (excluding the chief elected official) paid an
annual salary or stipend for any of their services?
� ��s �
If "Yes," please indicate the
approximate annual dollar amount that
your council members receive.
Full-time council member $ __
Part-time council member $ __

28. Does your municipality have a provision for a legislative referendum? (a
process where the council places any question on the ballot for voter
approval or rejection)
1 Yes
2 No
29. Does your council have standing committees (permanent bodies with set
memberships and regularly scheduled meetings) that consider specific
policy matters?
1 Yes
,
2 No
� .--------------.
If "Yes," approximately how many
standing committees did the council
have as of January 200 1 ? _._
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